

# THE LIVING AGE



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## THE GUIDE POST

IF THIS issue of *THE LIVING AGE* contains a greater proportion of serious articles than usual, it is because we must reflect the mood of the world's press. Armageddon may, or may not be, just around the corner, but magazines and newspapers abroad have been more pre-occupied with war than at any time since the fall of 1935.

'JAPAN'S Way with the Vanquished,' our first group of articles, might be called a 'design for living' for those peoples who fall under Japanese rule. It is the fate China must expect if she succumbs. The excerpt from an article by William Teeling on the way Japan has 'pacified' Formosa recalls Wang Lung's device for pacifying his uncle in *The Good Earth*. A. Morgan Young, a British journalist who was expelled from Japan, continues the theme in his article, 'More Drugs for China.' [p. 290] Ralph Morton, who is an authority on Manchukuo, offers what may be regarded as a fair balance-sheet of Japanese control in his survey, 'Manchuria: After Six Years.' [p. 292]

IN ETHIOPIA, Spain and China, the airplane has proved to be the most diabolical of man's playthings. And since the massacres that have taken place recently are only a sample of what will happen when Great Powers collide, we must wonder if there is any hope at all for teeming civilian populations in modern war. Cannot International Law do anything to end, or to restrain, this menace to humanity? This question is answered in the article, 'Modern War and the Civilian,' by Sir John Fischer Williams, one of Great Britain's outstanding international lawyers. [p. 295]

WHILE the tension between the Powers in the Western Mediterranean has been

rather well reported in the American press, the same cannot be said of the feud between Italy and Great Britain in the Levant. Our group entitled 'In the Troubled Mediterranean' has been designed to clear up some of the obscurity in that quarter. Four brief but informative articles from German, Swiss, French and Austrian sources deal with various aspects of the rivalry. [p. 299]

JAPAN feels about Vladivostok as the British do about the delta of the Scheldt—that it is a pistol pointed at her head. Now that her Army, Navy, industry and transport are on a war footing, there are creditable rumors that the Japanese military leaders wish to take advantage of the disturbed conditions within the Soviet Union by seizing Vladivostok. The Red Army, which they would have to overcome in such an attempt, is described in the article, 'Is Russia Ready?' [p. 309]

ALREADY there are challenges to Britain's right to hold so much of the earth and its resources; before long there may be challenges to her power to hold her vast Empire. As yet her navies have not 'melted away,' but A. M. Carr-Saunders, the noted expert on population, points out in the article 'Only 4,000,000 Englishmen!' [p. 314] that her manpower will melt away very rapidly after 1970 unless the birth-rate rises. Sir John Marriott, the historian, deals with the corollary problem of the 'Under-garrisoned Dominions,' and warns Australia, especially, of her peril. [p. 317]

OCCIDENTALS sometimes kill each other for the sake of honor, but seldom themselves. Suicide according to Bushido, the Samurai code of honor, is difficult for the Westerner to understand. Alan Gresh-

(Continued on page 376)

# THE LIVING AGE

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## The World Over

IS WORLD DEMOCRACY'S five-year retreat about to become a rout? Certain it is that the rapid progress of the 'lawless' forces will not be halted by warnings or threats. So much is clear from the events of recent weeks. Since President Roosevelt called for a 'quarantine' of the aggressors on October 5th the following victories have been chalked up for the anti-democratic Powers:—

Great Britain and France have abandoned the Spanish Loyalists to their fate;

Soviet Russia, which has coöperated wholeheartedly with the democracies, has been virtually isolated;

Italy has joined German-Japanese anti-Communist alliance, which has been proclaimed a World Anti-Communist Front to which other nations are invited to adhere;

Brazil has become an undisguised dictatorship that is to be reorganized as a Corporative State;

The Brussels Conference on the Sino-Japanese conflict has given evidence only of its powerlessness to restrain Japan;

Conservative elements have persuaded the British Cabinet to begin dickering privately with Germany on the colonial question—a confession of weakness that invites a new snub, as a satisfactory basis for compromise has not been prepared;

France, under the tacit or express threat that Japanese forces might occupy the Chinese Island of Hainan, has curbed the shipment of

arms and munitions through Indo-China to the sorely-pressed Chinese.

To this list there may soon be added other setbacks to democracy, for certain Latin-American and European nations may jump on the anti-Communist bandwagon. Most serious would be defections to Berlin and Rome along the Danube, a question that is discussed by two able writers elsewhere in this issue.

It is hardly necessary to add that the name of the World Anti-Communist Front is misleading—that anti-Communism is only a screen for attempts on the part of the aggressive Powers to win strategic, territorial and material objectives by blackmail or force.

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WHENEVER THE BRITISH CABINET has contemplated action in support of its policies during the past two years it has been restrained by warnings from the military and naval experts that 'we are not ready.' Since Britain's decisions depend so largely on her strength, let us examine the progress that has been achieved on her rearmament program. It was begun almost a year ago. Much of the work thus far has been concerned with enlarging the productive capacity for making armaments. A part of this phase, it seems, is nearing completion, but some of the large construction projects, especially ordnance foundries and shops, are only in the early stages of erection. Five capital ships have been laid down, but battleship building is a lengthy process and they will not be completed until 1941 or later. The greatest progress has been made in aircraft construction and in the rather negative direction of providing London with parks of anti-aircraft guns. Improvements in the Army, in both enlistment and equipment, have been slow; and it may be necessary to resort to conscription. In all branches of rearmament there has been difficulty in obtaining skilled labor. Public opinion is overwhelmingly behind the rearmament program, but the Labor press has never ceased to complain that the Government's methods of limiting profits from rearmament are inadequate. From these facts it is fair to conclude that Great Britain is not much stronger than she was in January, 1937. Relatively, she may be no stronger at all, because Germany and Italy were already producing armaments at a high tempo when Britain made her decision to 'catch up.'

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COMMENT ABROAD on the Wall Street slump has failed to disclose any important factors that our own analysts have overlooked. It is interesting, however, to note where the emphasis has been placed by several of the foreign experts. Frédéric Jenny, the strictly orthodox financial editor of the *Paris Temps*, does not neglect other causes but stresses the New Deal's 'merciless partisanship of wages against profit.' Another French economist, writing in *Europe Nouvelle*, draws two les-



sons from the Wall Street 'krach.' He finds, first of all, that no matter how powerful economically a nation may be, it cannot isolate itself from the rest of the world. The United States has suffered repercussions from the conflict in the Far East and the tension in Europe in spite of the width of the Oceans. Other nations, in turn, have suffered repercussions from the slump in Wall Street, and this has been true even of the totalitarian countries, which have been forced to draw upon their capital. The second lesson this writer draws is that statesmen who are supported by the free ballots of all their people are no more able than dictators who rule by force to adopt sensational economic measures without paying the penalties prescribed by the laws of economics.

The London *Economist* ventures, in its usual manner, to tie up the Wall Street slump with the international situation:—

The economic factors are very much better than in 1929. But the international political situation is incomparably worse. It is questionable whether the world can afford even a minor setback to economic recovery at a time when political tension is already almost unbearable.

Relaxation of this tension thus becomes an economic as well as a political imperative. Every finger, economic as well as political, points to the single conclusion: it should be the supreme task of Governments, in the interests of prosperity no less than of peace, to bring the present international uncertainties to an end. Any expenditure of courage and resolution to this end will be paid most directly in cash, as well as in the peace and liberty of mankind.

Douglas Jay, the astute financial editor of the London *Daily Herald*, is not greatly disturbed and suspects that President Roosevelt is ready to adopt drastic reflationary measures 'at once' if a depression really threatens. His view is that:—

Ever since March, 1933, American recovery has moved in upward surges of four or five months, followed by stagnant periods just about as long. My guess is that we are almost through another stagnant period.

May he be right!

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THE THEORY THAT CAPITALISM is drawing its last breath in Nazi Germany received a black eye in October when the last of the shares in the Dresdner Bank owned by the State were sold to private owners for 135,000,000 marks. About a year ago the Nazi Government owned 70 per cent of the capital of the Commerz- und Privat-Bank and 90 per cent of that of the Dresdner Bank. Since that time shares worth 302,000,000 marks have been restored to private ownership. This 'de-socialization' of the German banks has taken place despite the bank socialization plank which has always been included in the Nazi Party program. Cash for rearmament seems to have been regarded as a more pressing motive than Party theory.

SINCE THE BEGINNING of Nazi rule the persecution of Jews has been more severe in East Prussia than in any other part of the Reich, possibly excepting Silesia. An example: bakeries were forbidden by Party headquarters in Königsberg to sell bread to non-Aryans. However, business is business! During the preparations for the recent Eastern Fair at Königsberg, at which a great number of foreign visitors, including important Jewish buyers, were expected, the Nazi Party hastily, but only temporarily, changed its policy. The following notice was sent to the members of the Königsberg Hotel and Restaurant Association:—

Re Jewish businessmen at the Eastern Fair:

The district propaganda leader of the National Socialist Party has forwarded the enclosed letter to us. In accordance with that letter, all existing decrees to the effect that Jews may not be accommodated and served by Aryan establishments are repealed for the period August 12 to August 20, 1937.

Heil Hitler!

Erich Nothmann, Local District Leader

The enclosed letter:—

This year a number of Jews from abroad will attend the Eastern Fair in order to conclude trade and sales agreements for their respective countries. *For special reasons* it is necessary to provide these foreigners with accommodations in Königsberg hotels and boarding houses. The Hotel and Restaurant Association has therefore received notice requiring the removal of all signs reading 'Jews not admitted' during the given period in Königsberg hotels and restaurants, and in all neighboring resorts and places which will presumably be visited by Jews during the Fair.

All Party officials and members and all municipal officials—including the Mayor and the Prefect of Police—also received copies of this letter.

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ITALIANS ARE HAVING TO GO DEEPER into their pockets to pay for their huge armaments, reclamation projects, the never-ending drain of Ethiopia and intervention in Spain. Moreover, this year's unfavorable trade balance will be the largest since 1930, and it will not be offset by 'invisible income' from abroad to anywhere near the extent it was seven years ago. In its extremity the Italian Government has already reconverted most of the war debt at 5 per cent instead of 3½, and has issued a compulsory loan for subscription. Its latest and most drastic measure to meet a prospective deficit of \$200,000,000 was announced in October—a 10 per cent levy on the capital of joint-stock companies. The London *Times* remarks: 'A non-recurring capital levy may be resorted to in order to redeem a non-recurring capital liability, but a capital levy for budget purposes is one of the worst forms of finance.'

'ON DECEMBER 12,' states a *Pravda* editorial, 'our whole country will go to the polls not only to vote in the candidates to the Supreme Council, but also to say wholeheartedly and joyously: "We are for Lenin's and Stalin's Party."' That, in brief, is the purpose of the Soviet Elections. It will be another mammoth demonstration designed to express the people's endorsement of the Stalin régime. This endorsement will not be shown merely by voting in the accredited candidates—since there is no opposition and therefore no alternative—but by the number of voters. In order to 'get out' the maximum vote, the Constitution has been translated into all dialects; registration has been simplified; enthusiasm-raisers will be sent to all election districts; and voting facilities will be provided not only in normal places, but also in hospitals, on board Soviet ships, in the Arctic settlements and even in the railway stations.

But are the elections only a demonstration? The Soviet papers call the elective laws the most democratic in the world, disregarding the iron-clad restrictions on the candidates. The Paris *Matin* asserts that the elections are only a preliminary to Stalin's proclamation of himself as Lord Protector, as a Russian Cromwell. But even *Poslednie Novosti*, the Russian émigré daily in Paris, grudgingly admits that the Elections represent to some degree 'the dictator's attempt to come into closer contact with the masses.' It points to the fact that although the people are not allowed to nominate a candidate unacceptable to the Government, they are at least given an opportunity to refuse to nominate a local Communist who has shown over-bureaucratic tendencies. It is also significant that the slogan of the campaign has been 'Come closer to the non-Party masses.' Editorial after editorial in both the *Izvestia* and the *Pravda* has insisted that the Communist organizations work hand in hand with the non-Party members and advance only those candidates who are acceptable to them. And among the thousands of nominations published daily, the number of simple workers, who may have won renown as Stakhanovites but who are not connected with the Party, may surpass that of Communists.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S TOLERANT ATTITUDE toward racial minorities has been regarded as one of the most enlightened characteristics of the régime. The Kremlin, and even many foreign observers, believed that in time this liberal policy would result in a real sense of unity based on a common political faith between the central government and the Republics of the U. S. S. R. The trend of recent purges, however, indicates that this belief has been ill-founded, for in six of the eleven 'Union' republics and in three of the autonomous republics there has been found such evidence of the hated 'bourgeois nationalism,' tending

even toward separatism, that drastic action has been taken against highly-placed leaders. The Soviet press lists the following units as being 'infected:' the Federal Republics of the Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Tajikistan, and the autonomous Republics of Karelia in the North, Dagestan in the South, and Bashkiria in the Urals.

In many cases the officials involved have committed suicide. Among them was Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine. Just two months before he took his own life he demanded the elimination of traitors and 'hostile elements' in a speech before the Soviet Central Executive Committee in the Kremlin. The secret police have since exposed a number of flourishing nationalist and separatist groups among the Ukrainians. In White Russia, where Chervyakov, head of the Central Executive, also committed suicide, all the high officials from the 'Premier' down have been dismissed and denounced. And since these officials have disappeared it is presumed that they have been placed in strict confinement, if not executed. From the other 'infected' Republics there have come similar reports.

Separatism, or 'counter-revolutionary activity,' as it is more often called in Russia, now ranks as one of the principal causes of the purges, along with Trotskiism, sabotage and espionage.

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REPORTS FROM GREECE continue to be contradictory, but as we weigh their evidence without prejudice, we are struck by a significant fact—that writers who report favorably on the régime have invariably been 'entertained' by those in power and have not gone among the people, while those who report unfavorably have lived and talked with the common people. What these unchaperoned foreign observers have seen and heard leaves little reason to doubt that atrocities comparable to those of Machadist Cuba are being committed. Political prisoners and suspects have been murdered, brutally beaten, criminally assaulted, tortured and sometimes forced to take fatal doses of castor oil. The number of persons who have been sent to the penal islands for real or alleged opposition is said to exceed 13,000.

The evidence that German influence is predominant in Greece is less convincing at present, but there is reason to believe that under German pressure the country's military stores have been depleted to aid General Franco.

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ALTHOUGH JAPAN is an ally of Germany, we have noted that the German press has been cautious in its predictions about the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War. The risks which Japan is taking are seldom

stressed, but the following quotation from the *Deutsche Webr*, the organ of the German General Staff, is an exception:—

It has been maintained time and again that Japan would ultimately win. A more cautious appraisal, however, offers no basis for such a conclusion. The Japanese Government declares that it does not want to fight against China, that it is not conducting a war, and insists that it is willing to pursue a policy of moderation. Japan is only interested, it is asserted, in keeping out Communism and in coöperating with the peoples of China and Eastern Asia. Such statements have not impressed the Chinese. They believe that time works for them, and that the longer the war lasts, the better are their chances of winning. It is impossible to turn the whole of China into a battlefield. But wherever the fighting may be, the Chinese are more familiar with the terrain and also more inured to hardship than the Japanese.

We cannot fail to compare the present conflict with Napoleon's campaign in Russia in 1812. The Japanese may march into China at various points, they may gain a foothold here and there, they may seize fragments of territory—but there will always remain the immense country, invincible, with a superabundant population, filled with irreconcilable hatred for the Japanese.

This view, which is that of German Staff officers who have had experience in the Far East, will give hope to the friends of China. It is based, however, on the assumption that the Chinese can employ guerrilla tactics with success. In attempting to do so, they face tremendous odds because Japan controls the air, and the airplane has made Fabian and guerrilla tactics far less effective than they once were.

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AT A TIME when China and Japan are impoverishing themselves by fighting a costly war, experts attending the Far East Rural Hygiene Conference in Java reveal that 75 per cent of the population of Asia is undernourished. The seriousness of this problem is emphasized by the fact that while the population continues to increase rapidly, the fertility of the soil is gradually diminishing, because in nearly all parts of the Orient the people take everything from the soil and put nothing back. It was the conclusion of the conference that measures to improve the condition of the peasant, to educate him and to make him healthier and happier must be seriously handicapped or fail altogether as long as he is underfed.

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SEEN IN THE LARGE, Premier Lyons's victory in the Australian elections was a victory for Empire policy; Labor's defeat, a blow to isolationism and high tariffs. In regard to defense, finance and tariffs, the link with the Empire is not only to be maintained but strengthened.



Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and North China provide warnings of the treatment China must expect at the hands of the Japanese if she is conquered.

## Japan's Way *with the Vanquished*

Soon after Japan took over Formosa, she began to permit a drug traffic to be carried on in the island, but the traffic was sufficiently controlled to prevent most of the ordinary Chinese working classes from getting the drugs. The people who were encouraged to take drugs were the sons of the wealthy Chinese upper classes; this policy has been pursued, however unofficially, in Manchukuo in recent years, and no doubt will be continued in other parts of China. The object is to undermine the better-class Chinese and gradually to get rid of families that might be leaders in opposi-

tion. Another method used in Formosa is to make it difficult for better-class Chinese children to get a higher education. When the children grow up, everything is done to prevent their parents starting them up in businesses of their own; and if it is a question of their succeeding to family businesses, it is again made indirectly difficult for them. As a result, I found several Chinese families of good position in Formosa with no sons; later on I met the sons scattered about in different parts of China, where they were trying heroically to get a fresh start in life.

—William Teeling in the *Spectator*, London

### I. MORE DRUGS FOR CHINA

By A. MORGAN YOUNG

From the *New Statesman and Nation*, London Independent Weekly of the Left

WHEREVER the Japanese Army goes, morphia and cocaine follow. They may be regarded as aids to pacification; they are certainly esteemed as producers of revenue. It is a subject

that has never received the attention in England that it deserves. When the Opium Committee of the League of Nations meets at Geneva, there are sometimes awkward questions which

greatly astonish the Japanese delegate, who promises to make inquiries and assures the Committee that there is nothing nearer the heart of his Government than the suppression of the drug traffic. But, alas! his Government finds it as difficult to trace the traffickers in drugs as to discover the shooters of ambassadors. An occasional stoker or steward is caught with the goods on him and sent to prison for a short term, but the bigger men never seem to get caught.

At one of these Geneva meetings, Mr. Sugimura Yotaro frankly confessed that the evidence was damning, but promised that something should be done. 'We are a nation of Samurai; with us honor is more important than anything else,' quoth he. But honor, after all, was not so important as revenue, and the trade has gone on increasing.

In the twenty miles between Osaka and Kyoto alone the present writer has counted more than a hundred fields glorious with great white opium poppies; but the chief places of production are now Korea and Formosa. In Formosa coca is also grown and cocaine manufactured.

It is only natural that this trade should be associated with corruption. The Dairen Opium Monopoly has been the center of repeated scandals, in which men of eminence are involved but never punished. Mr. Hoshi, a manufacturing chemist who had a high idea of the value of his services to the State as the first manufacturer of alkaloids on a commercial scale, was fined a million yen for irregularities in his opium imports, but was excused the fine on appeal. In ports where Japanese, on the grounds of the importance of Japanese interests, have

managed to get into the Customs service, it has always been easy to contrive the illicit import of drugs from Japan.

It would be exaggerating the case, perhaps, to describe morphia as a major factor in Japan's China policy, but it is unquestionably an important one. When Manchukuo was created, there was some doubt as to whether Jehol should be included, and it was notable that, for some time preceding the conquest of that Province, a campaign went on in the Japanese press, in which an excessive bitterness and scorn were expressed over 'the Opium Province.' The common charge was that its revenues were gained mainly by the growth of the opium poppy, and it was plain that this bitterness was due to a feeling that nobody but Japan had any right to make such profits.

After the conquest of Jehol the Japanese followed the retreating troops into intramural China and throughout a large area made themselves masters of the land, with 'such garrisons as were needed for the protection of Japanese subjects.' As soon as the Japanese established their military posts in the summer of 1933, a swarm of Japanese and Korean drug sellers came in and began their work of poisoning the populace. If any local Chinese official interfered with them, he was promptly removed. There was even a technique for removing him, for one of the Japanese requirements when they established themselves was that Chinese officials who were anti-Japanese or otherwise obnoxious should be removed.

In 1935 Miss Muriel Lester made an investigation of this iniquity, and went to see Mr. Kawagoe (then Con-

sul-General at Tientsin and now Ambassador to China) about it. Mr. Kawagoe gave an excellent example of the Japanese method of sizing up his interviewer and giving a reply calculated to please. Very impressively he told this well-known evangelist that what the people needed to save them from such bad habits was *more religion!*

It is now the experience of twenty-five years that wherever Japanese influence extends in China, so does Chinese drug-addiction, and where Japanese military dominance exists,

the trade is unrestricted. It is a not unimportant point that the enormous profits accruing are not mentioned in any official documents. Morphine, heroin and cocaine are truly an 'invisible export,' and one needs to be extremely ingenuous to suppose that active military support is given to a lot of Japanese and Korean rascallions merely because they are Japanese. Perhaps our ideas, gathered from official statistics, that Japan's military resources are financially straitened do less than justice to the business ability of Far-Eastern military genius.

## II. MANCHURIA: AFTER SIX YEARS

By RALPH MORTON

From the *Spectator*, London Conservative Weekly

WHEN Japan occupied Mukden on September 18, 1931, she could rely on the ignorance of public opinion in Europe regarding the Far East and on the preoccupation of European governments in their own economic affairs. The Lytton Commission, if it did nothing else, made public opinion in Europe aware of the real meaning of the action of Japan, but preoccupation with their own affairs has throughout these six years prevented other countries from taking any great interest in Manchuria. It is easy now to recognize the Mukden Incident as the spark that set in flame the conflagration that would destroy the League of Nations. But Europe, while realizing the fatal consequences of caution, has come to regard Manchukuo as an accomplished fact and has treated it partly as a side-issue which can be disregarded in view of greater issues and partly as a joke.

But the fate of Manchuria can never be quite a side-issue, nor is it certain that the State of Manchukuo can be regarded as an accomplished fact, if by that we mean that its future is to continue along the lines of the present. And to regard the new State as a kind of hoax is dangerous. It offers a problem which lack of recognition by most other countries by no means solves. For the inconvenience to Japan of not gaining the recognition of Manchukuo by other Powers is certainly offset by the gain in irresponsibility. Japan knows well how to attain her ends in Manchuria while asserting her irresponsibility for the actions of the friendly but independent State of Manchukuo.

Japan has certainly not found her task so easy as she had hoped, nor the benefits so great as she had expected. At a tremendous cost she has regained for the South Manchuria Railway the

domination of railway communications; she has procured for a large number of her surplus population a means of livelihood; and she has gained a monopolized market for her goods. What counts for more, she has gained control of a vast territory, and has saved it from possible Soviet influence, and now holds a position from which she dominates North China and Mongolia.

But how far have the face of the country and the life of the people changed? The most obvious development is in the increase and improvement of communications and in the new buildings and greatly increased Japanese population of some of the larger towns. The railway system has been unified, extended and modernized. Motor roads, built by forced labor, extend all over the country. They are built too slightly to last long, but will probably soon be macadamized and are primarily for military purposes. Air service between the main towns is also well developed. The cities are becoming more and more Japanese, but though the Japanese on giving up extra-territorial rights gained among other benefits the right to own land anywhere, not many are to be found in the country places. The currency has also been unified and nickel takes the place of the old small notes.

The common people make use of these amenities gladly and even rather proudly, but with no sense of gain. Security of life and property is no better, and the standard of living has not improved. Japanese efficiency has dealt, as foreign efficiency is liable anywhere to deal, with the externals of living alone. The streets are cleaner, there is some attempt at public health

and dogs and bicycles must be registered. To the people such efficiency is a matter of irritation and of suspicion. They give more serious thought to the large tracts of land which are now abandoned. For in many parts, from fear of bandits, the Japanese have forced the peasants to destroy their houses and to live in towns far from their fields. In some of the more settled places their land has been given to Koreans.

In place of the former annual immigration from China, as many as are free to do so try to go back. The wealthy have all gone. Now the poorest are going, and those who are concerned for the education of their children. The new roads which are proving the greatest blessing by providing easy communication are not welcomed because their great width—100 feet for the main roads—takes a huge proportion of the small field of a peasant and there is no compensation. Everything seems to justify their greatest fear—that their land will be taken from them.

## II

The Chinese inhabitant of Manchukuo finds the present dark for himself. He sees the future darker for his children. He sees the best jobs going increasingly to Japanese. Jobs are few so he keeps his children at school as long as he can, but he finds that the door of the school is not opening any wider. There has always been a strong desire for education in Manchuria, and the proportion of illiterates has been fairly low. Each village managed to have a school of sorts. Now the Japanese have raised the standard of efficiency in the schools, and the effect has been to close a great many schools

which were certainly not up to standard but which were doing very useful work in the villages.

The Japanese ideal is to make what schools there are efficient in the work of turning out the kind of citizen they want. Many primary schools have been closed, and secondary education is now restricted to four years. Great attention is paid to sport and physical training and to manual work. In many schools the pupils do all the cleaning. Along this line of physical and manual education the schools show a great improvement.

But the authorities would see in physical training the only outlet for the pupils' vitality. Intellectual education is carefully standardized and curtailed. Reading is discouraged and discussion forbidden. The textbooks are few and inadequate and, of course, propagandist, and the teachers are forbidden to give any instruction outside them. More time is always devoted to the study of Japanese than to the study of the pupils' own language. English is taught only in boys' secondary schools and there only for two hours a week. In opposition to the ideal of sex equality in Chinese education and in line with Japanese practice, intellectual education is even more severely curtailed in girls' schools. In the future it will be practically impossible for a boy, and certainly impossible for a girl, from Manchuria to pass the entrance examination into a Chinese college.

The Japanese claimed that they occupied Manchuria to liberate the people. It was not pure pretense. The Japanese believed it. Their disillusionment is part of the price paid for Empire. It has bred in the minds of the officials a suspicion of the thoughts of

all the Chinese in Manchuria. The suspicion is equated with the fear of Communism. And so, especially in the last two years, they have given great attention to different types of 'dangerous thinking' and to all kinds of societies and groups. No meeting of any sort can be held without notice being given, and notice must be given of any visitor in a house. Thousands have suffered imprisonment and torture. For the method is as much one of intimidation as of investigation. This has induced in the minds of all the Chinese inhabitants a fear and suspicion of all Japanese actions which it is very difficult for the altruism of well-meaning Japanese to overcome.

It is inevitable that Korea should be taken as the model for Manchukuo. The Japanese Government certainly seems to be following the lines laid down in Korea. The people are apt to look at Korea as the picture of their future. But there is one great difference which makes the future hard to foretell. When Korea was subjugated, Korea was lost. And the Koreans knew it. They were filled with an overwhelming feeling of despair, combined on the part of some with the hopeless desire for desperate action. Assassination has been common.

Manchuria has been conquered; but there is still China. Despair is always tempered by the knowledge that China is still near, a refuge and a possible source of help. So the Chinese in Manchuria do not look to themselves for help. Any help that may come must come from some change in the relations of China and Japan. So there are few attempts at assassination, a tremendous eagerness for news of China and the appearance of a ready acquiescence.



What can international law do about bombing? Here is an expert's reply.

# Modern War *and the Civilian*

By SIR JOHN FISCHER WILLIAMS

From the *Listener*

Weekly Organ of the British Broadcasting Corporation

IT IS unnecessary for me to attempt to describe the horrors resulting from the fall of modern bombs charged with high explosive in a crowded city. Events in the Far East have shocked the civilized world; and yet there had been no lack of warning by competent voices of what under modern conditions and with modern weapons war must almost certainly involve.

It is, however, perhaps worth while to call attention to one point. We are sometimes told that these things are a reversion to the Dark Ages and barbarian invasions such as that of Genghis Khan. But these horrors are unlike those caused by barbarians in the Dark Ages in one respect. In massacres by barbarians in hand-to-hand fighting the assailant saw at close quarters the suffering which he inflicted and there may have been possibilities of merciful discrimination. Modern massacre from aircraft, as from long-range gun fire, is, on the other hand, blind. The assailant is in the air and in most cases never sees

the individuals whom he kills. His hands physically have no blood upon them. He kills he knows not whom, and he is spared the spectacle of the material and human destruction which he causes.

Naturally, people ask the question: 'What does international law say to these horrors?' I will try to answer this question, as a lawyer concerned with the international law of war.

It is not my task now to offer an opinion on the claim of Japan that her action is not a violation of international treaties binding upon her. I begin by saying that I assume that we have to deal with a war between China and Japan and that, therefore, the international law of war applies. The fact that neither of these Powers has so far made a formal declaration of war is in my judgment irrelevant. The present situation is certainly not peace; it is war.

This brings me to the general question of the relation of law to war. There are some people who say that

law, particularly international law, has nothing to do with war. War on that view is a mere state of violence and a negation of law. This, it is said, always was true but not always recognized, and is now certainly true since in 1928 the Pact of Paris, which is usually called the Briand-Kellogg Pact, outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, and bound all States in the world to settle their disputes by pacific means.

But that international law could have no application to war is false doctrine. The normal man is revolted by the idea that war has no rules. The general common sense of mankind is on the side of the founder of international law, Grotius, who called his great book *The Law of War and Peace*; and long before Grotius, St. Augustine had said: 'To give laws to war is a preparation for peace.' I think the common sense of mankind is on the side of the Catholic saint and the Protestant lawyer. This state of things has not been altered by the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The world still agrees that a rule of law applies to war as long as war in fact occurs.

## II

There is, then, a law of war. What do we mean in this connection by the word 'law?' Unfortunately, we cannot mean that the law of which we speak is the work of a powerful legislature supported by benches of judges and magistrates to determine and apply the rules laid down and by policemen and soldiers to enforce them. On the other hand, we do not mean that the rules between nations to which we give the name of law are simply moral rules binding in conscience only and

never to be enforced by any outside authority. When we use the word 'law' we imply that if and when a central power exists in the society concerned, it is right and justifiable that it should enforce these rules against those who break them.

But when we speak of the rules of international law in relation to war, we do not assert or assume that such rules are in fact obeyed. During the Great War they were in fact often disobeyed. At the same time no combatant in the Great War denied the existence of an international law applicable to war. If a belligerent broke the law, either he did not admit the facts, or he argued that what he had done was in itself no violation of the law as rightly understood, or he sought to justify what had happened on the dangerous plea of reprisal for offenses committed by the enemy.

Occasionally one hears that international law is something which States obey only so long as they are pleased to do so, and that, therefore, a State can at any moment declare itself free from international law. So far as I know, no one has ever pushed this idea to the point of saying that violations of the rules of international law as to war have destroyed the binding authority of those rules. The Japanese Government does not claim that it is at liberty to violate the international law of war, nor does it deny one of the main principles of that law—the principle according to which non-combatants are not a legitimate military objective. It takes the line partly that the facts are being incorrectly reported (thus, for example, it denied the report of the destruction of Chinese fishing craft by a Japanese submarine) and partly it asserts that

the killing of non-combatants was incidental to attacks upon legitimate military objectives.

There is, therefore, no dispute as to the broad principle of the international law of war which rules that non-combatants are not a legitimate military objective, and that therefore it is not lawful to seek victory in war by spreading terror in the civilian population. But I am afraid that when I say 'not lawful' I unfortunately do not, and cannot, mean 'impossible.'

Has Japan then violated this principle? Observers on the spot believe that she has. Public opinion in Great Britain and at Geneva accepts this view. Certainly Japan has caused horrors to which I can remember no parallel in the Great War. The whole sympathy of Great Britain is with her victims, and this sympathy will probably not be much diminished if Japan succeeds in establishing her claim that all her efforts have been aimed at military objectives and that the slaughter of civilians was a regrettable and unfortunate incident of a not illegal use of the modern weapons of war.

It is difficult to know with certainty how far the governing rule that non-combatants are not a legitimate military objective has been observed or violated in any actual case of an air attack on a large industrial city. No clear code of detailed rules has received general acceptance. But attacks on unarmed craft in the open sea by daylight are more easy to judge; in the event of such an attack the excuse of a nearby military objective is not available.

An international lawyer cannot claim that the principle that non-combatants are not to be the objective of military attack is to be extended so as

to give non-combatants complete immunity. If non-combatants are in the neighborhood of an army, or, as in modern conditions is more probable, live near some other part of the modern military machine such as a munition factory or a line of military communication, they are inevitably, and, according to the rules of war, legitimately, exposed to danger. Civilians cannot be used as a screen to protect a military objective from attack. On the other hand, some insignificant military work or line of communication cannot supply a legitimate excuse for an attack on a crowded city.

Thus, unquestionably, modern developments have terribly increased the danger to a civilian population. Industrial efficiency is now the main-spring of the conduct of war. The skilled, and perhaps even the unskilled, artisan, male or female, engaged in war work, the limits of which are hard to define, has to a great extent taken the place of the man-at-arms of former days and the serving soldier as a contributor to success in war. Let me repeat that even when the rules of international law are strictly observed, modern war involves terrible dangers to the non-combatant and civilian population.

### III

Some people have suggested that the only method by which the general rule in favor of non-combatants could be made effective would be the institution of separate non-combatant areas, where only the very old and the very young, together with all those who took absolutely no part in the military effort, could be segregated. I own that, to me personally, this idea does

not seem a practical solution of the problem. The only really practical solution would be to cut the knot and prohibit all bombing from the air. You can judge as well as I can what chance of being accepted such a solution has.

These difficulties of application do not, however, mean that the rule against attacks on non-combatants has ceased to exist. If it did not exist there would be no restraint upon excesses of violence against individuals in time of war. Prisoners could be killed; unarmed populations could be mowed down by machine-gun fire. There is, I am confident, no possibility that humanity will in this matter go back into greater depths of barbarism than it has ever known and allow deliberate mass murder of non-combatants to be lawful. Those who use such methods will be reckoned as enemies of the human race.

When we consider how the rules of international law may be enforced, we are face to face with the whole problem of the organization of human society. There is at present no machinery, either on paper or in fact, for the enforcement of all the rules of international law. The Covenant of the League of Nations provides for certain and definite sanctions only in one special case of law-breaking—that of a resort to war by a Member of the League in violation of the Covenant. Neither the Covenant nor the Briand-Kellogg Pact establishes an obligation on Members of the League or on the nations of the world to enforce all international law against violators.

The enforcement of international law should be, and may in the future become, the proper work of a central international authority with general

if not universal jurisdiction. It would not be a way out of our present difficulties—that is, it would not end the horrors of modern war waged with modern weapons—to make it the duty of separate individual States to take into their own hands the enforcement of the law of war and procure obedience to it by their separate military action. Such action would only add another war to that already existing. But if we may not yet expect the institution of a system of forcible sanctions by world authority, and have to content ourselves with something less, it may be found that it is easier to stop or hamper violations of the international law of war and, what is more important, to bring the war to an end, when only two States are engaged and there is therefore a large and powerful body of neutral opinion, than when the world is split into two opposing camps and the law-breaker has no new enemy to fear.

As things are, it must be confessed that the most that international law does in the regulation of the conduct of war is to hold up the standard of *a certain minimum of humanity*. But the ultimate aim of law must be the disappearance of war. This will not come about until the great body of mankind gives effect to what it knows already: that the existence of war cannot be reconciled with the continuance of the life of civilized society. If, however, war is to disappear, we must find some method of bringing about peaceably the changes which the future will demand. The world will not stand still; but in its normal life it cannot move by a series of catastrophes, though it may be that we need one more catastrophe to jolt us onto the road of common sense.

So tense is the struggle between Italy and Britain for supremacy in the Mediterranean that an 'incident' may bring war. Several important aspects of the struggle are here described.

## *In the Troubled Mediterranean*

### I. WAR IN THE AIR WAVES

By KURT WAGENFÜHR

Translated from the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Berlin Coördinated Daily

EVENTS fraught with great significance for the broadcasting situation in the Mediterranean area, as well as for short-wave broadcasting all over the world, have occurred in recent months. In the House of Commons Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden discussed anti-British radio propaganda in Arabia and Palestine. The subject was taken up by the British press and resulted in suggestions that the British Broadcasting Corporation should institute a radio service in foreign languages in collaboration with the Foreign Office. Then came a personal message from Mussolini to the British Foreign Minister containing reassurances concerning Italy's attitude, particularly in regard to the Palestine crisis.

Let us look behind these events.

The radio situation in the Mediterranean Basin has for several years been extraordinarily tense. The broadcasting center of the Mediterranean is Italy and its political radio headquarters is at Bari in Apulia—at Rome, of course, by remote control. It is well known that within Italy the radio has not yet reached the point of development achieved in other European States. That can be accounted for largely by reference to national characteristics, climate and certain psychological conditions. On the other hand, Italy—or rather Premier Mussolini—has recognized for many years the significance of the radio as an instrument of foreign policy and has made daring use of it in this field. Here he broke sharply from the practice in other States, almost all of



which have been concerned primarily with a thoroughgoing exploitation of the radio at home. Premier Mussolini's plan was first put into effect on a comprehensive scale during the Italo-Ethiopian War, when it proved extremely successful.

Extraordinary and systematic influences extend into the entire Mediterranean area from the station at Bari, which is one of the youngest in the Italian network, since it was only opened toward the end of 1932. Bari is sometimes called the 'Radio Tower of Babel,' and this designation is quite accurate. It broadcasts programs, and particularly news service, in the following languages: German, French, English, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, Hungarian, Rumanian, Turkish, Albanian, Greek, Croatian, Hebrew, Arabic, Hindustani, Chinese, Japanese and also Esperanto. In addition there are short-wave broadcasts in foreign languages from Rome and foreign language broadcasts on regular frequencies from the stations at Florence, Trieste, Milan and Turin. These are 'limited' to German, French, English, Hungarian, Bulgarian and several other languages.

## II

Radio development elsewhere in the Mediterranean area has been very slow. Greece is now building her first transmitter. Albania has not, as yet, a broadcasting station of her own, nor has Yugoslavia, because of economic difficulties. Bulgaria has three very small stations and will complete her first large transmitter in the near future. Rumania has operated a medium-powered transmitter only since the beginning of 1936, and Turkey is

also lagging behind when compared with the general European development of the radio. The 'radio export' from Bari therefore finds ready listeners, and its 'gift' broadcasts have thus far encountered little competition.

Schemes for the installation of a transmitter to counterbalance Bari have been considered in Yugoslavia; and plans for foreign language services—primarily in Greek—have also been considered by Bulgaria and Rumania.

The Balkan countries, therefore, continue to be a fertile field for broadcasts from Bari. This situation may, of course, change when these countries carry out their plans for radio expansion. From the geographical viewpoint, Greece, especially, possesses many advantages, and she may some day become a second radio center in the Mediterranean.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the situation is more complex. Syria, as yet, has no transmitter of her own but it is evident that France is deeply interested in erecting one at Beirut. Such a station would serve as a counterfoil to the Turkish broadcasts and those inaugurated in Palestine in March, 1936. France's North-African network would receive an additional base which might some day extend its influence toward Russia and India.

Yet the crux of the problem lies in Palestine and Egypt, where Italian broadcasts clash with British interests. This became particularly evident during the Italo-Ethiopian War. The air became a veritable witches' cauldron. This war in the ether was fought with every means, and its effects are apparent even today. Italy, at that time, could reap the fruits of long preparation, for her propaganda and her

contact with the various fronts were amazingly efficient.

As for the future, one must not overlook the fact that Palestine and Egypt form bases of a British radio chain that extends from London to the Mediterranean, to India, to Australia and to New Zealand, or that it is highly sensitive to disturbances at every link.

Italy now has new and ambitious radio plans. She intends in the near future to establish a transmitter at Tripoli; she plans later to have a station in Ethiopia, though for the time being she has postponed building a transmitter there. A high-powered transmitter at Addis-Ababa might play a very important rôle, for it could cast its voice into the sphere of the Indian Ocean where at the moment the Anglo-Indian and Netherlands-Indian broadcasts have a virtual monopoly.

The high-powered transmitter at Tripoli would invade deeply the French North-African sphere of interest, which is now served by the stations at Algiers, Rabat and Tunis. For many years there have been demands in France for the improvement of French African transmitters, as well as of the short-wave *Radio Colonial* at

Paris, in order to carry the voice of France into the world more effectively. French observers have repeatedly pointed out that the radio has caused changes not only in the political equilibrium but also—with special reference to the Italian musical programs—infringements upon cultural zones which until recently had been entirely reserved to France.

There remain Portugal and Spain. Thus far Portugal has played only a small rôle in the Mediterranean radio struggle. Spain, in 1936, stood at a turning point in her development, but the turmoil of the Civil War has completely halted her progress.

Should England, as a result of the radio political situation in the Mediterranean, create a comprehensive foreign language service, she might extend it over the entire earth through relays and short-wave transmitters. We should then have to think in larger units of space than those to which we are now accustomed. The Indian and the Pacific Oceans might become fields for giant transmitters, opening up immense new territories. But it appears that the Mediterranean Basin, with its highly sensitive network of invisible waves, will remain the central arena of the war in the air waves.

## II. VISIT TO THE DODECANESE

By F. L.

Translated from the *National-Zeitung*, Basel Liberal German-Language Daily

*[For more than a year a great deal of attention has been paid throughout the world to events in the Western Mediterranean where, on the fringe of the theater of war, the Italians have succeeded in getting a foothold on the*

*Balearic Islands, enabling them to block the Straits of Gibraltar whenever they deem it necessary. As a result attention has been diverted from the fact that at the same time the Italians have control of other strategically important*

*posts in the Mediterranean. Halfway between Italy and North Africa the small but strongly fortified Island of Pantelleria challenges the significance of Malta. The Straits of Otranto can, in case of need, be blocked by the base on the Island of Sasseno, thereby padlocking the Yugoslav ports. And finally, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Dodecanese Islands enable Italy, because of their favorable location near the southwest coast of Asia Minor, to keep watch on the Dardanelles and the seaways to Cyprus.*

*The importance of Pantelleria became apparent in the recent war games. The significance of the Dodecanese, on the other hand, became known to a broader public only when 'unknown' submarines near the Island of Tenedos recently bombed and sank several ships bound for Spain.*

*What is happening in the Dodecanese Islands? What are the Italians doing on these Islands, which they have now held for twenty-five years?* EDITORS OF THE BASEL NATIONAL-ZEITUNG]

THE last rays of the setting sun shine upon the beach promenade of the Island of Rhodes. The ocean, the old windmill towers on the harbor mole, the pinnacles on the walls of the Crusaders' city—all glow in golden radiance. The fragrance of gardens hovers over the modern city which has grown up serenely and majestically along the ocean front. The evening breeze sways the sailboats. A motley crowd gathered on the café terraces is enjoying the most beautiful hour of the day: soldiers, sailors, young people from the town and numerous tourists.

Suddenly there is the roar of a cannon; at once all the soldiers jump

up and stand at attention. The civilians also rise, bare themselves, and many of them salute with upraised arm the gigantic tricolor which is being lowered from the flagpole on the Government Palace. Young townspeople join in this gesture of glorifying Fascism, but their features, gay only a moment ago, now betray a certain bitterness; and later, when a small column of troops marches past to the tune of an aggressive band, they seem to be more absorbed than ever with their backgammon and seldom turn their heads.

Why do the natives dislike the sounds of war so much? We came to Rhodes as innocent tourists without the slightest suspicion that Italian rule might have clouded this paradise. But now we remember a few observations we made on the boat. Hundreds of Italian soldiers traveled with us. They were nice, clean-cut youngsters, a little sad at the thought of their impending terms on the lonely, fortified islands, of camp life, of the hard labor of constructing fortifications—for no civilian worker is admitted to the military zone. In retrospect, did it not seem strange that every time we talked with the soldiers some ill-tempered officer appeared in the offing—that under his frowning glance the chatter of our young friends immediately died down?

Upon arriving at Rhodes, we were touched by the helpfulness of a gentleman who, as if by accident, constantly bobbed up at our side showing the tenderest solicitude for our plans. Later we learned that this friendly gentleman belonged to the secret police.

For a quarter-of-a-century the Italians have been on the Dodecanese

Islands, first as conquerors, but later confirmed in their rights by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Yet they have not succeeded in Italianizing the population. On Rhodes there are mostly Greeks, but also Turks and Spanish Jews. Only in the city is Italian spoken and understood. In the country and on the other islands Greek is indispensable. If one does understand it, interesting facts come to light—facts which are not mentioned in the propagandist pamphlets that are supplied to tourists.

One hears, for instance, of fertile tracts of land which have been expropriated by the Government for flying fields or drill grounds, or for Italian settlements. One hears of children who have been punished because they sang Greek hymns; about the exiling of Orthodox priests who did not refrain from voicing their belief that the Dodecanese should be reunited with their Greek motherland.

## II

One cannot deny the skill with which the Italians entice tourists to Rhodes. The new city is bright and modern with a picturesque open market hall, while the old part of the town with the Gothic houses of the Knights Templars, the great towers, the colorful arched alleys and the Turkish city with its mosques, minarets, bazaars and public baths have all been restored with good taste. Broad, well-kept roads run all over the island and invite excursions by bus. What does it matter that these roads, as if by chance, always lead to the airports? But these are so well hidden that the innocent traveler does not notice them, nor is he likely

to see the suspiciously new barbed wire entanglements which run along the coast that faces Turkey.

It is almost impossible to get permission to visit the Island of Leros. Even the few strangers whose standing with the Government enables them to visit Leros are not permitted to see anything important. Upon arriving they are greeted by two *carabinieri* who thereafter do not let them out of sight. They are forced to leave their cameras at the customs house, for they are entering a military zone, and even a suspicious glance may be interpreted as espionage. The view from the ship, though not very extensive, is significant. One sees cliffs with strange holes which betray emplacements for heavy artillery, and roads which seem to lead up the barren rocks into space. In the harbor itself there are seaplanes and submarines. Heavy cases which, according to their labels, contain airplane accessories and barbed wire are transported from the ships to the large sheds on the shore.

But the real naval airport is on the other side of the island, hidden from prying eyes, and it is to that side of the island that the mysterious mountain roads lead. One hardly sees anybody except soldiers, and the pleasant white cottages of the village seem deserted. Almost all the former inhabitants have been transferred to other islands, so that the Fascist conquerors might make Leros one of the strongest naval bases in the Mediterranean.

Later, in Athens, we tried to discover the secret which hovers over these beautiful islands. One of the leading agitators for the reunion of the Dodecanese with Greece received us.



He was a venerable scholar, but full of energy, ready for action and sacrifices. He himself was born on one of the islands, the son of a sponge-fisherman. He now devotes all his time, his energy and his fortune to this one purpose, and is proud of having been condemned to death several times by the Italian courts on charges of treason.

At first he mistrusted us, but later he opened his heart and told us about the struggle for his homeland. Thus we received access to his comprehensive data. He showed us many interesting photographs, and statistics revealing the startling decrease of the Islands' population. Fruit and wine culture has been restricted in many villages in order to eliminate competition with Italian production. Sponge-fishing, the main source of income of the island population, has been made practically impossible through numerous restrictions that have been dictated by fear of espionage.

From him we also heard of the tragic story of the mothers of Kalym-

nos. On this island religious disorders had arisen because the Orthodox priests had been involved in anti-Fascist activities and had been exiled as a result. From that day on, the two hundred churches on the island remained closed and the population refused to recognize the new priests who had been sent from Rome. An epidemic broke out and many children were stricken. The mothers refused the spiritual assistance of the Roman priests. At night they went secretly to the cemeteries and buried their dear ones with their own hands. Fourteen mothers were sent to jail and had to pay fines as a result.

This defenseless population is unable to oppose exploitation and persecution by the powerful strangers. Beyond Italy's grasp, however, their brethren are not idle. Wherever emigrants or exiles from the Dodecanese live—and they are to be found not only in Greece but also in Egypt, in New York, in California and in Australia—they carry on propaganda for the liberation of their homeland.

### III. ITALY WOOS THE ARABS

By ANDRÉ PALERT

Translated from *Marianne*, Paris Liberal Weekly

PREMIER MUSSOLINI'S attempts to influence the Arab world against Britain really date back a decade, although the general public first became aware of them only a few months ago, when the Duce girded on the sword of the Prophet and proclaimed himself the 'Protector of Islam.' In so doing he followed a precedent set by Kaiser Wilhelm II just before the World War.

Left empty-handed when the mandates in the Near East were distributed, Italy sought her revenge. She set about winning the sympathies of the Arab world by endorsing its most extravagant claims. The evidences of her penetration into Arab countries, particularly in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, have been easy to discern. First among them are her large capital investments in those countries. A



walk taken through the modern part of Jerusalem reveals that many of the most imposing buildings belong to a great Trieste insurance company, the *Assicurazioni Generali*. The Bank of Rome has surpassed all the other foreign banks in the volume of loan business. It is significant that the Italian companies in Palestine, whose business documents were formerly drawn up in four languages—Italian, English, Arabic and Hebrew—have recently dropped the English and the Hebrew texts.

Italian steamship lines have been sending new *de luxe* liners to the Near Eastern ports, and are charging lower passage rates than the lines of any other nation. Arabs traveling abroad are given special rates under all kinds of pretexts, particularly in the case of Arab groups desiring to visit Italy. Italy has in recent years been attracting to her universities hundreds of Arab students, who are exempted from paying tuition and aided in other ways.

Has this material and moral propaganda (in the latter category we must also consider the broadcasts in Arabic from the radio station at Bari) brought any results? Has Italy succeeded in winning the friendship of the Arab world to the extent that she can direct it against England? I have put these questions to many leading Arabs, both politicians and intellectuals. Their answers invariably ran as follows:—

‘If we Arabs had to decide between France, England and Italy, we would certainly not choose Italy. We are well aware of the fact that colonization of the French and English type is mainly a colonization by capital. It does not injure the native population, but brings it material advantages. Italian coloni-

zation, on the contrary, is a colonization of men, and would be carried on at the expense of the natives. If, in the East, we know the French and the English as conquerors, administrators and capitalists who contribute to our material wealth, we know the Italians as petty merchants, artisans and workers who come to compete with our people. Although Mussolini now proclaims himself the ‘Protector of Islam,’ we Arabs have not forgotten that only ten years ago he ordered the extermination of the whole native population of the Libyan oases and that the methods of Italian colonization in Ethiopia have hardly been humane. It is true that a part of our Arab youth finds some features of Fascist rule attractive, but the statesmen of the Arab countries know that Rome’s imperialism—her will to expand—is the only serious threat to Arab independence.’

## II

But if, in the Arab world in general, the efforts of the Italian propaganda seem to have miscarried, in Palestine the case is somewhat different. There the Arabs have found in Italy an ally against their common adversary, Great Britain. It is only natural that a wholehearted alliance should be formed between them, at least temporarily.

The man in Palestine in whom the Italians have put their hopes was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, whose recent flight has received much comment abroad. His ambition to become leader of all the Arabs and his fanatical hatred of the British made Mohammed Haj Amin El Husseini the greatest man in Arab Palestine and a natural ally of Italy.

The Mufti had also become one of

the most eminent personages of the Moslem world, a leader whose moral prestige as defender of the Arabs was so well established that he was in a position to arbitrate in the war between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and ultimately to bring about peace between the two Arab States. In spite of his prestige, which enabled him to assume a rather independent attitude toward the British authorities, it soon became evident that without foreign aid he could not attain his goal of becoming undisputed ruler of Palestine and spiritual leader of the Arab world.

At the time of my interview with the Grand Mufti, he asserted the determination of the Palestine Arabs to fight the British Partition Plan with the last drop of their blood. Haj Amin then expressed his faith in ultimate victory with the aid of Allah.

It is well known, however, that in spite of his piety, the Mufti had procured for himself other than Divine assistance. During the general strike of last year £60,000 were brought to him from Rome. That became known through a mishap which occurs not infrequently in the East: the intermediary who was charged with delivering the money thought himself entitled to keep half for his own use. A complaint went from the Mosque of Omar to the Palazzo di Venezia, and the promising young Italian consul who had handled

the transaction was rusticated to an obscure post in Central America.

In spite of this incident, the flow of money and other aid from Rome did not stop. All the arms which the Palestine Police and British troops have taken from Arab terrorists came from Italy. Some months ago, during the friendly negotiations between Great Britain and Italy, the anti-British broadcasts in Arabic from Bari were suspended and Italian support to the Arab Nationalists was also supposed to have been withdrawn. For a time the Grand Mufti himself became more conciliatory toward the Mandatory officials. This period of calm was brief, and with the return of tension between the great Mediterranean rivals, the Italian bounty began to flow once more to the Arab Nationalists. The result was a revival of terrorism in Palestine, culminating in the assassination of the British Governor of Galilee.

Nevertheless, both the Italians and their ally, the Grand Mufti, seem to have misjudged the attitude of the British. Aroused by the assassination of one of their high officials, they showed unwonted energy and suppressed the Arab Nationalist organizations with firmness and speed. The Mufti's inglorious flight may well mark the waning of Italian influence in Palestine.

#### IV. KEYS TO BRITISH STRATEGY

By M. Y. BEN-GAVRIEL

Translated from the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, Vienna Liberal Daily

ONE of Great Britain's deepest concerns in the present emergency is to strengthen the imperial life-lines

which safeguard India; and this concern has resulted in the development of the port of Haifa in Palestine into

the foremost British base in the Near East.

Two recent reports emphasize Haifa's key position in British strategy. According to one, construction will soon begin on a great strategic trans-desert highway from Haifa to Bagdad; according to the other, the small but strategically important port of Aqaba on the Red Sea will subsequently be linked to Haifa.

The idea of connecting the Mediterranean with the Eastern possessions by the 'Overland Route' is as old as British colonial policy. Its realization would not only relieve traffic through the Suez Canal, but also provide for the possibility that the Suez Canal might be put out of commission in time of war. It will be remembered that during the World War a Turkish expedition almost succeeded in rendering the Canal unserviceable.

There has been discussion in Great Britain since the end of the War as to whether a railroad or a strongly built asphalt automobile highway would provide the better means of communication across the desert. That the decision would be made in favor of the highway has been expected for some time, because obstacles in the way of building the railroad have constantly increased. The Bedouins showed quite clearly that they regarded the railroad as a threat to their independence when the first surveys began in 1921. Differences of opinion with France then cropped up over the route to be followed by the pipe line across the Syrian desert, along which the proposed railroad was to be laid. Later the route originally planned had to be altered because of its nearness to the increasingly powerful State of Saudi Arabia.

Finally, when all these difficulties seemed to have been ironed out, an insuperable financial problem arose. Great Britain wished to unload the cost, estimated at about 8 million pounds sterling, upon the three States of Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, because such a project—'way back in Turkey'—could not easily be sold to the British taxpayer. Iraq, however, flatly refused to assume its share of 5 million pounds for a scheme which was designed primarily for Great Britain's benefit.

## II

Negotiations between London and Bagdad in regard to the highway have now reached the stage where a delegation of engineers is already beginning the detailed surveys of the route, the cost of which, to be borne by the three States mentioned above, will be much less than that of a railroad.

The new road will follow rather closely the Imperial Airways route to Bagdad and will permit the movement of troops and supplies by truck train in thirty-six hours over a distance which took many months only a few decades ago. This means nothing less than that Britain, so long as she retains control of Haifa, can in an emergency do without the Suez Canal and at the same time effectively protect the important Protectorate of Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf. Kuwait has, as a matter of fact, lately become one of the great British nerve centers in the Near East. It is not only an important base, but is also the site of immense oil deposits and controls Arabia from the East.

Apart from the development of a

new Overland Route, Great Britain's next most important strategical project in the Near East concerns the port of Aqaba, which is situated on an arm of the Red Sea. Aqaba seems destined to become England's future key position in the Red Sea area. Immediately after the War it belonged to the Hejaz, but when Ibn Saud roared in from the desert to conquer the Moslem Holy Cities, Great Britain quietly allotted it to Transjordan, which she controlled.

Ibn Saud has repeatedly protested against this action and demanded Aqaba's return, but it is unlikely that Great Britain will ever voluntarily relinquish the port, the value of which increased incalculably the moment Italy conquered Ethiopia and became a Red Sea Power. Although undeveloped at present, Aqaba possesses unusual natural defenses, and would serve as an ideal terminus for a second Overland Route from Haifa to the East.

Haifa and Ma'an, which are north of Aqaba, are already linked by rail, and the stretch from Ma'an to Aqaba is easily covered by automobile. The Dead Sea, with its enormous potash deposits, is located directly on the Haifa-Aqaba route, so that in case of war England would be independent of German potash production. The construction of a route from the southern end of the Dead Sea to Aqaba on the Red Sea presents only financial difficulties.

If the two schemes here outlined should be carried out, England's position in the Near and Middle East will be greatly strengthened. Their realization will mean that Palestine, whether she is to be cut up into two States or not, will always be dependent on England.

The Haifa-Aqaba-Bagdad triangle seems likely to become the most important buttress of Britain's greater strategic triangle, that of Gibraltar-Aden-Singapore.

#### NOT ALL FOR LOVE

Last year there were eight times as many marriages between Austrian peasants and Yugoslav peasant girls as in 1935, and the number is still increasing.

Why? Dowries are duty-free in Austria. In 1936 forty times as many cattle were driven duty-free across the frontier as in the previous year. These herds were all declared to be dowry.

—*Sunday Express*, London

This observer provides the main facts  
about the state of the Red Army today.

## *Is* Russia Ready?

From the *Manchester Guardian*  
Manchester Liberal Weekly

IT IS hardly probable that the Red Army will intervene in the undeclared war between Japan and China. Whatever happens Soviet Russia will try to order its policy so as not to be drawn openly into a war between other States. Nevertheless, as a political factor this Army plays a great potential part. The organization of the Red Army is far from being completed to plan, but for some years past it has been carried so far that we may take it that military preparedness on the Asiatic frontier has been attained.

The so-called Far Eastern Province has now a self-supporting army, with its own technical and victualing bases (the last in the form of militarized collective farms). It is really three armies, with headquarters at Khabarovsk, Chita and Ulan Bator. The great Siberian Railway has been double-tracked, and a geographically less exposed parallel line running north of the main one is nearing completion. More than this, the necessary

organization has been already completed to enable war to be waged on the Asiatic front virtually without drawing on the resources of European Russia. Besides the industrial plants in the territory of the Far Eastern army there are today enough industrial centers in Siberia and the Urals to provide for the army and navy fighting on the Far Eastern frontier.

Still more important is the completion of the Turksib, the line which connects Russian Central Asia with Siberia and so with the Far East. This not only makes it possible to carry on an Asiatic war almost entirely with forces drawn from Asiatic Russia but creates an additional supply base in the great Republic of Kazakstan.

The estimates made of the military strength and armaments of the Red Army are not all authentic, if only because each day brings an increase in men and material. About two years ago the active strength of the Soviet Army was officially given as



1,300,000. Even this does not exhaust the units on active service. There are, in addition, the troops of the Commissariat of the Interior, in two main divisions, one distinguished by light-blue caps and the other by green. The light-blue uniformed troops are the so-called Interior Guards, largely made up of infantry units, strongly armed for close fighting—an infantry élite, with relatively little cavalry but a strong artillery arm.

The troops with green caps are the frontier guards; they are specially selected troops and are carefully instructed. They form frontier brigades, armed with every kind of weapon, and in the event of war they would be a valuable advance guard. The number of troops in the Commissariat of the Interior is difficult to estimate but it must be somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000.

These forces are mainly conscripted; there are also large numbers, again difficult to estimate, of professional troops. To these troops belong the railway protection companies. They consist of experienced men, specially well trained, who live in barracks. Most of them would, of course, be relieved in the event of war by inferior formations so as to fight as crack troops at the front. The post and telegraph guards and the great numbers of industrial guards are organized in the same way, but the police, as a rule, are not militarized. It is probably assumed that in time of emergency they would be needed at their posts.

Beyond this the number of retired recruits grows greater every year. The old Russian social democracy believed in the principle of the Swiss militia, and the Red Army was

accordingly given a dual character by the late People's Commissar Frunze. Only a small proportion of the recruits were enrolled for the two years' service in the regular army. By far the greater number entered territorial units, made up on the militia principle, whose composition changed every few weeks. This principle of army building has been given up in recent years. There are virtually no territorial units left; they have almost all been merged with the regular army.

## II

The military training of the soldiers of the Red Army is extremely good, and all boys and an increasing number of girls from sixteen years of age are given preliminary training for their coming military service. The defense society, *Ossoaviakhim*, maintains shooting ranges and wooden towers for parachute practice in almost every village; the society also covers almost every field of military studies. At eighteen years the obligatory military training begins.

One of the most important problems that still remain unsolved concerns officers. The rise of ex-workers and peasants to positions of command was encouraged from the beginning for reasons of political expediency; thus there is no homogeneity in the cultural and social background of the officers' corps of the Red Army, for it contains also, especially in the higher ranks, many officers of middle-class extraction and a considerable number of officers from the old Imperial Army.

The standard of education of a great part of the corps of officers, particularly in the ranks from captain to colonel, is extremely low; but

now an intermediate school education is normally required for a career as an officer. Only a small number of non-commissioned officers of long service who have passed the necessary examinations are now considered for officer's rank. All officers' training schools are uniformly organized and have three or four-year courses, according to the arm of the service. Graduation from one of the military academies is essential now as qualification for the higher commands.

The founding of the General Staff as a separate institution (formerly it was a section of the so-called Supreme Staff) was a part of the great reorganization of two years ago, and another new institution was also created—the General Staff Academy. This is not so much an institute for study as for military research, though recently officers have been appointed to the academy for training. The generals and officers of this General Staff Academy wear especially fine uniforms, with black velvet collars and other distinguishing marks recalling the uniforms of the old Imperial General Staff. To raise the authority of the officers in the eyes of the troops and the people, titles, parades, uniforms, great banquets and many decorations have been instituted.

The Red Army is badly off for reserve officers. A year's service after leaving the intermediate school makes a reserve officer, and this cannot be considered sufficient. In the reserve, too, are many whom chance brought to positions of command in the Civil War. The heterogeneity of origin and education among officers of the reserve is even greater than in the regular army. An attempt is being made to

improve matters, and commissions have now begun the examination of the reserve officers. In important industrial establishments the reserve officers are knit together in a special organization which looks after their further training.

### III

Soldiers are not often to be seen strolling through the streets of Russian towns. The efficient political service provides the soldiers free in their barracks with all that they would have to pay for outside. In addition to the military General Staff there is a political and cultural general staff in the political section of the army. Its duties include not only political agitation among the troops and preparation for propaganda among the enemy in time of emergency, not only the maintenance of contact with the civil population, but provision for everything connected with the cultural and personal welfare of the soldiers.

The political administration of the army provides the troops not only with military and political books, but also, through the Central Theater of the Red Army at Moscow, it carries on an army theatrical service. The purpose of the army theaters is to popularize the defense system among the troops and the civil population. The Moscow Theater organizes the local theaters at the headquarters of the army commands and the touring theatrical companies that visit army detachments all over the Union. An important part of the work of this central theater consists in the training of instructors, whose duty is to cultivate artistic appreciation and effort among the troops in every branch of art—music, drama, painting.

A splendid achievement in this direction is the great Red Army choir, which does really magnificent work in the choral singing of soldiers' songs, in dancing, and in playing on national musical instruments. This Choir appears on any and every occasion and has contributed not a little to the popularization of the army. There is also a centralized system of military newspapers, from central daily papers to the wall newspaper of each company. There can be no question that in this political service the Red Army has not only an entirely novel but a good and serviceable instrument.

But the recent suicide of its head, Yan Gamarnik, is enough to show that even this organization cannot guarantee reliability. Anyone who journeys through Russia will get the impression that the young generation is wholly loyal to the régime; but allowance must be made for the Russian's gift of play-acting, developed in the course of twenty years of rigid dictatorship. Every one of the leaders shot in recent months had unceasingly and loudly professed entire and enthusiastic loyalty to the régime.

Moreover, the mood of a Russian is easily influenced. In time of emergency the Soviet Army will be a peasant army; in war time the skilled worker will be even more indispensable in his factory than he is now; and the mood of the peasantry fluctuates with every movement in the economic situation, every variation in the harvest, every Government deviation in one direction or another in its policy toward the national minorities.

At the outset of the régime every soldier was taught to respect the enemy and to be prepared for military

setbacks, but in late years military instruction has departed from this healthy principle and reverted to the errors of the Tsarist Army. A new nationalism is preached, in barracks as in civilian life, largely in order to increase the peasant's readiness to fight; but at the same time the old errors of exaggerated faith in the army's fighting qualities and of underestimating that of the foe is reviving; to paraphrase an old Russian saying, 'the future adversary is being killed with a damp rag.'

This is to play dangerously with the old Russian failing of utter loss of spirit at the first touch of failure. The recent executions of army leaders recall similar incidents in every Russian war of the past. The Russian soldier has always had little faith in his leaders. In the campaign of 1812 they were unjustly charged with treason. In the World War the trials of Sukhomlinov, War Minister, and of Colonel Myassoedov contributed not a little to the break-up of the Russian Army. And to this day the army is at the mercy of similar potential crises arising out of loss of trust in the leadership.

#### IV

This training in exaggerated confidence has, of course, its serious purpose. The Red Army has adopted the doctrine of the Reichswehr, under Seeckt and Hammerstein, that the issue of a war can be decided by a tremendous first push of the army cadres. Hence the enormous extent of mechanization, and hence the secrecy over the distribution of the army. No unit is spoken of even by its number in the Soviet Union: all is secret. And this is intelligible;

for the garrisons are already on the spot where in the event of mobilization they would have to take part at once in operations.

The Red Army is divided into commands, each of which comprises several army corps. But these are not commands in the old Russian sense but armies, prepared and mobile; and five of the ten commands and, of course, the Far Eastern Army are based on the frontiers of the Soviet Union; three of them are on the European frontier. In addition, the Asiatic command, the Moscow command and the North Caucasian command with its great masses of cavalry may be regarded as armies ready for immediate action.

So much for the vast machine; but it does not work in a vacuum. And, apart from questions of morale, it is threatened by the defects of two important elements—the system of communications and the bureaucratic system of supply. Russian military writers trace past Russian defeats largely to difficulties of communication. In order to reduce these, the European and Asiatic fronts have been separated, and each is now independent of troop transports from the farther side of the Urals.

Many railways have been built recently, and hundreds of thousands of prisoners are building roads at the utmost speed for the motorized army or canals for goods transport. Of late the railway services have been im-

proved under Kaganovitch. Goods transport is now up to the tonnage provided for in the estimates. But even now, in peace time, the railways are unmistakably working under tremendous pressure; and there can also be no doubt that a large part of the railway staff is in opposition to the Stalin régime. Officials have been placed on trial in recent months all over the country; on the Far Eastern Railway alone there have been 311 officially announced executions under court martial in the past six months.

Still more serious is the question of goods transport in the event of mobilization. Even now the distribution of goods is working extraordinarily badly. The system is thoroughly bureaucratic, and every decision has to be awaited by an army of officials, higher and lower, who meanwhile are at a loss to know what to do. There is a constant danger that mobilization would produce a sudden supply crisis, either in the army or in the hinterland, through administrative and technical mistakes, even without any actual deficiency of stocks. In short, the Bolsheviks have created a vast and excellently trained war-machine. But apart from the element of morale, the organization of this machine is far ahead of the economic, technical and administrative development of the country. The answer has still to be awaited to the grave question of how this dangerous discrepancy can be bridged.

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Every Spaniard will admit that no race in Europe has been in the past, or still is, more careless of human life, whether their own or of another.

—Sir Arnold Wilson, M. P.

Is the British race decadent? In England and the Dominions there is deep concern over the falling birth-rate.

# *The Vanishing Briton*

I. ONLY 4,000,000 ENGLISHMEN!

By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

From the *Daily Telegraph*, London Conservative Daily

ACCORDING to the Oxford Dictionary a prophet is 'one who foretells events.' It is well to remember this definition when considering what Sir Leonard Hill and others have recently said when discussing the population situation and prospects of Great Britain. For some of the most important statements which have been made are not prophecies.

Most of the discussions, for example, quite rightly take note of Dr. Enid Charles's calculations. She has shown that *if* there is no gain or loss by migration, and *if* fertility (which means, roughly, average size of family) and mortality (which means, roughly, expectation of life) remain as they were in 1933, the population of England and Wales, which is now about 41,000,000, will be about 37,000,000 in 1970, about 28,000,000 in 2000 and about 20,000,000—that is, half its present size, in 2035.

This is not a prophecy. It is not a prophecy to say that *if* a man walking

past you at three miles an hour continues to walk in a straight line for an hour, he will be three miles away at the end of that time. And Dr. Charles's calculation is precisely of this nature, and there is no doubt about its accuracy. She has not said what will happen, but only that *if* things go on in a certain way, other things will inevitably follow.

She has made other calculations, and one of them has been widely noticed. She has shown that *if* there is no migration and *if* mortality continues to fall until 1965 and fertility to 1985 in the manner in which they have recently been falling, the population will be about 34,000,000 in 1970, about 18,000,000 in 2000 and between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 in 2035.

Again, this is no prophecy. It is like saying that if a man who is walking past you at three miles an hour reduces his speed he will be less than three miles away in an hour's time. If, however—to continue the simile—



anyone believes that the man is getting tired and cannot keep up the pace, and in consequence says that, so far as can be seen, the man will not cover three miles in the next hour, we have, if not a prophecy, at least an opinion about the future.

So, too, we can have opinions about the future trend of population based upon what we think concerning the probable future strength and direction of the forces which govern it.

Thus the most promising way to approach the question of future population is to begin with the certain knowledge of what will happen if things go on as they are. Next we can discuss in turn the three forces in question—mortality, fertility and migration—and ask whether they are likely to continue as they are or to change, and if the latter is more probable, what effect this will have upon the course of numbers.

Taking mortality first, there is no doubt that medical science will progress and that public health organizations will be improved, and that in consequence lives will be saved in the future that are now lost. But when people imagine, as they often do, that this increased saving of life will compensate for small families, and when they suppose that if all children born were brought up there would be enough children, with the present size of family, to prevent a decline in numbers, they are mistaken.

It is not difficult to show that if all children now born grew up, married and had families of the present average size, the population would decline in somewhat the same manner as shown in Dr. Charles's first calculation, though not so fast. The reason for this common misapprehension is that there

is far less scope for saving life among those under 50 than is popularly supposed, and that therefore the benefits of improved health conditions will mostly accrue to those over child-bearing age.

The next factor to be considered is fertility, or size of family. There is no reason to suppose that we have lost the capacity to have large families; families are small because they are deliberately limited in size. At present the professional classes and the better-off section of the population have very small families while, among the less well off, families are rather larger. But the latter are reducing the size of their families.

Though it is not possible to look far into the future of fertility, it seems most improbable that in the near future the professional classes will increase the size of their families, whereas it is highly probable that the less well off will continue to bring down the size of their families until they are somewhere near that of the former. Therefore the likely change in fertility in the near future will be in the direction of reducing the average size of family in the nation as a whole.

## II

There remains the question of migration. Forecasts are more difficult here than in relation to fertility. Size of family depends upon habit and outlook, which change relatively slowly, whereas migration depends upon economic conditions which alter rapidly and upon legislation which can be put through in a few weeks. Nevertheless something may perhaps be said about the probable future of migration.

Traditionally England is a country

of emigration; up to 1931 we lost heavily every year through the departure of people seeking permanent residence in the United States and the Dominions. The depression altered the direction of this movement, and we have recently been gaining some thousands a year by immigration. But the inflow, which consisted largely of people who had emigrated but had not got settled overseas before the depression set in, is ceasing, except from the Irish Free State.

It seems likely that with returning prosperity we shall in the future once again lose population to the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, though, owing to the restrictions which these countries have placed upon immigration, and to other factors, the annual loss will be much less than before 1931. It is otherwise with regard to the Irish Free State, also traditionally a country of emigration. Owing to the legal restrictions and the other factors just mentioned, the Irish can no longer go in numbers over the ocean, but there is nothing to prevent them coming to this country. They are coming in considerable numbers; about 60,000 entered in the three years 1934 to 1936. Inflow from this source is likely to be maintained and even to increase.

Therefore, assuming also that we shall continue our policy of keeping to a very low figure the entry of aliens who intend to be permanent residents, the expectation for the next decade or two is some loss overseas and some gain from Ireland—the balance not being large enough to be of much consequence.

At this point Dr. Charles's first calculation becomes very useful. It shows what must happen if there is no

migration and no change in the other two factors.

As we have seen, migration is not likely to be important for some time to come, and the expected changes in mortality will be of little consequence from this point of view, but fertility will probably decline for a time. Therefore the trend of population for two decades or so is likely to be toward totals lower than those given in Dr. Charles's first calculation. Indeed, we may find ourselves heading for the totals given in her second calculation. Therefore it looks as though the population will be less than 37,000,000 in 1970.

But this is not the whole story or even the most important part of it. Her calculation also shows that, if present trends continue, even without any further decline in fertility, the fall will become sharp after 1970. The reason for this may be roughly indicated by the analogy of a reservoir. If only half as much water is being pumped into a reservoir as is flowing out, the outflow will keep up well for a time until a point is reached where, unless the inflow is suddenly doubled, the outflow will drop in catastrophic fashion.

If a very sharp drop after 1970 is to be avoided, factors must soon begin to change in a direction favorable to population; for no one can suppose that we could suddenly double the inflow, that is to say that we could suddenly replace small families by large families, since all experience shows that habits in these matters change slowly.

Our anticipation for the next two decades is a weakening and not a strengthening of the relevant factors. This is a matter for serious concern,

not because it points to a reduction of some 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 in 30 years, which in the opinion of some might not matter very much, but because it paves the way for the setting in of an almost inevitable fall after 1970 of so drastic a kind that it can scarcely be regarded with favor on any grounds.

Some people may be inclined to say that our present problems are enough

and that 1970 can be left to look after itself. But to say that is to fail to understand that future population is determined, more or less definitely, years beforehand. Therefore in an important sense the population of 1970 and after is a present problem, since, unless the trend of population changes soon, it will be too late to prevent a fall in numbers so heavy that our civilization will be in danger.

## II. UNDER-GARRISONED DOMINIONS

By SIR JOHN MARRIOTT

*From the Nineteenth Century and After, London Independent Monthly*

OF ALL the problems that now confront the British Commonwealth of Nations, the most fundamental is the problem of population. All other problems, such as those of defense and trade, are, in logic and in fact, dependent upon the solution of the primary problem of population.

It may be objected that the question of redistributing the white population of the Empire has receded into the background in view of the greater urgency of the problem of depopulation. True it is that the menace of depopulation is, at the moment, exciting increasingly anxious attention. On the facts there seems to be general agreement. On the deductions to be drawn from the facts there is, on the contrary, a wide divergence of opinion. If I refrain from embarking on the controversy it is partly for the unfashionable reason that I possess no special competence for the discussion of a highly technical question, and partly because, if the main contention of the present paper be valid, the birth-rate problem may solve itself.

Production must evidently precede distribution: if the 'natural increase' of population declines as rapidly and generally as many of the experts anticipate, the question of 'redistribution' would become purely academic. At the present moment it is actual and urgent.

The facts, though familiar to experts, may be briefly set forth. The population to the square mile is in the United Kingdom 483, in England 701, in New Zealand 13, in Canada 3, and in Australia 2. Leaving out of account Monaco, which has 5,750 inhabitants to the square mile, and Malta, which has 2,227, the only European countries comparable in density with England are Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgium has 702 and the Netherlands 627. Germany has 366, Italy 358, but France only 197. The figures ordinarily given for the Dominions need, however, to be corrected. The Astor Committee on Empire Migration, which reported in 1933, pertinently pointed out that physiographical considerations render

considerable areas of Canada unsuitable for permanent white settlement. Deducting these areas, the Committee put the average density of Canada, not at 3, but at 7.256 to the square mile. Of the Australian Commonwealth only three-fifths of the total area is similarly assumed to be habitable. The density would, on this assumption, be raised from 2 to 3.75, and of New Zealand from 13 to 16.8. But when all deductions have been made and all considerations taken into account, the stark figures are appalling.

## II

During the second half of the nineteenth century some 12,500,000 emigrants left England. Considerably more than half of them were bound for the United States. Between 1900 and 1913 the volume of emigration was larger than ever—aggregating about 7,000,000, or an annual average of half a million. Of these more than 50 per cent went to the United States, but nearly half a million went to Australia, an equal number to South Africa, and to Canada no fewer than 1,625,054. Between 1900 and 1909 1,297,217 persons, or 130,000 a year, left these shores for Empire destinations. But the peak was reached in the next four years when we were reinforcing the Overseas Empire at the rate of 304,000 per annum, or an aggregate of 1,217,710. All this migration took place with a minimum of assistance from the State. Only since the War has the Government of the United Kingdom played any direct part in Empire migration and settlement.

During the War itself migration naturally ceased. When it was re-

sumed in 1919, it was with the generous assistance of the State, which was deeply concerned about the fortunes of ex-service men who had lost their jobs, or had never had any. Much discrimination was exercised in the choice of these migrants, but not enough; and great embarrassment was thus caused to the Dominions and no little suffering inflicted on individuals. Between 1919 and 1922 Empire migration was at the rate of over 180,000 per annum.

In 1922 the Empire Settlement Act was passed. That Act was the outcome of a Conference held in 1921 between representatives of the British Government and the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Conference examined exhaustively the question of State-aided Empire settlement; its conclusions were endorsed by the Prime Ministers of the Empire. One who took an active and hopeful part in the passing of that Act must regretfully confess that it has been, on the whole, a dismal failure.

The Act empowered the British Government to coöperate with the Dominion Governments or with public or private organizations, such as the Church Army, the Salvation Army, Dr. Barnardo's Homes, etc., in carrying out agreed schemes for the assistance of suitable persons who wished to settle overseas. It was contemplated that the schemes would take different forms: for development or land settlement, for assisting suitable persons with grants or loans toward passage money, allowances for training or otherwise. The financial liability of the Home Government was limited for the first year to £1,500,000 and for the fourteen subsequent years to £3,000,000 a year. The Dominions



undertook, on agreed schemes, to contribute on the basis of £1 for £1 for that portion of the subvention spent on assisted migration.

The experiment fell on evil days. For the first seven years things went fairly well. Nearly 300,000 persons were assisted to migrate, mostly to Australia, but a large number also went to Canada, about 40,000 to New Zealand and a few to South Africa. In 1929 the economic blizzard blew through the world. It is a fact, established if paradoxical, that migration is 'a symptom of prosperity and not a cure for depression.' From the inauguration of the experiment down to December 31, 1928, the total number of emigrants assisted under the Act was only 405,396, and of the 107,841 who have migrated since 1928 more than half proceeded as 'full-fare-paying' passengers under the £10 rate to Canada. The total expenditure under the Act down to the end of last year was only £6,105,417, against an authorized expenditure of £43,500,000. Truly a pitifully meager result—a grievous disappointment of the high hopes entertained by the authors of the Act of 1922.

The fiasco must be attributed partly to the 'Act of God,' partly to the wilfulness and stupidity of man. With regard to the controllable reasons, let it be said at once that the admission or exclusion of immigrants is entirely a matter for the Dominions. In particular, they have plainly every right to insist upon a reasonably high standard of physical and moral fitness for those whom they choose to admit. Infinite harm has been done by the careless association of the problems of unemployment and Empire migration. The homeland has no right to saddle

the Dominions with the burden of its own unemployables. Nor, indeed, has it ever asserted the right. But suspicions have unquestionably been aroused in the Dominions by careless talk and irresponsible writing on this side. From the minds of responsible statesmen overseas the suspicion has by now been dissipated, but it persists among the ignorant masses.

And not only among the ignorant. The old 'lump of labor' fallacy is still widely accepted, especially among trade unionists in Australia. They have not forgotten the incident of the 'six hatters.' In 1903 six English hatters were, under an Act passed by the Commonwealth Parliament in 1901, refused permission to land at Melbourne. The immediate difficulty was overcome, but an article which appeared at the time in the *Sydney Bulletin* accurately reflected the general sentiment:—

'The right of Australia has been once and for all established definitely to keep out of this Continent English-born citizens if in her own interests she so chooses. . . . Australia . . . has shown that an Englishman is not necessarily welcome because he is an Englishman. The six hatters have made history.'

### III

Nobody denies the right thus bluntly asserted; but we may respectfully question the validity of the economic theory upon which the policy of the Australian trade unionists was and is based. It is, indeed, perfectly natural that when trade is depressed and unemployment figures are rising, highly-paid and highly-protected wage-earners should regard with jealousy the intrusion of competitors for such em-



ployment as is still available. But it is sometimes forgotten that producers are also consumers. What the secondary industries in the Dominions most urgently need today is expanding home markets. Despite high labor costs, they may or may not be able to compete in neutral oversea markets; but closer settlement would assure them a market at their own doors. Greater density of population may well bring them enhanced prosperity. On the narrower economic ground the restrictive policy of 'Labor' in the Dominions may, then, be impugned. But there are wider considerations.

'Australia,' wrote the *Sydney Bulletin*, 'has proved her power to keep Australia for the Australians.' As applied to immigrants from England, the words were true in 1903. As regards British immigrants, they are true in 1937. But in a wider sense? A 'white Australia' is a magnificent ideal. Australia can truthfully boast that her population is more nearly 100 per cent British than that of any other country—not excepting Great Britain—in the world. But what of the future—the immediate future? Can a vast continent, a territory of 3,000,000 square miles, be held by a population of 6,620,000 people?

The late Lord Northcliffe visited Australia in 1922 and was asked, on his departure, to give his opinion frankly about the future of that great country. He gave it. He declared himself to be 'profoundly impressed by its magnitude, its profuse wealth, . . . its emptiness and its defenselessness.' He was 'staggered,' he said, 'by the indifference of the Australian people to the vital question of population.'

'The key,' he insisted, 'to your white Australia ideal is population.

You must increase your slender garrison by the multiplication of your people. The world will not tolerate an empty Australia. This continent must carry its full quota of people . . . you have no option. Tens of millions of people will come to you whether you like it or not. You cannot hold up the human flood by a restrictive clause in an Act of Parliament.'

Lord Northcliffe's blunt words were at the time much resented in Australia. But they were true then, and they are equally true, and even more pertinent, today. Nor is the indifference noted by the great journalist any longer universal.

It is true that the Dominions now want men from Great Britain; but they want also money, and most of all they want *markets*. Rarely have I heard a speech from a Dominion statesman which did not lay equal emphasis on the three requirements in conjunction. Gladly will the Dominions welcome immigrants from the homeland, but there must be capital to set them to work, and for their surplus produce the Mother Country must provide protected markets.

#### IV

The situation is, then, decidedly more encouraging today than it has been for some time past. Parliament has extended the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 for a further period of fifteen years, though amended in two important respects. The maximum expenditure in any one year is cut down from £3,000,000 to £1,500,000; but as the largest amount ever expended under the expiring Act was, even in the 'peak' year, less than £1,250,000, the restriction is academic—the more so

as the Government has given an assurance that if the new maximum proves insufficient it will ask Parliament for more money. More welcome is the amendment by which the State subvention to the approved schemes of voluntary societies is increased from 50 to 75 per cent.

The voluntary societies—the Salvation Army, the Church Army, Dr. Barnardo's Homes and others—have continued even during the days of depression to do magnificent work for children. And for children and young unmarried women the demand of the Dominions has never ceased, though for women it has slackened.

Most encouraging is the awakening sense of the urgency of the problem now clearly discernible in the Dominions. They are exceedingly cautious in utterance. Rightly so. They will not encourage false hopes; they insist on reciprocity; they will admit migrants only if the homeland will furnish capital and guarantee markets. But the rise in the price of primary products is simplifying the trade position, and the wiser heads in the Dominions begin to realize the truth that capital expenditure has run ahead of population and that only by increasing population can the burden of overhead charges be diminished. No visitor to Canada, for instance, can fail to be struck by the fact that in regard to public buildings, hotels and much else, Canadians have been building with more faith than prudence for a future that cannot materialize without a rapid increase in population.

Can the homeland supply the men? That at present it can supply a great many is indisputable; that it can keep up the supply if the birth-rate at home

fulfills the fears of the pessimists is impossible. But if migration is resumed on a considerable scale, those fears will, I am convinced, be dissipated. The reasons for diminishing families are admittedly complex. They cannot be analyzed in a few sentences. But among them one of the most potent is the sense of overcrowding—the lack of elbow room. For deficiency of space migration is the obvious corrective.

The effect upon migration of schemes of social insurance was examined by an Inter-Departmental Committee in 1926. While holding that there were other causes more directly operative in restraint of migration, the Committee concluded that the cumulative effect of the various schemes was 'to counteract to an appreciable extent the attractions of the life of independence offered in the Dominions.'

Since then there has been a large increase of expenditure on the 'social services.' The effects are much more clearly manifest today than they could have been in 1926. There is, of course, no going back on the policy of social insurance. Consequently there are, I am persuaded, only two ways out of the impasse. One is the standardization of insurance schemes throughout the Empire. Failing that, it is imperative to devise some means by which insured persons shall not lose the benefit of their own contributions by migration to other lands under the flag. Meanwhile, there ought to be no lack of fit persons well qualified for life in the Dominions. Should the Dominions be chary in admitting them, they will learn, perhaps too late, that it is men that make commonwealths; that adequate population is an indispensable condition of prosperity.

Colonel Yuchi atones for his unpardonable sin against the Samurai code.

## Samurai Honor

By ALAN GRESHAM

From the *National Review*  
London Independent Conservative Monthly

COLONEL Heitaro Yuchi, of the Imperial Japanese Army, was sitting up in his cot in a private ward of the Base Hospital at Shanghai, swathed in bandages from head to foot, thinking deeply as he nursed his battered sword. He had long since reached the conclusion that the offense of which he had been guilty could be expiated only in one way. True, it was through no fault of his own that he had fallen alive into the enemy's hands after being left for dead on the battlefield, but the Samurai code knew no extenuating circumstances, and the sooner he vindicated his honor, the better.

He recapitulated for the hundredth time the events of his career. It had been an honorable one and his reminiscences were untinged by the pangs of remorse.

Yuchi's mind went back to his childhood, spent among soldiers, for his father had followed the ancestral profession of arms. He had passed through the several grades of cadet school, obtaining his commission in his father's old Regiment, to the command of

which he had now himself attained. To lead this famous Regiment into action had been his ambition, and now in the hour of its realization he had brought disgrace upon it and upon himself by committing the unpardonable sin against the military code.

He recalled the first important duty which he had performed as a young officer when his Regiment occupied a place of honor on the night of the Emperor Meiji's funeral. The suicide of General Nogi, just as the cortege of the Imperial Funeral was leaving the Palace appealed to him as to all his countrymen as a sublime act of self-devotion to one's lord. Nogi, the flower of chivalry in life, was beatified by the manner of his death, and Yuchi determined that Nogi should be his model.

He longed for active service, but with the world in profound peace he would have to wait for years. . . .

Then came 1914, the zodiacal 'year of the Tiger,' a year of ill omen, according to the soothsayers. There was an uneasy feeling of impending ca-

tastrophe. Then the conflagration broke out, Europe was plunged into the furnace and the flames of war spread to the East. Yuchi and his comrades regarded this as a stroke of good fortune. Congratulations were showered on his Regiment when it was sent to join the expeditionary force besieging Tsingtao.

He would always accord the honors of war to a beaten foe, but this wholesale surrender had merely increased his secret contempt for all foreigners in proportion as it raised his national *amour propre*. And from the European fronts came the news of other wholesale surrenders, which he would never have credited but for the examples of Port Arthur and Tsingtao.

Staff and regimental service alternated until he accompanied his Regiment to the Manchurian operations in the autumn of 193-. The Regiment was then transferred to the Shanghai War zone, where he found some semblance of the warfare which he had seen in Europe. Then came the memorable day, the crisis of his career, which had brought honor to the Regiment and shame to himself.

The Regiment was held up in the attack by a belt of wire entanglement which had escaped the attention of the artillery. An advance was of the utmost urgency. A party of volunteers stepped forward from the ranks offering themselves as 'human bombs.' With explosives packed around their bodies they had hurled themselves against the barbed wire, only to be blown to pieces in cutting a lane through which their comrades could advance to the attack. Yuchi had then led his men with great skill and gallantry in the furious assault which captured the enemy position. But the

success had cost the Regiment nearly all its officers, including himself, and severe casualties in the ranks. A rectification of the front line necessitated a withdrawal from this position. His men, encumbered with the wounded, had no opportunity to remove their dead, and hastily digging a shallow grave they buried their leader after removing his weapons and papers.

Upon reoccupying the ground, the enemy had excavated the burial trench. Perceiving signs of life in his blood-covered body his captors had dressed his wounds and removed him to a hospital. When sufficiently recovered he had been returned through the Red Cross to his own army, and placed in the Japanese Base Hospital.

## II

His sword and pistol, carefully preserved by his Regiment, were once more in his possession. He sat contemplating the weapons.

The sword lying across his knees had been passed down from father to son, an heirloom which many generations had carried into battle. On it were ancient bloodstains. 'A warrior's sword is his wife and child,' ran the poem. How he should have cherished its honor, making it the instrument of his own death sooner than being divorced and disowned by it! And now, blunted and battered, it could not even perform the last office for him. Well, what right had he to claim that honor from it, or from any of its kindred? He must perish by a meaner weapon.

He turned to the pistol at his side. It was empty and the pouch had no ammunition. . . .

An orderly interrupted his reverie

to announce that the Commander-in-Chief was on his way to visit the wounded in hospital. His Excellency would be here immediately.

'Leave me my sword, please,' he was saying as the Commander-in-Chief entered, accompanied by Colonel Watanabe, an old friend of Yuchi's subaltern days.

Yuchi's attempts at the ceremonial obeisance were cut short by the General, who bade him be at his ease. With many apologies Yuchi begged to be excused for his deficiencies as a host. The orderly brought in tea and cigarettes. The General's compliments on Yuchi's bravery in action and solicitude for his recovery were met by abject apologies for the disgrace which his unworthy body had brought on the Army by the retirement of his Regiment and by his being taken alive, with a hint that suitable reparation would be made at the first opportunity.

'But it was nobody's fault. Your conduct gained you promotion to full Colonelcy and your Regiment was mentioned in a Special Order of the Day.'

'Your Excellency is too generous. I have failed in my duty.'

Seeing his efforts at persuasion fruitless, His Excellency and Watanabe presently withdrew.

A few minutes later Watanabe reappeared.

'His Excellency has sent me to inquire if there is anything you desire.'

The two men understood each other.

'His Excellency is indeed kind.' Yuchi held up his battered sword. 'Look here, Watanabe, what use is a thing like that? And my pistol—no ammunition!'

Watanabe took the pistol. 'I'll see

to it, but it's quite unnecessary. As the General told you, the whole army couples your exploits with those of the "human bombs." Songs and poems about the Regiment and its heroes are already on all lips.'

'Pray don't mention it. You'll stand by to perform the last office of a friend? There is no further argument.'

'If you insist—well, get everything ready. I'll be back soon,' and Watanabe, placing the pistol in his pocket, left the ward.

### III

Yuchi took up from the table at his bedside a roll of rice-paper, poured some water on the ink-slab, rubbed on it the stick of ink, and carefully steeped his writing brush in the ebony fluid. First, he wrote to his parents.

'The sword is the instrument whereby a Samurai wipes out his dishonor. My sword's point is blunted, its edge is like a saw. I must therefore beg your forgiveness for using an inferior weapon.'

To his wife he wrote to remind his children in years to come that their father had preferred death to dishonor.

To his military superiors and to his Regiment he wrote in similar terms, reminding the latter that he was their father, and exhorting them to continue steadfast in their duties.

He then took out from a well-worn wallet a faded picture of his childhood home with his parents sitting on the veranda. He next extracted a photograph of his wife and children, which he laid beside the first picture.

Watanabe returned. 'Here is your pistol, loaded,' he said, handing Yuchi the weapon.

'Ah, Watanabe, very good of you. Tell the orderly that I am going to



sleep and do not wish to be disturbed.'

'And now we will make our preparations,' continued Yuchi. 'You will please deliver these letters at the first opportunity. I am unable to get into my uniform but you can pin my medals on the breast of my sleeping gown, so—thanks. Spread a clean towel before me on the bed—so—and place these portraits on it. My parents represent my ancestors and my children my descendants. They are the unworthy substitute for the August Portrait [i.e., of the Emperor]. My sword you will place on another clean towel across my knees. Thanks.'

A pause, and then after a deep breath:—

'You are my witness, Watanabe, that I am about to perform the rites according to rule as far as circumstances permit. I thank you heartily for your friendly offices.'

Watanabe bowed, and Yuchi continued: 'Bring me a basin of water and a clean towel—we must wash our hands—and give me a drink of water. Prepare the weapons. Place the pistol in front of me on the bed. Draw your sword to dispatch me as soon as I fire the shot, for should the bullet not prove fatal, I may be brought back to life as before. There must be no second disgrace.'

Watanabe having complied, Yuchi placed his hands on his thighs and bending forward as low as he could, proceeded in the ceremonial monotone to address the photographs before him: 'Honored Parents and Spirits of my Ancestors! I pray your forgiveness for the misdeed for which I am about to atone as far as the means at my disposal permit. You, my wife and children, will see that a true account is handed down to posterity.'

Yuchi remained motionless for a while, and then, drawing a deep breath, slowly raised himself to an upright sitting posture.

'I am ready,' and without averting his gaze from the portraits he reached for the pistol which Watanabe, bowing ceremoniously, carefully guided into his hand.

Placing the muzzle against his heavily bandaged head, Yuchi pulled the trigger. A sharp report and he crumpled on the bed.

#### IV

When Yuchi regained consciousness, his mind was whirling. Bending over him was his old friend Watanabe, who assured him that all was well, that everything would be explained later, and that at present they must not talk.

Yuchi was accordingly left to his own confused reflections, which became even more bewildered as full consciousness returned.

The following day the Commander-in-Chief again paid him a visit.

'Fully appreciating your honorable intention, I commanded Colonel Watanabe to undertake the office of comrade in your last moment. My instructions were that you should have your pistol loaded, but with dummy bullets that could do no more than stun you through your bandages. This is the explanation. Your splendid devotion is in the best traditions of the Samurai; it has inspired not only the Army but the Nation; the story of your sacrifice was spread throughout our forces and at home before the official announcement was issued that you were still happily alive bearing a charmed life. Samurai Honor is now satisfied.'

# Persons and Personages

## 'GRAND' MUFTI

From the *Sunday Express*, London Independent Conservative Weekly

**YOUNG**—he is only forty-four—crafty, fanatical, ambitious, Haj Amin El Husseini, 'Grand' Mufti of Jerusalem, has in sixteen years become the most powerful and the most sinister Arab in the Near East, arrogating in his own person the powers of a pope, a sovereign and a political leader.

No man in the Moslem world has, within living memory, struck so much terror in the minds of his own people and so much hate in the hearts of his enemies. No man has been such a dangerous thorn in the side of the British Administration of Palestine, or done as much to disturb the peace of the Holy Land.

To measure the extent of his ambitions and the power he has sought, you must imagine concentrated in him the aim to be a Hitler, a Mussolini, a Caliph, ruler of Islam—with the mentality and methods of an Al Capone. That and nothing less is this Arab leader.

The strangest thing in the remarkable career of Haj Amin El Husseini is that this most violent, ruthless, fanatical opponent of the partitioning of Palestine between Arabs and Jews owes his position, power and influence to a Jew!

In 1920 Haj Amin, then a little known young official, was sentenced by a British court to ten years' imprisonment for inciting the Arabs of Palestine to revolt, and for his agitation which led to a wave of murder and destruction in Palestine. He fled to Transjordan, where he remained in hiding.

Sir Herbert (now Viscount) Samuel then came to Jerusalem as first High Commissioner of Palestine with a policy of reconciliation based on the traditional principles of British Liberalism.

The practical application of this policy was to appease the dangerous men; and high up in the 'black list' presented to the High Commissioner by his officials he found the name of Haj Amin.

The exile, Samuel discovered, was a Husseini, a member of the most powerful family in Palestine and, even more important, a younger brother of the Mufti of Jerusalem, head of the Moslem religious community. One of Samuel's first acts was to pardon the fugitive, who returned to Jerusalem, his offense forgiven and bearing the halo of martyrdom in a holy cause.

Fortune smiled on the returned exile. Shortly after his return his brother, the Mufti, died. Rivalry for the office was bitter between the three great Arab families, the Husseini, the Khalidi and the Nashashibi.

Samuel, still bent on reconciliation, created a body called the Moslem Supreme Council, and announced an election for President. Haj Amin was a candidate, but the election found him only in fourth place. To the astonishment of his friends and the dismay of his rivals, Haj Amin awoke one morning to find himself Mufti and President of the Moslem Supreme Council.

Presumably for reasons of policy, but despite Haj Amin's record as a convicted, though pardoned, agitator, Sir Herbert Samuel had set aside the three better-placed candidates and appointed Husseini to the coveted post. Samuel's nomination was all the more inexplicable because Haj Amin had no real qualifications for a post which required religious scholarship and piety. It was, too, as subsequent events proved, a highly dangerous move, because his bitter and determined hatred of British policy in Palestine was to be proved over and over again.

Haj Amin had little or no religious background to qualify him for holy office. He had received only an elementary religious training in a Moslem and, subsequently, a Government school. At the age of nineteen he was sent to Al Azhar, the Moslem University in Cairo, where he lived in dire want, dependent on the five-pounds-a-month salary which his brother, the Mufti of Jerusalem, received from the Turkish Government.

When the Great War broke out he was sent to a Turkish officers' school in Constantinople. Later he joined the Turkish Army and fought against the Allies. After the British conquest of Jerusalem he returned home. Having no occupation, he obtained work in the British administration as a minor official.

At one time he was a junior clerk to the Arab assistant of Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, who has since described him as 'the immediate fomentor of the Arab excesses' in Palestine. Haj Amin passed to the Police Department, then to the Customs, and for a time served in the Intelligence Service. He was dismissed from the Government service and thereupon began a career of open agitation, with the avowed object of driving both Jews and British out of Palestine.

HIS unexpected appointment as Mufti and President of the Supreme Moslem Council gave him his chance. Far from being grateful for Sir Herbert Samuel's generosity, he set himself the task of raising the banner of Arab nationalism, of rousing the Arabs to rebellion, of preaching a *jihad*, or holy war, against the British and the Jews. He would raise armed forces and achieve his real ambition—to reach the pinnacle of

power as Caliph, supreme religious and lay head of all the Moslem peoples.

Haj Amin's first step was to assume the political as well as the religious leadership of the Palestine Arabs, using his hostility to the Jews as the lever to hoist himself into power. He proclaimed himself 'Grand' Mufti, a title hitherto unknown. He contrived to concentrate in his own hands the revenues of the Waqf, the Moslem religious establishments, derived from tithes, wills, property and other sources. These revenues have amounted to some \$300,000 a year.

Though the Palestine law requires full disclosure of these revenues, the Mufti has never produced a balance sheet and has kept his funds secret not only from the Government but from the Arabs as well. He has expended and administered these huge funds at his own absolute discretion. It is public knowledge that he has used them to create a rebel army in Palestine, to purchase and distribute arms and to finance rebellious political agencies.

As religious leader and financial controller, he has kept all the religious officials and teachers under absolute control and dependent on him for their pay and livelihood. By distributing funds, and as holder of the holiest Moslem office, he has wielded unchallenged sway among the fellahin—the peasants—who are always highly inflammable material for political agitation.

Added to the Mufti's power was his power as head of the Sharia, or religious courts, from which he has also derived large revenues.

Haj Amin's real ambition centered around making Jerusalem the Rome of Islam with himself as Caliph—the Moslem Pope with temporal powers. His chance came at a time when the Moslem world was in danger of disintegration. Turkey had abolished the Caliphate; King Hussein of the Hejaz had failed to secure the post because the Indian Moslems objected to him. King Ibn Saud, of Arabia, as a Wahabite 'non-conformist,' was ineligible, and the position of Mecca itself, as the Holy City of the Mohammedans, was uncertain.

Haj Amin therefore set about making Jerusalem the new Mecca and, by focusing on agitation against the Jewish settlement in Palestine, proclaimed himself the 'Defender of Islam,' with the special object of defending the Moslem Holy Places. He conceived the idea of creating a great Arab Empire with himself as Supreme Ruler. In 1931 he summoned a Pan-Islamic Conference in Jerusalem, and secured his nomination as Supreme Dictator and President of the Executive.

A curious thing about this Conference was the fact that delegates were appointed only by the Mufti's personal invitation. No others were eligible to participate.

His 'election' to the presidency of this conference achieved for him a

world-wide reputation as the leader in the fight for Arab freedom and for a united Moslem world. His immediate objective, however, was to rouse the Arabs of Palestine. With the huge funds at his disposal and his enormous religious influence, he set out to harass the British and the Jews.

Revolt after revolt in Palestine has been instigated and financed by him. From his secret office in Jerusalem he has directed murder and riot not only against the Jews and British, but against the Arabs themselves, for there have been numerous assassinations of 'moderate' Arabs who opposed him and refused to contribute to his 'war chest.'

For sixteen years this sinister figure has held Palestine at his mercy. Yet this avowed enemy of Britain was until October 1st a salaried official of the British Administration in Palestine.

A few days after he had been deposed as President of the Moslem Supreme Council by the British Administration he fled in disguise to Syria. And now, proclaiming himself a living martyr to the Moslem and Arab cause, he continues to wage implacable war against the British and the Jews from across the frontier.

### LÁZARO CÁRDENAS

By MARCO ARTURO MONTERO

Translated from *Claridad*, Buenos Aires Leftist Topical Monthly

**T**HERE are many sincere revolutionists who forget all proportion. By going too far or too fast in their reforms they cause a schism within their own ranks, which the forces of reaction utilize to destroy them. Mexico's revolutionary President, Lázaro Cárdenas, has not fallen into this error. He has gone about his great task of reform with energy, good will and a complete understanding of popular restlessness. He does his work quietly, without demagoguery.

Composure, in fact, is one of President Cárdenas's most striking characteristics. His habit of pondering over his words at decisive moments has often caused his impatient friends to become desperate and his enemies, the reactionaries, to take courage. To the former, Cárdenas's lack of aggressiveness is a sign of weakness; to the latter, it means indecision and therefore hope for themselves. Yet, when the actual decision must be reached, he acts with such precision, courage and political dexterity that even those most experienced in these matters are astonished.

Cárdenas has given much time to the study of Mexico's problems. He is aware that many of the existing evils are too deeply rooted to be remedied by sudden drastic action. He understands the implications of



the problems he is trying to solve, both at home and abroad, and he does not under-estimate the grave danger of reaction if too many enemies should be created at one time. He knows that an aggressive attitude and theatrical gestures can, at certain times, raise a storm of popular enthusiasm, but he also realizes that actions based on the emotions are far more likely to lead to disaster.

This rational outlook is very important, and it is the key to Cárdenas's success. It is no exaggeration to say that in his short term as President he has achieved a record of social reforms that has never been equaled in any similar period in Mexico's history. He has sapped the vested interests of Mexican reaction and he has prevented the growth of Fascism. All that he has done, he has done with serenity, with vision and with a deep knowledge of the interests and psychology of the Mexican people. His enemies have been confused by his personal honesty. Only such a man as Cárdenas could have thrown Plutarco Elias Calles, the old wolf of Mexican politics, from his pedestal.

IT IS important to remember that the revolutionary work of his administration is, above all, Cárdenas's own personal achievement. And that is the main reason for the people's almost delirious worship of their President. For Cárdenas has but one thought in mind: to serve the people of Mexico. This ideal stands revealed in every word that he utters. It also accounts for his frequent trips throughout his country. Once, when a petty critic scoffed at his 'slumming expeditions,' Cárdenas replied: 'It is necessary that the Mexican people, and especially the forgotten peasants, should understand that the President of the Republic is a man no different from other men, yet a man who has the inescapable obligation of serving his people. By going among them I am attempting to raise the dignity of our people.'

Thus we see Lázaro Cárdenas dressed in simple clothes, seated on a hard floor in the company of peasants, sharing both their food and their hopes. We watch him listening to them attentively, honestly, inquiring minutely into their thoughts the better to understand their needs and desires. Children, women, old men, workers, peasants, students—all who are working for a better Mexico—approach Cárdenas without embarrassment, without doubts and with the simplicity of those who know they will be heard. Official complaints do not suffice for him. Whenever possible, he is determined to make a personal investigation. His visits are always fruitful; and his enemies fear him on that account. They do not know on what day or at what hour they may be surprised by his appearance, but they know from experience that his visit will have positive results.

The attitude of the Mexican people is, in a certain sense, however,

conditional. It will follow Cárdenas and aid him enthusiastically as he travels along the road of revolutionary accomplishment, and it will endorse the limits he himself fixes, provided the gains already achieved are not compromised. Inasmuch as Cárdenas has devoted himself honestly to the task of bettering the lot of the Mexican workers, they give him their wholehearted support. Nothing in the President's character or political life indicates that he will waver from that course.

### MAETERLINCK AT SEVENTY-FIVE

By ÉMILE VANDERVELDE

Translated from *Vendredi*, Paris Liberal Weekly

ON HIS seventy-fifth birthday it is with justice that we celebrate Maeterlinck as one of our greatest glories. But what a contrast there is between the Maeterlinck—the Count Maeterlinck—of today, the Academician and, if I am not in error, a member of the nobility of Leopold III, and the Maeterlinck whom I knew and for whom I had the respect and affection of a younger brother fifty years ago.

There was in Brussels at that time, in the home of Doctor Heger of the University, a very democratic salon that was frequented for the most part by his students and former students, by biologists, doctors and students of medicine. I went there often. And sometimes one met there two unknown young poets named Emile Verhaeren and Maurice Maeterlinck. Both were Flemings, but spoke and wrote French.

Who could have imagined then that Maeterlinck, the sensitive poet, the aesthete and mystic, the author of *Serres Chaudes* and *Princesse Maleine*, would one day end up as a solid citizen of Ghent, wealthy and deeply concerned about his worldly interests?

When we founded, with Louis de Brouckère, the *Cercle* of Socialist students and former students, Maeterlinck, then a young lawyer without clients, was among the first to join. It is somewhat amusing now to recall that, by reason of that affiliation, the author of *Pelléas and Mélisande* was for several years a member of the Belgian Workers' Party.

His revolutionism was, as I look back, far more aggressive than that of Emile Verhaeren. His anti-bourgeois prejudice was similar to that of Flaubert. Offended by the Beotism of a government which had refused to assure him the creative leisure he desired by appointing him a justice of the peace, as it had done in the case of another poet, Emile van Arenbergh, he lost no opportunity to launch invectives against those in power. When the Socialists began the campaign which was to result just

after the War in the achievement of universal suffrage without plural voting, Maeterlinck gave them his resolute support.

I still have in my possession the May 1st issues of our paper, *Peuple*, which were published during this campaign. In them I find articles by Anatole France, Camille Lemonnier and Emile Verhaeren. In them I also find articles by Maeterlinck. The last he wrote was for the issue of May 1, 1913. He wrote then: 'It is inscribed in the instinct of the masses as indestructibly as in bronze, that all the peoples of the world have the natural right to pass through this phase of the political evolution of the human polypary and to question, each in its turn, and in its own language, the possibilities of happiness that such an evolution brings them.'

It was a plea for political equality written, as one can see, in moderate terms. When one reads it today one sees emerging another Maeterlinck. He is still a democrat, certainly, but not without reservations. Eighteen months later came the catastrophe.

When I saw him after the War in his villa at Nice, where he was raising his bees, I had a clear impression that during those bloody years a great gulf had been created between us, and that the man whom I saw before me, who had become a rabid nationalist, a conservative hostile to democracy, was no longer the man whom once I had loved and admired. He has described himself in his last work, *Le Sablier*, as retired from action, aloof from his former friends, having taken refuge in a sort of skeptical and disillusioned aristocratism. 'All that distinguishes the intellectual élite from the masses that swarm in the lower depths,' he wrote, 'is a few observations, a few reflections, a few shaky hypotheses upon which they painfully rise to launch themselves into the great wind of the unknown.'

After all, what does it matter that he has changed? His work remains with us. We have the best of his work, his *Treasure of the Humble* and his *Life of the Bee*, and whatever he thinks and says now, these works, which the new generation does not know as it should, still contain his early spirit, the ideas of his youth and of his ripened manhood. At a time when the Belgian workers struggled with stubborn energy to escape from the abyss of misery and ignorance in which they had suffered through three centuries of slavery, Maeterlinck had stretched out his hand to them. I have not forgotten it and neither has the working class.

A rare account of the Spanish War by  
a writer who has observed both sides.

## Reconnaissance *in* Spain

From the *Sunday Times*  
London Conservative Sunday Paper

**F**AILING a radical change in the international aspect of the Spanish struggle, the odds point to a victory for General Franco. Having visited the front lines on both sides, I can only wonder that the Valencia troops have held out as long as they have. Government soldiers are still fighting in sand-shoes and ragged corduroy trousers, while Franco's troops are well equipped. They are also better organized and disciplined.

Of the Government's 600,000 soldiers there are possibly fewer than 4,000 who have ever had any previous military experience. The majority of the 20,000 international volunteers fighting for Valencia are not trained soldiers but factory workers, miners and laborers. The Russians are estimated at about 2,000, consisting of air-pilots, officers, gunners and technicians.

Apart from Franco's civilian conscription, he has 80,000 Italians, who include three regular army divisions; he has an experienced foreign legion,

the hard-fighting Moorish regiments, the Guardia Civil, the regular Spanish army and 10,000 German technicians and air-pilots.

The Government army has been organized by Russians on Soviet lines. Everyone from general to private is '*camarada*,' and each battalion has a political commissar whose duty it is to interpret to the soldiers the orders issued by their officers. It is considered barbarous that soldiers should be submitted to a 'theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die' régime. When it is necessary to dig trenches after a day's fighting, it is left to the commissar to convince them of the necessity of it.

Even more significant than this, however, is the Government's lack of officers. Most of the present officers are soldiers who have risen from the ranks and completely lack technical military training. There is even a dearth of general staff officers to plan out the strategy of the campaigns; and although the Government controls the

larger part of the Spanish fleet, its ships lie impotently in the harbors because there are no officers to navigate them.

Even today in Loyalist Spain it is impossible to find out who is the Generalissimo. And, incredible as it may seem, the Soviet officers are recalled to Russia every six months and replaced by new men. A Russian general on the Madrid front, who had been in Spain about four months, told me that he would soon be returning to Moscow. It seemed strange at the time, but I thought that this was merely optimism that the war would soon be over. However, in Salamanca a few weeks ago, I interviewed a captured Russian air-pilot who told me that the entire staff was changed every six months so that the army should not become tainted with the capitalistic ideology.

Although the army and air force are under the control of Soviet leaders, the majority of working-class people in Loyalist Spain are not fighting for Communism, but for the ten pesetas a day they are paid under the present Republican régime, as compared with the wage of one peseta under Franco.

If Loyalist Spain succeeded in winning the war, however, it is more than likely that they would be submerged by a Soviet rule. The Communists deny this, but considering that nothing but a strong and ruthless dictatorship could hold post-war Spain together, it would obviously be inevitable.

If there had been no Right-wing uprising, it is extremely doubtful that the Republic would ever have been driven into a Soviet régime. Although it is true that before the Franco uprising the Republic was unable to main-

tain discipline, and that there were many outrages and shootings, the fault must not be wholly attributed to a bad Republican Government. From the first day of the Republic in 1931, Right-wing groups began to plot its downfall. Even today, in Insurgent Spain, officials who failed to resign their jobs when the Republic was declared, and maintained friendly relations with the Government, even for a limited period, are regarded as 'suspect.'

The Insurgents declare that if they had waited a few weeks longer to rise against the Republic a Bolshevik revolution would have broken out, insisting that Russia had been arming Spain for five years. Considering, however, that when Mola marched up to the gates of Madrid last November the Government troops had only fourteen hundred rifles, eight machine guns and one cannon with which to defend the city, this appears to be an exaggeration.

## II

The resistance of Republican Spain is strengthened by an active terror of Fascist rule, fanned by Valencia propaganda. The bombing of such towns as Malaga and Guernica are advertised by Valencia as examples of 'Fascist butchery.' When I arrived in Salamanca, a Press officer asked if I had been subjected to the Guernica propaganda, declaring that everyone knew that Guernica was not bombed by the Whites, but burned by the Reds. He offered to drive me up there so I could see for myself; so one afternoon we motored over from Bilbao.

Guernica was a lonely chaos of timber and brick, like an ancient civilization in the process of being excavated.



There were only three or four people in the streets; one old man was standing inside an apartment house that had four sides to it but an interior that was only a sea of bricks; it was his job to clear away the *débris*, which seemed a life work, for with each brick he threw over his shoulder he stopped and mopped his forehead.

Accompanied by the Press officer, I went up to him and asked him if he had been in Guernica during the destruction. He nodded his head, and when I inquired what had happened, he waved his arms in the air and declared that the sky had been black with planes—'*aviones*,' he said, '*italianos y alemanes*.'

The Press officer turned pale. Guernica was burned, he contradicted. The old man, however, stuck to his point, insisting that after a four-hour bombardment there was little left to burn. The Press officer moved me away. 'He's a Red,' he snapped.

We talked to two more people, and both of them gave us the same story about the airplanes. The Press officer became silent, and when, later in the day, we ran into two of General Davila's staff officers, he brought up the subject again. 'Guernica's full of Reds,' he said, 'they all try to tell us it was bombed, not burned.'

'Of course it was bombed,' said one of the staff officers, 'we bombed it, and bombed it, and bombed it, and, *bueno*, why not?' The Press officer never mentioned Guernica again.

In following the campaign in the Asturian mountains, it was pitiful to witness the terror of the civilian population fleeing before Franco's advance. Upon entering many villages only a few hours after the Government troops had retreated there was often

not a sign of life; even the children and the old people had gone.

This terror, of course, is not merited. When Franco's troops enter new towns they bring truck-loads of food for the civilian population, and immediately set up an orderly régime—more orderly than under the authority of the Republic. The villages are clean and well organized; there is plenty of food and petrol, and even the roads are well cared for.

In cities such as Bilbao and Santander, which held out during long sieges, there are many hundreds of German technicians engaged on the water supplies to guard against typhoid, working on the reconstruction of the docks and repairing the electrical systems. These technicians are also reconstructing the bridges that have been blown up by the retreating Asturian miners. Laborers and road gangs of prisoners work all night, erecting temporary structures with remarkable efficiency.

### III

Although the civilian population is well fed and well treated in the towns occupied by Franco, those persons who have held positions under the Government meet with a different fate. I entered Santander a few hours after Franco's troops, driving from Bilbao with a young army officer who is one of five judges now sitting on the Military Tribunal.

I attended the Tribunal one morning and heard the cases of four men, tried in one group. Three were army officers—two lieutenants and one colonel—and the fourth had been Secretary to the Treasurer of Santander. The prosecution and defense took ap-

proximately fifteen minutes, the prosecution asking for the death penalty and the defense asking for leniency on the grounds that they had been conscripted for the army and that the Secretary to the Treasurer had committed no crime while in office.

The Court was cleared for the verdict, but when it adjourned for luncheon I asked the lieutenant what the sentence had been. He replied that they had been condemned to death. Upon inquiring what the standard for the death penalty was, he answered: 'All officers, all Government servants and all men and women who have denounced Whites.' He said that they had heard sixteen cases that morning and fourteen had been condemned to death.

Several weeks later, in Salamanca, an official bulletin was published stating that out of 4,000 prisoners tried, only thirty-five had been condemned to death. I could scarcely believe, however, that I had happened to select the one morning on which nearly half of these sentences had been imposed.

The 'denouncing' system continues to operate with full force. The most innocent remark may be interpreted as 'unsympathetic,' and with little explanation the indiscreet one will find himself in jail. The close coöperation in which Italy and Germany are working with Spain is revealed by the fact that several correspondents were placed under arrest, then asked to leave the country, because they had written several years ago against the Fascist and Nazi régimes.

Although the Italian army has been leading the campaign in the North, the Spaniards are not generous in praising their fighting ability. 'They are all right,' they say, 'as long as they have

Spanish officers.' This, however, should be taken more as an indication of Spanish character, which does not look too tolerantly upon foreigners, rather than a reflection on the Italian forces.

Although it is true that the Italians had little opposition in the Asturian campaign—because the Northern Government lacked planes and ammunition—journalists who accompanied them from Bilbao to Santander speak highly of their organization.

I was in Santander when the Italians celebrated their victorious entry by parading triumphantly through the city. The parade lasted for three hours, while tanks, lorries and armored cars thundered through the city. The bewildered population of Santander lined the streets with open mouths as pictures of the Duce were plastered on the buildings, and black-plumed Italians on motorcycles zoomed down the streets, followed by battalion after battalion of steel-helmeted troops.

When Franco organized his rebellion, it is doubtful that he ever envisaged the international complications that would ensue, but the fact remains that he is neither strong enough nor clever enough to maintain a balance against Hitler and Mussolini. And to-day he no longer wishes to attempt to do so.

In Spain it is openly stated that the most important payment Italy and Germany will receive for their assistance will be a strong Spanish alliance and the use of strategic ports and gun positions.

Franco is assured that Italy and Germany will not expand territorially at Spain's expense; he boasts that with Fascism united there will be bigger plums to pick.

Decisions of the greatest importance to the peace of Europe must soon be made at Vienna and at Bucharest; two writers explain the issues at stake.

# Watch *on the* Danube

## I. AUSTRIA IN BALANCE

By ALBERT MOUSSET

Translated from *Europe Nouvelle*, Paris Political Weekly

THE Berlin-Rome Axis has been the greatest threat to Eastern Europe since the World War, but its effects in that quarter have been somewhat paradoxical. Logically, Hungary should have found in the Axis a pretext for an uncompromising attitude toward her Little Entente neighbors. Austria ought logically to have found in it a new cause for discouragement. And yet the Budapest Government is actually showing a new spirit of conciliation, while that of Vienna is bearing itself with a composure which amazes friend and foe alike. And both in Vienna and Budapest they speak openly about creating a Danubian system, although both know very well that Rome and Berlin have always regarded projects of this kind with the keenest suspicion and distaste.

We are forced to conclude, then, that the meeting between Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini, far from intimidating Eastern Europe as the two dictators expected, has, on the contrary, caused it to lean toward a more independent policy, and to assume all the risks such a course involves.

How does the Austrian question now stand in the light of the Berlin talks? We remember that in Venice the two dictators were unable to find a solution that was satisfactory to both. Last April, Mussolini contented himself with advising Chancellor Schuschnigg not to adopt an anti-German attitude, adding that the Rome-Berlin Axis was merely a 'temporary political necessity.' The truth was that Hitler then needed to maintain at least the appearances of his friendly

agreement with Austria of July 10, 1936, while the Duce thought only of preserving Austrian independence.

Today the situation is entirely different. By his intervention in Spain, Mussolini has committed himself to a strong policy against France and England in the Mediterranean—a policy to which he had to sacrifice his Danubian ambitions. Evidence of the change can be found in his pushing Hungary into the arms of the Little Entente, after he had pursued for the last fifteen years a policy entirely opposed to any rapprochement of that kind. Why? Because from the moment he abdicated his active claims in Eastern Europe, he had no other way of preserving the independence of the Succession States, with the little influence he had retained in that quarter, than to direct them toward a sort of economic federation. From his rôle as Austria's protector, the Duce has descended to that of 'Moral Patron.' In this guise he encourages new combinations which might arise even without his initiative.

## II

Germany has not been deceived by this stratagem. While Rome plumps for a Danubian economic entente, the German press breathes fire and brimstone at the very idea that such an organization might be created at the Reich's expense. The Hodza-Schuschnigg interview made clear, by the reactions it provoked from both sides, the relative positions of Italy and Germany. It is known that the Austrian Chancellor and the Czechoslovakian Premier met at Baden while Mussolini was Hitler's guest. The meeting was unattended by pomp or

publicity. Officially, the two statesmen discussed only economic questions, relating to trade and to Czechoslovakia's share of the International Loan to Austria in 1923.

These were discussions at which no one could fairly take umbrage. Nevertheless, the *Völkischer Beobachter* has accused Prague of seeking to establish a Danubian economic system that would prejudice German interests. Yet M. Hodza in his statements has never once neglected to emphasize the necessity of German and Italian coöperation to the success of any Danubian scheme of economic rationalization. The arguments of the Nazi paper do not hold water. They are merely pretexts that are being advanced in the hope of nipping any Danubian pact in the bud.

The current negotiations have only a very modest significance. They are interesting mainly because they may be a prelude to a more general understanding between the States of the Little Entente and those of the Rome Protocols (concluded between Italy, Austria and Hungary in 1935). The general nature of the relations between these two groups has been the object of diverse interpretations. Just now the main obstacle to a rapprochement is the Rumanian position on the minorities question.

For the moment there is apparent only a new atmosphere, the basis for a new orientation, rather than any definite scheme, and to go beyond that would be premature and might provoke dangerous reactions. Already Mr. Beck's trip to Vienna has caused considerable apprehension. Poland's policy in Central Europe is a factor which is too often neglected. The Warsaw Cabinet is interested in

preventing both *Anschluss* and a Danubian confederation. It realizes that if Germany should annex Austria, all the weight of Germany's will to expand will be immediately brought to bear on the Silesian frontiers. Poland also knows that a Danubian Entente would deprive her of her trump card, the bogey of Hungarian revenge, on which she has depended to threaten Czechoslovakia and intimidate Rumania. For these reasons she desires the maintenance of the *status quo* along the Danube, and that fact must be remembered.

### III

Meanwhile Chancellor Schuschnigg carries on in Austria a surprisingly vigorous struggle against the extreme Right and extreme Left. He is supporting the Patriotic Front, around which, in his opinion, all those who wish to preserve Austrian independence should rally.

The German *Kulturkampf* provides him with an invaluable argument for Catholic support. He would like to gather around him both the *Nationalbetont* (national-minded) and the Socialists—or at least to unload upon the illegal organizations all the extremist elements from both groups. He would then be free to work with the rest. This maneuver has not succeeded. He is now going back to his supreme desire: restoration of the Habsburgs.

The Legitimists are again taking the offensive. On October 4th, Baron Wiesner, representing Archduke Otto, declared: 'The objections of the Little Entente to the restoration of the Habsburgs have been largely surmounted. Henceforth our offensive will be directed principally against

the Austrian Nazis and the Marxist extremists.'

By encouraging the Legitimists, Chancellor Schuschnigg can hardly conciliate the extremist groups. Besides, the Legitimists do not appear to realize that if the Little Entente has soft-pedaled its opposition to the Habsburgs, it was precisely because Germany's veto has made their opposition unnecessary. Baron von Neurath recently told Chancellor Schuschnigg that he was opposed not so much to monarchy as to the Habsburgs, expressing once more the view set forth in *Mein Kampf*. He added that Germany might, perhaps, accept a Liechtenstein.

'Why not a Wittelsbach (the Bavarian Royal House)?' the Chancellor replied with sarcasm. It is obvious that Dr. Schuschnigg will not compromise on this matter. He expects restoration by means of *Volksentscheidung*. He has not once used the word '*Volksbestimmung*.' This is significant because it means that he does not intend to hold a plebiscite on the Habsburg question, but that he will arrange to have the restoration demanded by the Austrian Burgomasters, who are subservient to the Government's wishes.

This is a dangerous game. It can only result in a revival of Nazi agitation and furnish Germany with new pretexts for undermining Schuschnigg's position.

One fact remains: Germany has destroyed one after another the international guarantees that put Austrian independence under the protection of the Great Powers. She has broken up the Stresa front, separated France and England from Austria and put the latter under a sort of Italo-German



condominium. To have her hands free in Austria she needed only to pay off the Italian mortgage. Today this has been done. Germany will doubtless continue officially to recognize Austrian sovereignty. But she holds in reserve a subtle distinction between sovereignty and independence, which makes all the difference in the world. This ambiguity has its counterpart in Austrian policy. Austria formally calls herself a 'German' State, but she refuses to permit the Reich to dictate

the duties that would seem to proceed from this definition.

For the moment she has no other alternative than an agreement with the other Succession States. It is the only measure of safety left for the Schuschnigg régime. And it is hardly necessary to add that France would give both moral and material support to such an entente. The scheme might work, but only under one condition: that no crisis supervenes in Austria's domestic affairs.

## II. RUMANIA AT THE CROSSROADS

By PRINCE KARL ANTON ROHAN

Translated from the *Pester Lloyd*, Budapest German-Language Daily

WHEN King Carol returned from his recent visit to Western Europe he conferred with Premier Tatarescu. The latter then announced that all decisions affecting the internal policy of Rumania had been postponed. It was generally assumed that the present Liberal Ministry would remain in office until the new year, thus giving the Crown time in which to make decisions which may vitally affect the future policy not only of Rumania but indirectly of all Europe. Next spring elections will take place, and in Rumania the Government in power normally wins the elections. It follows, therefore, that whoever is called to power by the King on the eve of the elections is almost certain to remain in control of Rumanian politics for the ensuing four years.

Three distinct political factions are in the arena: the Right, comprising the Goga and Cuza (National Christian Party) and the Vaida-Voevod groups; the Liberal Center (the group now in

power); and the Left Democrats (National Peasant Party). If this were merely a domestic conflict, Europe would have little interest in the outcome. However, the fluctuations of the last few months within the Little Entente, the relations of the Little Entente with Hungary, and tremendous efforts by Moscow, Prague and the French People's Front for a change in Bucharest that would be favorable to their policies are ample proof that this is far more than a mere domestic matter. In the struggle between the international People's Front on the one hand, and the European dictatorships on the other, King Carol at present occupies a key position. The Tardieu plan for a Danubian Entente, which has been revived by Chancellor Hodza, the practical value of the pact between Czechoslovakia and Russia, and finally the Franco-Russian alliance are all dependent upon a Rumania that is friendly toward the People's Front.

The first of the postponed decisions which Rumania must make is in regard to Hungary. A changed attitude is desirable. It is likewise desirable to bring about a change in the European attitude toward Rumania's Magyar minorities. Here reasons of state demand concessions from Rumanian Chauvinism. But we know from experience that Nationalists, even though they profess the contrary in their election propaganda, are better able to bring about a reconciliation with alien groups than the Leftists, who are always in danger of being charged with treason by the Nationalists.

The second decision is concerned with the long discussed right-of-way for the Russian Army through Rumania. Here the whole of present-day European politics is at stake. The Berlin-Rome Axis is fighting for an honest understanding with Western Europe. Whether or not this would mean renewing the Four-Power Pact is a mere matter of form. But without a revival at least of that spirit of European coöperation which brought about the Four-Power Pact, Europe faces a catastrophe. The People's Front is fighting against an understanding between the Powers of the Berlin-Rome Axis and Western Europe and for the ever increasing participation of Russia. As the latter is a factor of unrest, the objective of the People's Front seems to be the division of Europe into two hostile ideological camps. Should Rumania definitely decide against the Russian right-of-way, that is to say, against the Titulescu policy, this would necessarily result in a rapprochement between Bucharest and Belgrade within the Little Entente, and in a broader sense an inclination toward the Berlin-

Rome Axis with stronger emphasis upon the alliance with Poland.

In the face of these relationships it is easily understood that European diplomacy is much concerned with the Rumanian problem. France is exercising all her influence to keep Rumania in line and to win the right-of-way for Russia. While Great Britain by no means desires any further expansion of Russian influence in Central Europe, she is at present so dependent on France in the Mediterranean that she does not, at least actively, oppose France where a Danubian pact is concerned. The constructive European policy of the Berlin-Rome Axis is necessarily concerned with preventing the imminent danger of Rumania's supporting the international People's Front, and with strengthening Bucharest in its position as the Easternmost outpost of Europe.

## II

The Liberals at present in power in Rumania have been able to avoid any decisions on the country's foreign problems. They have clung to the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact, remained faithful to their French alliance, renewed the somewhat threadbare pact with Poland. But relations with Rome and Berlin have also become a little friendlier in recent months.

If King Carol intends to continue this vague policy, which is almost devoid of concrete advantages, he will probably do what a few months ago would have been regarded as impossible, namely, entrust the Liberals with the formation of an elected Government. If, however, he tends more strongly toward the interna-

tional People's Front policy, then he would logically have to call upon the National Peasant Party with whom Titulescu is closely associated. Their appointment, therefore, would be tantamount to the revival of Titulescu's pro-French foreign policy against which King Carol conducted a tenacious struggle for years—until he finally felt strong enough to remove the undesirable Foreign Minister. Should King Carol decide against the Popular Front and for an improvement of relations with the Berlin-Rome Axis, he would have to form a Rightist Government, probably under the experienced statesman Vaida-Voevod.

In view of the confused situation in Spain and the negotiations between the Great Powers of the Four-Power Pact, experts in Rumanian affairs believe that the National Peasant Party may possibly come to power under certain conditions. Apparently the former National Peasant Vaida-Voevod has recognized this possibility and kept on good terms with his old

friends. Participation by Vaida-Voevod in a coalition Government comprising the National Peasant Party and parts of the Right would indeed have strong domestic backing. Outwardly it would mean a clear rejection of Titulescu's People's Front policy, without endangering the last ties to France and the members of the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact.

Prophecy, however, is idle. The decision of the Crown seems to have been postponed. It is expected within the next few weeks, and when it is made it will determine not only the fate of Rumania but also the fate of Europe—and of this Europe is aware.

*[Premier Tatarescu's resignation on November 14th and his reappointment three days later appear to have left the situation in Rumania unchanged. The vital decisions on domestic and foreign problems which, according to Prince Roban, the country must soon make, seem only to have been postponed a little longer. THE EDITORS]*

#### WHO'S WHO IN SPAIN?

How can a majority of the Spanish people in Spain be called 'Rebels' against Spain? How can a subversive minority be called 'Loyalists?'

—Mr. George Glasgow

As to the claim that General Franco represents an overwhelming majority of the Spanish people, why have hundreds of thousands of refugees fled before him into Government territory? I have heard of no corresponding movement on any comparable scale from Government to Insurgent-controlled areas.

—Duchess of Atholl

An outstanding authority discusses  
the problems that now confront India.

# Looking Forward *in* India

By BARON MESTON

From the *Contemporary Review*  
London Topical Monthly

ONE autumn afternoon, close on thirty years ago, I was walking down the Mall at Simla with the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale. The Morley-Minto reforms had just been announced, and Gokhale was greatly excited over a measure of advance in India's political life for which he had long labored. In answer to some question about the future, he suddenly turned to me and said: 'From this beginning, if my people will only use their opportunities carefully and well, they will have self-government in fifty years.' Besides being a great patriot, Gokhale was also a very wise man; and his prophecy does not sound so startling today as it did at the time. Indeed, it is interesting to speculate how the advance might have developed if Gokhale's condition had been fulfilled and Indian leaders had used their opportunities differently.

There is nothing to be gained, however, by moralizing over lost opportunities; and despite them, we are—and we may legitimately take credit for the fact—not substantially behind

Gokhale's time-table. For within the last few weeks the third momentous stage has been reached, and the great Provinces of India have become, in a very effective sense, self-governing in their own spheres. The boycott of the Provincial Cabinets by the Congress (or advanced Nationalist) Party has been raised, and in the six Provinces where it had necessitated the formation of makeshift Ministries, the leaders of the majorities in their various legislatures are now taking over the administration.

The impasse, while it lasted, was due partly to a legacy of silly braggadocio as to how the new Constitution must be smashed, and partly to the indomitable Oriental instinct for bargaining in the hope of still further concessions. Mixed with these causes were the woeful mistrust and suspicion which have dogged all our efforts to prepare India for political manhood.

The blame is not, we must admit, all on one side; we have been just as

distrustful of the good faith of many Indian leaders as they have been of ours, and the charge of exploitation in the past is not always easy to rebut. But slogans in India have a tendency to degenerate into parrot-cries. The doctrine, assiduously preached by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, that the new Constitution is only a device for preserving the vested interests of British officials and capitalists has surely lost any truth it ever contained. It has also outlived its usefulness, as the more sensible Nationalists have come to realize.

## II

Whatever be the influences which ended the deadlock, the situation is now clear; in several of the chief Provinces, Indian politicians whom we have hitherto known only as violent anti-Government agitators are firmly established in the seats of power. How are they going to use their power? The best answer, of course, is that which will be given in time by the deeds of the new Ministers. But their deeds will in some measure—in a larger measure than we often imagine—be influenced by what is expected of them. If British opinion generally, and not only its more pessimistic sections, is convinced that nothing but disaster can ever come out of the new régime, then disaster is quite a probable issue. If on the other hand we believe—and show our belief by all reasonable co-operation and tolerance—that Indian Ministers will make good, it is at least probable that they will do so. Distrust has begotten nothing but distrust in the past; it is time to try whether confidence is capable of begetting confidence.

Congress leaders who have accepted

Ministerial office are popularly credited with having to make a choice between two alternatives, and two only; either, as one writer recently put it, 'to wreck the Constitution and return to the political wilderness, or to work the Act in order to prove that its limitations are such as to prevent the expression of Indian aspirations.' If these are the only options—and on that point there is a good deal more to be said—the second, at least, need not disturb us. There has never been any claim that the Act of 1935 is final: it is a milestone from which further advance will be measured. The solemnly declared policy of the British Parliament is 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'

That development is obviously far from complete; whatever be the precise meaning of Dominion status, we all know its general import. The proper way to work for it is within the frame of the new Constitution; and if Ministers of the Congress faith adopt this method, they will be doing nothing more or less than patriotic men have habitually done in those Dominions which have already achieved full self-government.

Far more serious is the other suggested alternative. Officially, the Congress has been consistently and vehemently iconoclastic. The new Constitution must be destroyed root and branch, by any means and at all costs. A Constituent Assembly must be convened to frame another scheme of government, based upon the people's will. The whole conception of a federation with the States and a central federal



government must go; the Princes must be told to mind their own business and democratize their own domains without delay.

All this, and more like it, figured in the election addresses last year. Are these menaces now going to be translated into action? An answer which finds favor with some observers is that, by taking office, the Congress has, so to speak, estopped itself from pursuing a policy of wrecking; that the mere fact of holding portfolios is a tacit acceptance of the existing Constitution. There is some force in this, but not too much. The logical dilemma is one from which the subtle Indian mind would have no difficulty in escaping; the question of sabotage from within has been too often canvassed to cause any real embarrassment about reviving it now if so desired.

### III

Are there, however, only the two alternatives which our pessimists ascribe to the new Ministers? Is there not a third? Is it not conceivable that they should, on taking office, turn their minds to making a success of it, as the first and most effective evidence of their fitness for the responsibility with which they have not hitherto been entrusted? Most of us who have had dealings with the more prominent members of the Congress Party will admit that they include men of marked business capacity; get them off the platform and away from politics, and their minds move, in the conduct of the ordinary extra-domestic affairs of life, on very much the same lines as our own. Men of that stamp find a special attraction in the organization of a big going concern; and the

governing of a Province is not so dissimilar, except in size, from any other well-managed business. There will be an instinctive draw to the actual machinery, the handling of its levers, the calculation of its output; and in the actual study of its complexities, the old preconceived prejudices against it will tend to change into an interest in its efficiency.

To this tendency there will be two potent auxiliaries. With one of them we are very familiar in our own England. How often has a new Minister marched into his office in Whitehall, sworn to destroy its complacency and its red-tape, to upset its policy and uproot its traditions. How rapidly has his fire abated when he is brought up against the realities of the administration and under the steadying influence of the permanent staff. It will not be very different in India. The Indian Civil Service has had plenty of calumny and abuse, but it has always been staunch to its job and it has seen India through many troubles in the past; its loyalty to the new régime will be a powerful factor in getting Ministers interested (as well as instructed) in their work.

A second impulse in the same direction will be the new local patriotism which Provincial autonomy is sure to engender. Hitherto the best brains among Indian politicians have been attracted to the central rather than the Provincial spheres. There is already evidence that this tendency is being reversed. The leveling force of all-India demonstrations, with English as the only common language, will diminish. The individual characteristics of different Provinces will gain in proportion, and rivalry—let us hope in good works—will develop.

This leads to another set of considerations. Few of us are without a streak of idealism somewhere, and the Congress is no exception; the ideal of social service has always had a place on its program. Officialdom has at times been sceptical of its sincerity in this respect, and a little scornful of its methods when they were not marked by efficiency. But the sentiment, planted by Gokhale and fervently nurtured by Mr. Gandhi, has been growing steadily. In the Congress propaganda, as in Nehru's autobiography, it has been extended into the realm of pure theory, but its sincerity can no longer be called in question. The opportunities for giving practical effect to it which Ministers will now enjoy should help to strengthen their anchorage. After all these years of political controversy, India is showing signs of being tired of theorizing, and it will expect the new governments to come down to realities and to put into practice their declared ideals of improvement in the condition of the people.

Arguments practical and sentimental thus combine to render it unlikely that the worst will happen, in the shape of a deliberate assault upon the Constitution. This forecast may turn out to be wrong, for an epidemic of insanity is afflicting the nations of the world today; but it is what we have a right to expect, for it would be impossible to conceive anything more sterile, or more damaging to both the welfare and the fair name of India, than the destruction of all the work and goodwill that is embodied in the Act of 1935. The Congress leaders deserved their victories at the polls last spring. They had worked long and hard; they had organized with ability;

many of their members had suffered much and sacrificed much for the cause. The task they have now undertaken calls for even higher qualities of heart and head. The British, by the labor of nearly two centuries, built up a structure of peace and security, of law and orderly government, which the new administration will be required by world opinion to maintain in its integrity. But more than that will be required; Indian statesmen will have to grapple with problems which the British, as people of an alien race, could not dare to handle. They are entitled to all our sympathy, and to any help for which they may call upon us.

#### IV

The range of problems in India today is indeed immense. She is facing all the outstanding political and economic issues of the West, as well as those which are peculiar to herself. Is she, for example, to become a Communist State? Ten years ago, such a question would have been unthinkable, so foreign is the Socialist conception to India's whole philosophy of life; today it is being hotly debated. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru set the fashion with a ranting, tearing denunciation of all capitalists, Indian or alien, and all landlords. His own creed professes to be Leninism, pure and unadulterated; and some of his followers go the whole way with him.

But Socialism in some form is rapidly gaining theoretical adherents, and the inner councils of the Congress are said to be sharply divided upon the issue. Though it has not yet come within the orbit of Provincial administration, its repercussions have begun

in threats of labor troubles of a kind wholly unfamiliar to Indian experience. At mass meetings of mill-hands in Calcutta in August they chanted a song with the refrain (translated):—

*The rich man's dog lives in luxury while  
the workers' children starve;  
The workers' watchword is to die fighting  
for bread;  
The laborers have beat the drum and  
hoisted the flag.*

And the flag they carried was emblazoned with the hammer and sickle. If this is the first shot in a class war between capital and labor, the new Ministers will have their hands full.

Graver still are the repercussions starting among the peasantry in certain Provinces. The No-Rent Campaign, which formed a part of Mr. Gandhi's civil disobedience movement, is expanding into a general attack upon landlordism. Like all other classes of mankind, there are good and bad landlords in Northern India; some of them are their tenants' best friends and protectors; a good many of them might well be exterminated; and a more liberal agrarian policy is much to be desired. That, however, is not the point at the moment; the immediate anxiety is a widespread disaffection among a credulous peasantry, fomented by Socialist preachers and capable of boiling up into a state of anarchy to which there would be no parallel since the Mutiny of 1857. It is not easy to overrate the potential seriousness of the situation.

The racial or religious problem—so much harder for the Indian administrator than for the unconcerned Briton—is too well known to call for discussion. A new phase, however, prom-

ises to be fertile in trouble; it is the growing antagonism between the old school of Brahmanical orthodoxy and the radical wing of advanced Hinduism, which would raise the age of consent, open temples to the untouchables and perpetrate other similar reforms. In its influence on educational policy, the *odium theologicum* is not unknown in England; its devastation will be far wider in India. Another controversy in which orthodox and advanced opinion, both Hindu and Moslem, will shortly be at grips relates to women's rights. Who in his senses would have imagined, twenty years ago, the possibility of birth control as a topic for discussion by Indian women? Still more fantastic would have been the idea of an Indian lady holding Cabinet rank; and yet there she is, in the United Provinces.

#### V

When we turn to progress generally, and more particularly to progress in what the Congress is fond of calling the 'nation-building' services, we find ourselves immediately in the most intractable of all the labors which await the new Ministers—finance. It is the one branch of the reform scheme on which the British Government and Parliament have been less than candid; it was slurred over, with expressions of vague optimism, by the Joint Committee and during the passing of the Act.

We have had, it is true, a certificate from Sir Otto Niemeyer that the Provinces, given certain subsidies from the Central Exchequer, are solvent. That, however, does not tell the whole story; and Sir Otto's award is being as roundly (and as undeserv-

edly) abused as all previous attempts at a fair allocation of the Indian revenues between the Central and the Provincial budgets. The hard fact is that the resources of the Indian exchequer cannot now meet, and will not, until India has had her industrial revolution, be ever able to meet, more than a fraction of the expenditure which the Indian patriot wants to incur. Even if all landlords were abolished, even if the military budget were cut in half and every British soldier withdrawn from the country, this would still be true.

The crux is that taxation is already high for a country where wealth is badly distributed, and new taxes are hard to find; so that the Provinces have little elasticity in their own resources, and it will be increasingly difficult for the Central Government to help them. The import tariff is so effectively protective that excise duties are being imposed to prevent the revenue from sagging. Revenue from intoxicants will disappear, if the Congress demand for prohibition prevails; and a material easing of the burden upon land is another plank in the Congress platform. Estate duties present peculiar difficulties under the Hindu family system; and taxation of agricultural incomes (at present exempt), though affording some temporary help, will prove a wasting asset, inasmuch as it will prevent capital

from going back into the land, where it is desperately needed.

The prospects, therefore, of providing at any early date the funds for ambitious projects, such as universal primary education, pure water supplies and other equally desirable purposes, are bleak in the extreme; and many a promise of the impending millennium will have to be withdrawn. That is a political gymnastic with which we are not unfamiliar nearer home; but it will be a trying experience for the 'prentice hands in India.

In taking a forward view of the Indian situation, it is not easy to avoid a certain feeling of dismay at the vastness of the responsibilities which are being shouldered by comparatively inexperienced administrators; but the occasion is one for charity rather than pessimism. It is no longer a question of whether we did wisely or unwisely in handing over those responsibilities; the question now is how we can best help Indians to carry them for the greater good of the country and the welfare of its people. We can at any rate strive for a closer understanding of the Indian point of view than we have displayed in the past; we can send our very best men to the posts in India where Britishers will still be employed; and we can improve our social relations with Indians—a minor courtesy of which the importance cannot ever be exaggerated.

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His forehead is beautiful . . . with feminine sensitiveness and delicate features. In the smile of this warrior one sees a woman's soul and a child's heart. The ravishing thing about Franco is his purity.

— *Candide*, Paris

A *bouillabaisse* of divers fishes: the English Gentleman; youth cultists; Berlin's Jew-baiting City Councilmen; and a man who sought a perfect wife.

## Miscellany

### I. THE ENGLISHMAN'S CREDO

By OSBERT SITWELL

From the *Sunday Times*, London Conservative Paper

THE Englishman's Credo, certainly the most elusive of all faiths, is, like the Baby in *Alice in Wonderland*, apt, while you watch, to take on other and less attractive forms. . . . But first, before proceeding to attempt any definition, I feel obliged to demand of myself what my qualifications may be for speaking of it.

At any rate, I suppose I qualify for it by antecedents and ancestry, having educated myself at two private and one public schools, and having been in the Army for seven years or more, and though, as a result of this, I often abhor the average view, finding myself in a minority of horrified dissent, at least I am the typical Englishman in that I am by blood partly Irish and partly Scottish as well.

*Thus from a mixture of all kinds began  
That heterogeneous thing, an English-  
man.*

So wrote Daniel Defoe, the father of the English novel, in a poem, the rest of which tends, though excellently phrased, toward violence and defamation. But to this admirable English characteristic of self-criticism—often, indeed, of self-blackguarding—I will refer later.

To begin with, then, let us only say that the Englishman is prouder of his faults than of his virtues, and will always listen with delight to any preacher who tells him of them. There is another side to this, a certain smugness. But, banishing for the moment all thoughts of complacency and the refusal to face facts, let us examine the national character in its more congenial aspects, remembering even then that these other, less pleasing qualities possess also their attendant merits and that when, for example, Napoleon complained that the English never knew when they were beaten, he was



only alluding to what others, myself among them, have described as this national refusal to face facts.

The nursery is a good index to national character; the things that nurses in Germany, France, and England are continually warning their charges *not* to do are obviously precisely the things which the German, French and English children tend to do naturally and will do when they grow up. Thus, there is an old adage of which the English nurse is continually reminding her charges: 'You cannot have your cake and eat it'—a very necessary caution, for though the pursuit of such antithetical ends may often bring unhappiness, it is in this direction that the inclination of the Englishman invariably leads him, and in which, indeed, he has often found his most celebrated and singular triumphs.

Thus the Englishman desired to be independent of the sovereign in matters of government and yet to have a king—the result was Constitutional Monarchy; to have religious freedom combined with a State religion—the result was the Church of England; for his children to have the chance of education if they wanted it, and yet not to be obliged to learn anything—the result was the English public school system.

It will be seen, then, that above all an Englishman believes in fluidity, as against any rigid application of theory or principle. The horrors of the Inquisition, of martyrdom on points of faith, are not the things to which he inclines.

## II

The origin of other attributes is to be sought in the facts of history and geography. That, for example,

we live on an island has largely shaped both our aims and characters; and in this the Japanese and ourselves are, indeed, comparable. Isolation from other countries and their particular needs has fostered the growth far down in the consciousness of both peoples that they are a race apart, different from others and of a high destiny.

It seems, also, to have implanted in them an ideal of duty and service, and a tendency to accept the conditions in which they find themselves. The sea always fathers a sense of patriotism, by making it difficult to observe, and still more to comprehend, the manners and ways of other countries, and it has also infused in both races a deep moral distrust of the neighboring continent, as wily and degenerate.

Isolation, too, affects, even now, the whole of life. A century and a half ago the Venetian traveler and adventurer Casanova visited England, and records that all our ways, habits and manners are precisely the opposite of those he has met in other countries; a criticism often directed toward the Japanese. And this perversity has made, no doubt, for individuality, just as it is, also, born of it. . . . And even in these days of standardization, the Englishman, I find, likes to think for himself, to drive on the left and to be as wrong-headed as he wishes.

But if this geographical conditioning of us is simple, the historical facts are more mysterious, less explicable. The two most unexpected and extravagant facts in our history have been the evolution of the English tongue and the emergence, within one hundred and fifty years of an alien conquest and subsequent domination, of the beginnings of the English parlia-

mentary system. That is to say that without a murderous revolt or struggle the English people had come out of their troubles and were governing themselves—in a time when that could be said of very few nations.

As for our language, the subtlety it has derived from Latin sources and the power and breadth it has derived from Teutonic have helped to fashion and mold the English character, have produced the finest poetry in Europe and a humor of a kind not to be found elsewhere. Without the leavening of Norman-French—and how curious that a class so numerically inferior to the English masses should have effected so tremendous a change—the English language would have been but a blunt and clumsy instrument, and ourselves an obedient herd of Teutons, with more philosophy and less poetry. But already by the time of Chaucer, who so admirably blends English poetry, realism and humor, the English tongue and character fit one another like hand in glove, and in his work every Englishman will find a portrait of himself.

### III

And it was in the time of this great poet, near enough, that the English gentleman first makes his appearance; the English gentleman, that most elusive of all ideals and most mysterious of all historical facts.

Of the ideal itself, no exact definition can ever be made, nor can it ever be explained—or even described—to a foreigner. The dictionary defines him as a 'man of chivalrous instincts, fine feelings and good breeding.' Originally it meant doubtless a man entitled to bear arms, though not of

noble descent. But this meaning had already been largely superseded. And Edmund Howes, writing in the beginning of the seventeenth century, shows that it had, by then, been long established in its present indefinable significance. It is sufficient to say that every Englishman, from prince to plumber, takes it for granted that he is a gentleman, and that the nearest you can approach to it is in Robert Louis Stevenson's description: 'It is a high calling to which a man must first be born and then devote himself for life. . . .'

Even Shakespeare, a player in days when no actor would have been admitted to a night club or a golf club, and who most surely was not in need of adventitious aids to self-respect, describes himself in his will as a 'gentleman;' and that, indeed, is almost all we know of him, except his plays. Even the gentleman ideal, however, has been submitted to English ridicule. But the Englishman loves criticism of himself, so long as it is by an Englishman or an Irishman (he rather resents it from a Scot!).

English poetry is the most typical, and contradictory, product of the English race; and there are few English poets—and those mostly bad ones—who have not criticized their country and countrymen. Tolerance, the English spirit of tolerance, forbids their being persecuted. They may rail at English stupidity; but they must also tolerate it. . . . But it is in the worst poetry, rather than the best, in *Excelsior* and *The Boy Stood on the Burning Deck*, or in our early ballads that we find reflected the code of conduct of the Englishman and his particular respect for steadfastness and a sense of duty.

Kindness, too, and charity he values. There is in the English character, I believe, an innate kindness and simplicity—the simplicity, still, of the islander, while the kindness may in part be due to physical and historical causes.

For nearly nine hundred years England has been free from invasion: and during that time, as a rule—and, of course, always with several and horrible exceptions—her people have had enough to eat; food at least has been more plentiful than in continental countries, and this is always a factor making toward amiability.

There was, too, from the earliest times, a much better chance for the worker in England to improve his position than prevailed upon the Continent. Whether this was the result, or cause, of a national love of justice, it is difficult at this distance to decide: but certainly the merchant who had started life as a working-man was able through his own endeavors to enter the ranks of the feudal barons at a time when on the Continent he would have found himself resolutely debarred, and every class of an iron mold apparently for ever fixed.

Moreover, in considering the peace-

ful and amiable disposition of the Englishman, we must remember that not only has his country been free from the ravages of foreign armies for nine centuries, not only is the English climate gentle, even though we continually despair of it, and not given to volcanic storms, but there has been no major civil disturbance since the time of Cromwell. The Civil Wars have never been forgotten; they wrought a deep and abiding impression in English hearts.

To sum up, the Englishman believes, among other things, that he is the only sane person in a mad world; the only man in step in the regiment; and that he has been appointed by Providence to set things right. He admires, above all things, loyalty and steadfastness to a cause (and rates them more highly than the cause itself) and kindness. It is the duty of all men to be kind to children and animals. He places more reliance on instinct than intelligence, and he believes that no causes are above compromise, and that two quite contrary opinions can be brought, lion and lamb, to lie together. . . . The results have been splendid for himself and for the world.

## II. ON FLATTERING THE YOUNG

By JULIEN BENDA

Translated from the *Nouvelles Littéraires*, Paris Literary Weekly

I SHOULD like to say a word about the peremptory manner which the young people of today affect, no matter what they are talking about. This phenomenon seems to me to be largely a product of the prodigious amount of attention that is being paid

to youth by many nations. And this brings me to consider the attitudes which the various régimes are taking toward this fraction of humanity.

Dictatorships, especially, make a practice of flattering youth. It is one of their cardinal aims to win its al-

legiance and to monopolize its activity. It is a significant fact in France that the moment a promising young man appears on the literary horizon, the leaders of a certain party of the extreme Right immediately begin to cultivate him. They try to demonstrate to him that his quarrel with them is merely an error of adolescence—that at heart he is really one of them. The totalitarian régimes go even further. They affect a downright veneration for the young people's judgment. They declare glibly: 'Our doctrine must be true because youth is behind it.' Obviously the latter's conceit is most pleasurably tickled by such flattery.

The democratic governments of France, Great Britain and the United States have no such veneration for the ideas of the young. As a matter of fact their tendency is rather to defer to the opinions of the elders, of the 'senators.' One may easily guess that youth has no love for such governments.

One should not, of course, minimize the things that the dictatorial régimes have done for youth—for example, safeguarding them against alcoholism and venereal diseases, providing them with free entertainment and starting young couples in life with a bonus. The democracies should emulate them in these respects. You will find that Great Britain, for example, is already doing much for her young people, without attributing to them superior qualities of discernment which they do not necessarily possess.

I confess that I respect the democratic governments for their refusal to take the young into their counsels in framing national policy. The idea that a doctrine is right merely because it

has youth behind it is absurd. It is well known that any positive, dynamic doctrine, involving plenty of action and little argument, is bound to have the approval of youth—or at least of the greater part of youth.

Do not misunderstand me. It is not my contention that young people have no capacity for judgment just because they are young. I merely refuse to think that a doctrine is good just because it has that kind of following. Ought I to add that a system where senility is at a premium seems equally stupid to me?

Young people say to me: 'We shall be the ones to suffer the consequences of your decisions. Therefore we should be the ones to make them.' It is as if I were to say to a surgeon: 'I am the one who is going to be operated on. Therefore it is up to me to decide whether an operation should be performed.'

Many young people will retort: 'You are old and naturally prejudiced against us.' As a matter of fact, age has never played any part in my convictions. Those who would take the trouble to read my *Jeunesse d'un clerc* will see that even when I was twenty years old I was opposed to the wholesale acceptance of the verdicts of youth. Besides, the truth of what I say is entirely unconnected with the date of my birth. It is the fact that all the parties which employ violence are courting youth. In France it is interesting to find that one of them is seeking the restoration of monarchy. And when did Richelieu or Louis XIV ever care anything about the opinions of the young? In their time, of course, they did not have to fight for the domination of the streets, and so did not need the col-



laboration of young persons with hard fists and good lungs.

The cult of youth in politics is

more often than not simply an appeal to force. Again I say, all honor to those who ignore it.

### III. BERLIN COUNCIL SESSION

#### VERBATIM MINUTES

Translated from the *Neuer Vorwärts*, Carlsbad Social-Democratic German-Emigré Weekly

**COUNCILMAN KORNER:**—Mr. Mayor! Party members! I should like to make a few suggestions.

The summer time naturally brings with it increased bathing activities. If the Jews on their own initiative visit bathing establishments or seek an opportunity to become familiar with water despite their historical experience—

*(Laughter)*

—very well. But I do not think it right that today public pools, the large public beaches, or the bathing beach at Gatow and the like should again become the stamping ground of Jews, lying helter-skelter among our own Germans. Upon me personally this sight has a most disagreeable effect. As a native of Berlin I naturally am a keen observer in these matters and I have recently noted that these Jews become very friendly with the families of workers, loll around on the same blankets with them and cast sly glances at our girls. Naturally political discussions and talks ensue—that is very easy during picnics. I should like to suggest and move that the city administration declare formally that Jews are not wanted in public bathing places.

**CITY HEALTH COMMISSIONER DR. CONTI:**—At present one public pool has actually barred Jews; another

does not, in practice, admit them. The overwhelming majority of public bathing places, indoor pools as well as beaches, have posted notices to the effect that Jews are not wanted. Some of them, however, among them Wannsee, have until now imposed no restrictions of this kind.

I have made inquiries as to the extent that misdemeanors have been observed. The information I received from the bathing supervisors was to the effect that none whatever had been noticed. However, I regard it as possible that these observations are not as keen as yours. Quite a number of these supervisors may not be able to distinguish who is a Jew and who isn't.

I myself am of the opinion that we should gradually intensify this policy of excluding Jews from public bathing places. I would regard it as unwise to do this by decree from above because of the foreign political repercussions, which would be quite out of proportion to the importance of the matter. On the other hand, the public bathing establishments themselves must gradually use stronger language in the wording of their posters and at the same time exercise a firmer supervision. That would certainly be desirable. I have authorized and admonished the supervisors to look out particularly for misdemeanors like the mo-



lesting of German girls and to take drastic action. They should not make it a Jewish issue but should grab the Jew in question and bodily throw him out. The same should be done when a Jew's bathing attire does not meet the requirements. In fact, this opportunity should be particularly utilized, without emphasizing the anti-Jewish aspect too openly.

Legally we still may not exclude the Jews completely from the bathing places. There exists a Solomonic decree by the Minister of the Interior which states approximately that Jews must not be denied the use of bathing facilities altogether, but that restrictions should be applied wherever possible. This decree enables us to post all bathing places except one. A Jew coming to bathe can then be told: 'You may go to this one pool.' This condition is my ultimate aim and I have selected the Dennewitz Street Pool for the purpose because that district has two pools, and this pool is favorably located in the West of Berlin and is, besides, rather unattractive. I should like to leave this pool without a poster and gradually intensify non-admission to the other pools as well as to the beaches.

Will this be advisable in the case of Wannsee? Wannsee is much patronized by foreigners. Wannsee therefore is the weak spot.

MAYOR LIPPERT:—The information given by the City Health Commissioner should be satisfactory. I should be happy, Party Comrade Conti, if the carrying out of these measures could be expedited.

As to the question of the public beaches—Wannsee, for instance—I should like to say this: in 1935 we put

up a sign there saying 'No Jews admitted.' We had to remove it at the request of the Foreign Office when the preparations for the Olympic Games began. What the Health Commissioner said is quite right: in that respect Wannsee is a weak spot. I spoke at the time with the then director of the beach and suggested to him a clever form of self-help. It really worked out very well. In general, I believe that at an open beach—the Gatow beach, for instance—the matter should not be treated officially. There are, thank heaven, S.A. and S.S. men who can be depended on even out of uniform. These are our political soldiers who keep their eyes wide open, and who will show them a thing or two if necessary.

COUNCILMAN VON JAGOW:—That should be taken up immediately with the Police Department.

MAYOR LIPPERT:—At the Wannsee beach this has worked out very well. There the S.A. men gave notice to the beach supervisors beforehand, identifying themselves and pointing out their location on the beach so that when something happened they would be available. They did not proceed in such a manner as to cause a terrific uproar right then and there, thus attracting a large crowd. They merely reported to a supervisor, who asked the offending persons to leave the beach immediately. Whenever it seemed necessary, our brave fellows waited for their man outside in the woods, away from the bathing crowds. There they administered whatever lesson was needed.

(Laughter)

This procedure is supposed to have worked out exceedingly well.

## IV. SEARCH FOR A PERFECT WIFE

By DILYS POWELL

From the *Listener*, Weekly Organ of the British Broadcasting Corporation

I DON'T suppose anybody reads *Sandford and Merton* for pleasure nowadays: I don't suppose most people have even heard of it. It was published about a hundred and fifty years ago, and was read with rapture by thousands of children. And right up to about 1890 new editions and abridgments appeared. Perhaps children were different then. It was a story about two little boys, one rich, one poor. Tommy Merton, the rich man's child, at the age of six, 'would scramble upon the table, seize the cake and bread-and-butter, and frequently over-set the tea-cups. By these pranks,' says the book, 'he not only made himself disagreeable to everybody, but often met with very dangerous accidents. Frequently did he cut himself with knives; at other times he threw heavy things upon his head; and once he narrowly escaped being scalded to death by a kettle of boiling water.' On the other hand, Harry Sandford, the farmer's little boy, 'was so careful and considerate that he would step out of the way for fear of hurting a worm.' The two were brought up together; one or the other of them was always running to his tutor and asking 'Pray, sir, what is arithmetic?' or 'Pray, sir, tell us the story of the Grateful Turk.' And what with one thing and another, in the end the unfortunate Tommy was converted to virtuous ways.

But I am not here concerned with the book but with the man who wrote *Sandford and Merton*. I have quoted a

few lines from the book just to show the kind of thing he wrote—and the kind of thing that made him famous. Thomas Day—that was his name—ought really to have been famous as a person much more than as a writer. Other people are inclined to think the English are mad. Thomas Day had a particularly English brand of madness: the kind of madness that makes us call a man eccentric. And, as so often happens, this extraordinary character was the child of a perfectly ordinary English family. He was born in London in 1748. His father was a Customs official who did well for himself and left his boy enough money to keep him in comfort all his life.

He went to school at Charterhouse, and from there to Oxford. He left Oxford without a degree but with two resolutions. He had made up his mind to do good to his fellow-beings; and he had made up his mind to marry a perfect woman. Day lived in an age of hope. In the last half of the eighteenth century people still thought humanity could be improved. Everybody was reading Rousseau; Day was one of his most enthusiastic disciples. Everybody was talking about the Noble Savage and the inherent goodness of man. And Thomas Day thought he could find a woman without feminine faults.

## II

While he was still at Oxford, Day made friends with a young Irishman named Edgeworth, whose daughter,

by the way, was the Maria Edgeworth who wrote *Castle Rackrent*. From what Edgeworth says about him it is easy enough to see that Day was already a pretty odd character. He was pitted with small-pox. He was knock-kneed. He dressed very strangely. He 'seldom combed his raven locks.' But on the other hand, he was 'remarkably fond of washing in a stream.'

Anyway, Edgeworth liked him for his real goodness of heart and took him to Ireland with him. And now Thomas Day's troubles begin. He wanted a perfect woman. And he began by falling in love with Edgeworth's sister. Margaret Edgeworth was a nice lively girl, who couldn't help liking Day, but also couldn't help thinking he looked rather peculiar. They struck a bargain. Margaret would marry him if he would polish himself up a bit. Day said he would; and off he went to get polish. But Margaret Edgeworth was not the perfect woman. Absence did not make her heart grow any fonder and she jilted him. So that was failure number one.

As soon as Day had recovered, he began looking around hopefully again; and soon he was attracted by another lady. Of course, he lost no time in telling her what he wanted. He told her that she must be 'in her dress and diet simple as a mountain girl, fearless and intrepid as the Spartan wives and the Roman heroines.' The poor girl felt that this was a bit too much of a good thing. She refused him. Failure number two.

Day was not discouraged. He felt that if he could not find a perfect woman ready-made, then he must make one. He believed in Rousseau's ideas on education, and he believed in

starting on people young. He persuaded a friend of his named John Bicknell, to go with him to Shrewsbury Orphanage. There the two young men picked out a pretty little girl with auburn hair; and after a good deal of explanation he got permission to bring her away. He was then, I may say, only twenty-one himself. He called her Sabrina. But he must not have all his eggs in one basket. So, again with Mr. Bicknell, he went off to Bloomsbury Foundling Hospital, and this time they picked out a charming little blonde. He called her Lucretia.

Naturally, the first thing in training a perfect woman is to keep her away from bad influences. Young Mr. Day took the two little girls to France. Perhaps you will say that was a rash thing to do with the perfect woman-to-be. But then, Sabrina and Lucretia did not speak French, and he took no English servants with him. So they had nobody but him to talk to. The first thing they did was to catch small-pox; he sat up all night with them. They nearly got drowned; he rescued them. A French officer was bold enough to speak to them; Day offered to fight a duel with him. In the intervals he taught them to draw an equilateral triangle. Sabrina wrote proudly to Edgeworth to tell him. This is the letter she dictated to Day:—

Dear Mr. Edgeworth, I am glad to hear you are well and your little boy. I love Mr. Day dearly and Lucretia. I am learning to write. I do not like France so well as England. The people are very brown. They dress very oddly. I hope I shall have more sense against I come to England. I know how to make a circle and an equilateral triangle. I know the cause

of night and day winter and summer. I love Mr. Day best in the world, Mr. Bicknell next and you next.

I am sorry to have to tell you that Lucretia, the blonde, was a disappointment. She would not learn to be a perfect woman and had to be sent away. In the end she married a tradesman, with whom she was very happy.

But there was still hope for Sabrina. They were back in England by now. Day put her through a severe training. He was determined that she should learn to be as intrepid as the Spartan wives. He fired pistols at her skirt; he let them off close to her ear. She screamed at the top of her voice. He wanted to harden her to the idea of pain, so he poured melted sealing wax on her neck and arms. She screamed again, rather louder.

She hated learning things. She couldn't keep a secret. Worst of all, she liked smart clothes. In despair he sent her to boarding-school. Still he hadn't quite given up hope. When she came back from school he gave her another chance. But it was no use. One day she either did, or didn't, wear long sleeves and a handkerchief which Day had, or hadn't, wanted her to wear, nobody was quite sure which. It was too much. Day cast her off forever. And so she married Day's friend, Mr. Bicknell.

Poor Thomas Day! He hadn't had much luck with creating the perfect woman. So he went back to trying to find a ready-made one. Indeed, he was already at it before Sabrina finally let him down. He fell in love with a lady named Honora Sneyd and wrote to her explaining just what he expected of her. I am sorry to say that she did not appreciate the compliment; she refused him. Not to be defeated,

he turned his attention to her sister Elizabeth. And really this time it looked like business. Elizabeth, like Margaret Edgeworth, made a bargain; she would marry him if he would polish himself up. And Day actually tried. He went to France and learned dancing, fencing and riding, to please her. He stood for hours in a kind of stocks 'with a book in his hand and contempt in his heart' to try and cure his knock-knees. He even wore a wig. But it was no use trying to polish up Thomas Day. I suppose Miss Sneyd saw this; anyway she jilted him. And once more his friends succeeded where he had failed. Edgeworth married Honora; when she died he married Elizabeth.

### III

But now, when it seemed hopeless, Day's search was at an end. Obviously he couldn't find his paragon for himself. A friend took on the job of finding one for him. And, what is more, he succeeded. He found an admirable young woman called Esther Milnes. He told Day about her. Day thought for a minute. Then he asked:

'Does she wear long petticoats?'

'Uncommonly long.'

'Has she white and large arms?'

She had. He married her.

I suppose it was only in the nature of things that at first he should not believe his luck. At the start he was not at all enthusiastic. He made difficulties because she had a fortune of her own, and when they married he insisted on placing it in trust beyond his control—a remarkable thing to do at the time. At first his friends received long letters from him in which he never even mentioned his wife's



name. But gradually he gained confidence. He lost no time in trying out his theories on her. He believed in fresh air and exercise—not at all the thing to do in England in 1778. A few months after the Days were married, Edgeworth and his wife came to Hampstead to visit them. It was in the depth of winter and Esther was supposed to be delicate. But there she was, in thick shoes and an overcoat, padding about out-of-doors in the cold. She must have been an exceptionally sensible woman, for she admitted at once that she felt better for it.

Day was extraordinarily lucky. His wife could discuss politics when required; but *only* when required, for she was completely submissive. As Edgeworth said: 'I never saw any woman so entirely intent upon accommodating herself to the sentiments, and wishes, and will of a husband.' And she adored him. She was put through a severe test. Soon after their marriage Day decided to move into the country, and he thought he would like to build his own house. He spent a month reading about architecture, then drew up a plan. He soon tired of being an architect. One day, when he was reading, a mason came to ask where he should put the window in Mrs. Day's room. Day was annoyed at being interrupted. He told the man to build the wall; the window could be put in later. So the room was built without any windows. Mrs. Day always had to use candles in it, and finally she turned it into a lumber-room.

But she never complained. She had to do all the housework, for Day would not let her have a woman-servant. She played the harp extremely well,

but Day regarded music as a luxury, so she had to give it up. After her marriage she never went to see her parents, who loved her and missed her. She really did live like a Spartan wife. Except for her husband she was almost completely isolated. But none of that really mattered; they were *both* happy.

I don't think it mattered even when they moved further into the wilderness. Somebody asked Day why he liked living in the wilds. He said: 'To be out of the stink of human society.' But gradually the feeling of living a life rooted in affection gave him a kind of calm and security. He had settled his own life, and now he could think about other people's lives.

He had always been a reformer. Now he was able to do something practical. He took up agriculture, and spent a great deal of time looking after the laborers, helping them when they were ill. He not only employed them through the winter, which was unusual, but gave them a shilling a week more, 'because,' he said, 'these poor people want more comforts at this severe season of the year.' He had already joined with Bicknell in writing a famous poem about slavery, *The Dying Negro*. Now he wrote *Sandford and Merton*. To the end of his life he was busy doing good. And in the end this awkward, ridiculous and yet somehow noble creature was killed by his own gentleness. He believed that animals should be taught by kindness, and he had trained a colt. One day in 1789 he decided to ride it. It threw him, and he was killed on the spot. His perfect wife lived on for three years and then died of a broken heart.



# NOTES AND COMMENTS

## Cocktails at the Commons

The construction of the new House of Commons cocktail bar is, I hear, proceeding steadily, but without undignified haste or excitement. Already a suitably discreet nomenclature for the various brands of cocktails likely to be mixed has been under consideration. The names chosen will have a personal but not too obvious bearing on members of the present Cabinet. The following are the most generally accepted interpretations of the titles:—

<i>Hook and Line</i>	MR. CHAMBERLAIN (being a reference to his favorite sport of angling)
<i>Safely Over</i>	MR. EDEN (a rather obscure reference to Paradise or to the Promised Land)
<i>Mark My Words</i>	MR. (now Earl) BALDWIN (his favorite phrase in important speeches)
<i>Pieman</i>	SIR JOHN SIMON ('Simple Simon met a Pieman. . .')
<i>Plum Duff</i>	MR. DUFF COOPER (whose figure is beginning to give that impression apart from the obvious name-link)
<i>Big Drum</i>	MR. HORE-BELISHA (on account of his recruiting activities)
<i>Maiden Aunt</i>	SIR SAMUEL HOARE (so called, because of his prim manner)
<i>Roaring Boy</i>	MR. ERNEST BROWN (whose lung-power is a stock-joke in the House) — <i>Morning Post</i> , London

## Caesar's Son

I get only mild sensations from bombing, perhaps because I was expecting enormous explosions like those in American films, whereas the little Abyssinian homes, made of withies and rushes, give no satisfaction to anyone bombing them. . . .

The little incendiary bombs give satisfaction; at any rate one sees fire and smoke. We conscientiously burned the whole of this zone. But there were no inhabitants left. . . .

I have never been able to see a fire, although I have often chased fire-engines. . . . Perhaps because someone had heard of this gap in my education a machine from the 17th Squadron was ordered to bomb the Adi-Abo zone exclusively with incendiary bombs. . . . We had to set fire to the wooded hills, to the fields, and to the little villages. . . . It was all most diverting. . . . The bombs hardly touched the earth before they burst out into white smoke and an enormous flame and the dry grass began to burn. I thought of the animals; God, how they ran. . . . After the bomb-racks were emptied I began throwing bombs by hand. . . . It was most amusing: a big *zariba* surrounded by tall trees was not easy to hit. I had to aim carefully at the straw roof and only succeeded at the third shot. The wretches who were inside, seeing their roof burning, jumped out and ran off like mad. . . .

We went to Dacue, where there was a market and a big crowd; we dropped a few bombs.

Surrounded by a circle of fire about five thousand Abyssinians came to a sticky end. It was like hell; the smoke rose to incredible heights and the flames reddened the setting sun.

—Bruno Mussolini in *Voli Sulle Ambe*, recommended reading in Italian schools.

## God's Social Credit

I believe God wants me to occupy my present position, and I shall not be moved by any other consideration.

—Premier Aberhart of Alberta

## Built That Way

I enjoy blood sports very much, because I like the ways of nature. Of course, they are cruel, because such is the way of nature.

—Lord Castlerosse

## Mariage de Convenience

An old diplomat at the Quai d'Orsay says of Mussolini and Hitler: 'You know, the two men are too different in character not to like each other, and too alike in their ambitions not to detest each other. As a result, we have something like a diplomatic marriage: official love and separate rooms.'

—*Vu et Lu*, Paris

**Heil-Storm**

Every allusion Hitler makes to it (Nordic superiority) produces a veritable heil-storm of applause.

—E. B. Osborn in the *Morning Post*, London

**Bayonet Friendship**

We would gladly believe in the professions of peaceful intent which the Japanese constantly express toward us, if only, once in a while, just for a change, they would really behave as other foreigners in China. Their nationals engage in smuggling, and when we try to stop them, they turn around and say we are anti-Japanese. Their nationals do a roaring trade in narcotics, and when our Government makes a move to suppress it, they brandish their swords and fire their pistols and exclaim: 'The Chinese are truculent and insulting.' Because we refuse to coöperate with the Japanese in dismembering our own country, they say we lack sincerity in our relations with them.

The Japanese have repeatedly accused us of being anti-Japanese. Is it possible to love a bully? Is it good sense in the Japanese to expect to cultivate Sino-Japanese friendship at the point of the bayonet?

—Wen Yuan-ning in  
*T'ien Hsia Monthly*, Shanghai

**Was Edward Ever Bowled?**

King George of Greece was once bowled first ball in a cricket match at his English private school.

He never forgot the incident.

It helped him, he said, to face the poverty-stricken years of his exile with more courage than he might otherwise have shown.

It enabled him, he told friends, to treat the misfortune of his expulsion from Greece as a stepping-stone to ultimate triumph.

—*Sunday Referee*, London

**Britannia Will Try**

A British diplomat was recently received by Mussolini. As was to be expected, the conversation soon came around to the subject of the Anglo-Italian tension over the Mediterranean.

'You must remember,' remarked the Duce, 'that the sea belongs to everybody.'

'I am of your opinion, Your Excellency,' replied the diplomat. 'But since our Empire is a widely dispersed one, the sea is a necessity for us.'

Mussolini reflected for a second, and then cried out: 'Nobody prevents you from borrowing it. But for God's sake, don't keep it all for yourself!'

—*Vu et Lu*, Paris

**Did They Use Gas?**

News from Palestine cannot but waken a profound sense of horror in all the civilized world. The precepts which for thousands of years have assured justice and civilization to humanity are openly violated.

—*Popolo d'Italia*, Rome

**Dangerous Indeed**

A warning of the dangerous effects attendant on the indiscriminate use of the drug benzedrine is given by the *British Medical Journal*. The habitual use of the drug, even in small doses, has been observed in some cases to involve 'a dangerous degree of disrespectfulness to superior officers on telephones.'

—*Daily Telegraph*, London

**Bone-Days**

Tuesdays and Fridays are 'Bone-Days' in all schools of Greater Berlin. The schools try to outdo each other. Thus the members of the highest Form in a primary school have been appointed 'bone-chairmen,' each of whom heads a district, or 'bone block.'

The money taken in for bones (one Pfennig per kilogram) is distributed to the children as 'bone-bonuses.' One child frequently appears at school with a whole basketful of bones. It has received at school the honorary title of 'bone-child.'

—*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Berlin

**Solution**

M. Laval has found a remedy to better the financial situation in France. He said recently:—

'The financial difficulties are not terribly serious. When I come back, everything will be all right.'

—*Lumière*, Paris

**With Il Duce at Berlin**

Every third man in the cordon had to stand with his face to the public to prevent spectators from breaking through in their blind enthusiasm and throwing flowers (!) into the Führer's car.

—*Schwarze Korps*, Berlin

# AS OTHERS SEE US

AMERICA IN 1937

By JOHN BROWN

From the *National Review*, London

WHEN I first visited Russia, in 1934, the head of the English bureau of the Comintern—he was a Scotsman, of course—talked to me of America, which he said he knew. 'There's no real democracy there,' he said. 'It's an illusion. The capitalists are the dictators. This is the only country which is really free.' Lozovsky, general secretary of the Profintern, Red International of Labor Unions, who controls more than twenty million workers, confirmed the Comintern opinion. Lozovsky knows the United States well, having worked there at various jobs before the 1917 revolution. But he made certain reservations. 'Working conditions,' he conceded, 'are very good in America, but the workers are still wage-slaves; they never have any control.'

I wonder what Lozovsky would have said had he been with me recently in the Michigan and Illinois strike areas, watching the 'powerless workers' defy soldiers, court officials and sheriffs, and barricading executives from their own offices? And the worried business men I interviewed bore no resemblance to the 'brutal capitalist bosses' of the Soviet banners and textbooks!

The present industrial troubles in America are chiefly inspired by the determination of the union leaders to win acceptance of the principle of collective bargaining, and in a seventy minutes' interview, John L. Lewis, chief of the C.I.O. unions, stressed this point over and over again. 'In England,' he said, 'no government would dare to abolish collective bargaining or even question the principle.' Burly, of leonine appearance,

Lewis is noted for forthright speech and large-scale plans. He made no secret of the fact that he intended to organize a third political party which would carry him to power in the 1940 elections. 'I have been making my plans for years past,' he said, 'and this is the psychological and strategic moment.'

Lewis has spent most of his fifty-six years in the trade union movement, and made a great reputation as a firebrand in the West Virginia mining area.

He is a different type of man from British and French union leaders. He has lived a hard and dangerous life, and his wide knowledge of the darker side of political life has given him a peculiar cynical self-confidence. Of his popularity among the mass of the workers there can be no question, for it was proved to me over and over again in the strike areas and in factories where disputes were threatened.

William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, who claims to control 3½ million workers, was dubious about Lewis's tactics when I interviewed him in Washington, but he did not conceal his alarm at the rapid growth of the C.I.O., which has gained two million members at a dollar a month in the past year. Green, who is greatly respected by the industrialists, is an apostle of conciliation, and the spring strikes, with their atmosphere of tear-gas, town-vigilantes and factory-made blackjacks and sandbags, were abhorrent to him.

President Roosevelt and Vice-President Garner, whom I met in the capital, would make no statement on the labor situation, but made it clear that they would not sanction military or armed police attacks on striking workers. Roosevelt is a firm believer in cross-table discussions and settlements between employers and labor leaders.

Business leaders I met in New York and the Middle West displayed an attitude of mind that was very different from the rugged individualism of pre-depression days. One Wall Street millionaire said 'I'm anti-Roosevelt, because I don't trust his spending schemes, but he's right when he says we can't talk down to the workers and refuse union recognition. That phase is over.' Nor did I hear any violent anti-strike language in the business clubs I visited. Indeed, there was more talk of profit-sharing schemes and voluntary pay increases than of 'foreign agitators' and revolutionary propaganda—save in the Pacific coast ports, where the recent maritime strike *was* led by Communist agents—some of them men I had met in Newcastle-on-Tyne and South Shields in 1931, when they were trying to smash the National Union of Seamen.

Labor leaders I met had no criticism to make of the attitude of the press, and this was not surprising, for I found that editors were giving as much (and sometimes more) space to the workers' case as to that of the employers'. If the liberal attitude of the press was a vivid example of democracy in being, the press and radio criticism of the Government was an overwhelming proof.

IN NO country in the world is a government with a strong mandate from the electors so severely attacked as in America. Even British and French radio authorities would be staggered at the remarks of some commentators. Dignity, they would say, was being sacrificed, and prestige destroyed. Yet I noticed no lack of dignity in American political leaders. Far more accessible than the most bankrupt of the European saber-rattlers, they are much too busy to trouble about aloofness and formality. Within a week of landing at New York I had met the President and five of his Cabinet Ministers.

Compare this with European condi-

tions—visitors to Belgrade are expected to wait a fixed number of days in the capital before seeing any Minister, and the schedule is adjusted according to precedence. Hitler's secretary may make all sorts of conditions before granting an interview, and Mussolini has made visiting diplomats wait three weeks for an audience on occasion. Stalin and his deputies remain practically inaccessible within the Kremlin.

Secretary for Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, the ex-editor who is freely tipped as Roosevelt's successor, was busy with his plans for subsidizing American farmers to the tune of a hundred million pounds a year when I met him. Discussing the billion dollar dam and drainage schemes that have been completed during the last four years, he admitted that they could have been 'sold to the world' with a tremendous increase of personal prestige for the inspirers. 'But I will never use such methods,' he affirmed. 'I am a democrat.'

I thought of certain European Ministries, where improvement schemes, totaling less than 1 per cent of the money spent on Boulder Dam, are only approved if they are 'camera-worthy!' And of the much-publicized Moscow subway, on which I worked as a laborer and wondered with many of my workmates why tunnels were being dug while surface traffic was so trifling!

James A. Farley, the tall, clean-shaven, 48-year-old Postmaster-General and chief of the Democratic party organization, discounted fears of extremist bodies in America. 'This is still a country of individualists,' he said. 'Every young man is ambitious, and ambition and Bolshevism don't go well together.'

Farley should know a good deal about ambition, for his office is besieged daily by hundreds of callers, anxious to 'find a little place' for themselves or their relatives as a reward for real or imagined service to the party. When the caller list rises above forty per morning, Farley's

desk is moved from the rear of his office to the door, and he remains standing throughout the interview. This has proved an effective way of speeding the unwellcome and the loquacious. 'Once they sit down,' his secretary told me, 'they might talk about the weather or their relatives!'

Farley is so hard-pressed by these visits that he works every day of the week, and even puts in a 12-hour shift on Saturdays, long after the workers in the Ministry building have gone home. He is more troubled than other Ministers in this respect, but several Cabinet leaders have long caller-lists to deal with. They could easily avoid this pressure by instructions to their secretaries, of course, but as one said to me, 'People would think we're high-hatting them.'

All Ministers I saw stressed the neutrality policy of the Government, and Secretary Wallace said that the war debts position would make an excellent anti-war propaganda point if a crisis did develop. 'So that you would be paid in propaganda value, at least?' I queried. He laughed, and admitted this was so. Like his colleagues, he was very pessimistic about the European situation. Most of the American leaders believe that war is now inevitable in Europe, and those who have just returned from abroad are the most emphatic on this point. But the frank isolationism of 1935 has given way to a belief that America will sooner or later be involved in the conflict. This explains the recent shufflings in foreign policy, which is in process of being recast.

Among the workers, I found that faith

in democratic institutions was stronger than ever. Americans share with Britishers the advantage of having *seen* the results of dictatorship in other countries, and no amount of philosophic argument would make an American craftsman wish to exchange his standards for those of a Russian workman or a German technician subject as they are to the discipline of the militarized State. At present there is a tendency to point to certain economic trends as a sign of vanishing faith in democracy.

This attitude is especially noticeable among professional and university men. It demonstrates their keen interest in affairs, but to a European visitor their very suspicions and vigilance give further proofs that their democratic system is alive.

An increasing interest is being manifested in British social service schemes, which were the butt of attack from certain sections of the American press before the Wall Street crash. One industrialist in Chicago, after telling me that his son had gone to London to study British social insurance with an official delegation, said: 'We used to laugh at your insurance schemes before the depression, but I guess that knocked a lot of sense into our heads.'

Everywhere I went I found a sincere admiration of British institutions, and the inner strength displayed by imperial democracy in combating post-War troubles. And there is a significant absence of the flamboyant flag-waving nationalism that characterized American politics a few years ago.



## BOOKS ABROAD

### COMMUNISM IN CHINA

RED STAR OVER CHINA. By Edgar Snow.

London: Gollancz. 1937.

(Bosworth Goldman in the *Observer*, London)

IT MAY seem incredible to most Europeans that any considerable community could be completely isolated from its neighbors over a period of years, more particularly if that community lived in a country so populous as China. Yet it is a fact that this remarkable book gives the first authentic news of the Soviet areas of China for ten years, save for the publication here in 1934 of the President's address to the Second Chinese National Soviet Congress in January of that year. Subsequent to that date, when the population of the Communist-controlled area was roughly 10 million, the military and economic forces mobilized against the Communists compelled a strategic retreat involving an average march of twenty-four miles a day for a year.

Most remarkable of all, the example afforded by this resolute yet relatively tiny proportion of China's population is in truth the origin of Chinese resistance to the renewed Japanese incursion; and an appreciation of the strategic and tactical methods obtainable out of this book may provide a basis from which the effectiveness of that resistance can possibly be gauged.

The fortunes of the revolutionary movement in China, as sponsored by the Communists, followed closely those of the Comintern. With the exile of Trotsky and the collapse of his theory of simultaneous world revolution came the break between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and the persecution of the latter. Yet the few years of activity by the Comintern 'hot-gospelers' had left a deeper impression than the years of Christian missionary teaching, and the Party

in China managed to survive not only the withdrawal of Russian advisers and resources but the onslaught of overwhelming superior force made with every mechanical aid evolved during this murderous age. Even after the Moscow-Nanking rapprochement of 1933, the Chinese Communist Party survived, and indeed expanded, without external aid until 1937 when pressure from within and without compelled the eclipse of those elements in the Kuomintang still favorable to compromise with Japan.

These years had shown the truth of Lenin's observation: that whatever befell in China, no force on earth could restore the old order of virtual serfdom. The explanation is, perhaps, to be found in a single plank in the Communist platform: they preached redistribution of the land in a primarily agrarian country where the peasants themselves owned so little of it. Despite periodic backslidings by the Communists themselves, nevertheless, this reputation preceded the Red Army on its offensives and on its great migration, insuring a measure of tolerance and support from the peasant backbone of China never before accorded to a military force.

The values of this broad base upon which the Communists could build were two. First, it made the peasants more receptive to other items of the Communist creed. The family, which throughout history had been the single pillar of the social structure, came to be replaced by the nation, which in turn made the Red Army more national in character than those of the provincial war lords whose extortions preserved the traditional contempt the term 'soldier' engendered. The units of the Red Army were named 'warriors,' and were respected as defenders of the newly significant peasants' rights. Secondly, this fresh consciousness of a national entity made possible the hit-

and-run tactics which prevented the extinction of the ill-armed partisans by the might of the repeated Nanking offensives.

The temporary abandonment of such tactics in favor of positional warfare eventually compelled the 'Long March.' The Red Army, some 90,000 strong, abandoned Kiangsi and marched, according to Mr. Snow, six thousand miles, taking with them their archives in two tin boxes, and the machines to reestablish their vital arsenals in distant and backward Shensi. If for the account of this march alone, *Red Star Over China* should be widely read. The Army crossed mountains and rivers, fought through forest and plain, suffered starvation and cold. Such a trek has been equaled in Chinese history, but it is a feat of which the Chinese as a race alone are capable. No reader, of whatever opinion, can but be thrilled by the heroism and ardor which could inspire the endurance of those who made the entire journey.

Once arrived in Shensi, the Kuomintang cordon which the Red Army had fought through to escape was re-created, and Communist territory had of necessity to evolve again a precarious self-supporting economy. Machine shops, headquarters, schools—in fact, most of the paraphernalia of the State in miniature—were set up in caves which at least had the advantage of security from bombs. Meanwhile, agriculture had to be intensively pursued, despite almost continual attacks, if the increased population were to survive.

Mr. Snow's visit to this isolated region was made possible by the tacit truce between the Red Army and Chang Hsueh-liang. This arrangement emerged as a result of the increasing dissatisfaction of the latter with Chiang Kai-shek's compromises with Japan, more particularly since the Communists had from the first advocated the cessation of civil war in favor of unity against Japan, even to the extent of abandoning their immediate internal aims. The culmination of the increasing sympathy between the Com-

munist and those sent specifically to exterminate them came with the imprisonment of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsueh-liang. Mr. Snow clarifies the tangled personalities of this episode, the ultimate effect of which was the decision to resist Japan. So the Communists were tolerated once more, and able to expand toward Outer Mongolia, thus opening again the only frontier of China which Japan is unable to blockade.

The strategy which made possible the continued existence of the Communists affords an example which China as a whole may now effectively adopt: retreating from those parts where the technical superiority of the Japanese can be effective. Everyone stirred or concerned by events in the Far East should read this book. Two questions of outstanding importance will remain with the reader: first, will our civilization regret or rejoice at the possible eventual emergence of a nationalist and unified China 450 million strong? Secondly, what form of Government in Japan will survive the terrible stress of a war against such an opponent?

[*Red Star Over China will be published in the United States in January by Random House.*]

### HITLER'S GERMANY

THE HOUSE THAT HITLER BUILT. By S. H. Roberts. London: Methuen. 1937.

(E. H. Carr in the *Spectator*, London)

THIS careful and well-informed review of contemporary Germany is the work of an Australian professor who has visited Germany more than once since the War, and who spent the greater part of the year 1936 there making an intensive study of the régime. Save for his 'general approach,' which is that of a 'democratic individualist,' Professor Roberts claims to have maintained impartiality; and this claim may be readily conceded. He pays a tribute to the Nazi authorities who 'did everything possible to aid my investiga-

tions,' and refused him nothing that he asked except access to their stores of banned literature, most of which, as he remarks, is easily accessible in the British Museum.

The book opens with as good an attempt as has been made anywhere to elucidate the puzzle of Herr Hitler's personality. For Professor Roberts, he is 'primarily a dreamer, a visionary,' living in an unreal world into which he was perhaps originally driven by his own thwarted ambitions and the shame of Germany's defeat.

'I heard him make the famous speech when he spoke of absorbing the Ukraine and Siberia. Under the cold analysis of foreign newspaper reporters, this speech read like a declaration of Germany's Eastern Imperialism. Actually it was nothing of the kind. Hitler merely forgot his audience and wandered off into a dream-world of his own. . . . He can say different things in successive moments and believe in each with the same degree of fervor.'

It is perhaps his temperament rather than his circumstances which cuts him off from 'any real contacts' and makes of him so curiously detached a figure—an embodiment of mass emotion rather than a man. This able and illuminating sketch of the Führer is followed by descriptions of the other Nazi leaders, including some who are scarcely heard of outside Germany.

Another section on the structure of the régime contains a valuable analysis of another enigma—the relationship between the Leader, the Party and the State. Professor Roberts has given what is the best account available in English of that amazing bureaucratic duplication, of which the most conspicuous, but by no means the only, examples are the three offices dealing with foreign affairs—the orthodox Foreign Office, the 'Ribbentrop bureau' which confronts it across the Wilhelmstrasse, and Herr Rosenberg's department which, though quiescent for

the moment, might at any moment be galvanized into activity by some new turn of the wheel.

The Party created prior to the Revolution, and has retained ever since, what is virtually a duplicate State organization. But it has remained a shadow bureaucracy existing side by side with, but not supplanting, the old bureaucracy. It is, as Professor Roberts remarks in another connection, 'like a bad dream of a lecturer in administration.' It can be explained only as a compromise between the old and the new. The old machine, backed by the Army, retained its identity and much of its authority. But jobs had all the same to be found for those Party enthusiasts who had hoped to make a complete sweep of everything that was not Nazi in the administration. It seems incredible that this flagrantly uneconomic system can last.

The economic chapters are brief but good, and show clearly how little Germany, of all countries, can achieve self-sufficiency and how far she has drawn on her financial, economic and moral reserves during the past four years. 'The Drive for a Common Mentality' is ably summarized, though there are one or two points of detail which might be criticized. In speaking of the isolation of Germany from the rest of the world, Professor Roberts seems to forget that a good many foreign newspapers, including the *Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* circulate quite widely; and the German intelligentsia is quite well aware of trends of opinion and policy abroad. (This is one contrast between Germany and Soviet Russia, where all foreign newspapers are rigorously excluded.) It is no doubt true that 'at each of the thirteen hundred camps in Germany, every boy will be doing the same thing at a given time.' But the same is true, or was until recently, of every school in France, the most individualist country in the world. There is no necessary connection between external uniformity and intellectual standardization.

The chapters on foreign affairs are (curiously enough—for most people in Great Britain feel that there is more to be said for Herr Hitler's foreign than for his domestic policy) the least sympathetic and least satisfactory in the book. 'Logically,' argues Professor Roberts, 'either the success or the failure of Hitlerism brings war in its train.' But he seems to forget the thesis of the first chapter that neither logic nor Herr Hitler's own pronouncements are any guide to Herr Hitler's actions. Moreover, Professor Roberts emphasizes elsewhere the present unpreparedness of the German Army for a serious war, and the economic weakness which makes such a war at the present time unthinkable. If one thing is clearer than another in German foreign policy, it is a determination to avoid any clash of arms which might bring with it the risk of military defeat. In this respect, Herr Hitler gives the outside world less cause for anxiety than Signor Mussolini.

The main conclusion of the last chapter is that the régime will come more and more under military control and revert more and more to the 'Old Germany.' But this rather begs the question how far the Army itself has already been transformed by Nazi influence. If the future, as Professor Roberts thinks, holds in store an 'Army State' rather than a 'Party State,' it will certainly be a very different thing from the 'Army State' of Wilhelm II.

#### BLACK MONASTERY

LE MONASTÈRE NOIR. By Aladar Kuncz.

Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française. 1937.

(Jacques de Lacretelle in *Marianne*, Paris)

I DO NOT hesitate to predict that *Le Monastère Noir* will be acclaimed as a literary discovery. For some of us it will be something more: a moving document of resurrection. It is very rare to find a life story that is written with so much skill that it becomes a work of art. It is that miraculous combination: a human docu-

ment and a gripping novel. The human quality of the work will arouse strong emotions in all readers whose memory goes back a quarter of a century. Upon reading the book, they will be able to resurrect the feelings and attitudes which have been dulled by the War and its consequences.

To me, Aladar Kuncz symbolizes humanity taken unawares by the War. The story of his fortunes during the Great War is the ultimate testimony to an innocence that existed long ago but which has now almost vanished from our memories. If this high praise surprises the reader, let him hear more of the story.

Kuncz was a young Hungarian professor whose mind had matured under the influence of French culture. He had lived in France for more than a year, not only in Paris but also in the Provinces. Every summer he came back to study and dream in the midst of the landscape that had become the visual expression of his spiritual homeland. He tells us in the beginning of his book: 'I was particularly interested in Verlaine, Mallarmé and Maurras. My favorite reading at that time was *Les Poètes d'aujourd'hui* and I loved to wander in the Luxembourg Gardens and to stroll along the shaded alleys of the Observatoire toward the Montparnasse Cemetery, where I would visit Baudelaire's tomb.'

After these pilgrimages Kuncz would return to Budapest, each time more enamoured of France. He collaborated in a new review, *Nuygat* (the West), the title of which clearly revealed its tendencies, and his first attempts at writing critical essays and short stories all bear the mark of this profound admiration. In July, 1914, when he was twenty-eight years old, he passed his vacation in Brittany near Morlaix with two compatriots, another professor and his fiancée. One day the three foreigners organized a competition in Breton songs and dances among the villagers. Prizes were distributed, and in the evening a procession



with torches terminated the festivities. Peasants and tourists all fell into the great parade which made its way by torchlight to the top of the cliff. At that moment Orbock, Kuncz's companion, overtook him, crying out the news he had just heard: 'We have declared war on Serbia!'

One can surmise the rest — the hurried return to Paris and the impossibility of getting back to Hungary. There followed internment and captivity in the fortress of Noirmoutier that lasted five years and upon which the author has based *Le Monastère Noir*.

KUNCZ'S book is the authentic story of a prisoner who had no other companionship than that of prisoners, and those who prefer their reading to be light and pleasant will do well to avoid *Le Monastère Noir*. But those others who seek in a work of art above all a profound knowledge of humanity will surely feel, as did I and all those to whom I have given this manuscript to read, that they have been given a revelation of another world. In the somber cells of his Black Monastery they will experience a sense of magic, a fullness of spiritual sensations that will at times leave them physically exhausted.

I am well aware that misery and captivity are ordeals from which an artist could draw naturally, without any artifice or trickery, his greatest effects. They preserve him from falling slave to false idols and false attitudes. Kuncz's experience is a crucible in which he is molded anew. Upon the walls of his prison he alone sees the *Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin* that is invisible to others. For examples of this kind of powerful soul-searching we must go back to Dostoevski's *House of Death* and Oscar Wilde's *De Profundis*.

But the case of this Hungarian intellectual, who had been imprisoned together with Austrians, Poles and men of many other races and creeds, is more than just the somber epic of a prisoner whose world is bounded by prison walls. It is also the tragedy of a man who loves his

jailers. If he describes with such a poignant emotion the daily trip to the river to get the water which was a part of his duties, it is because this moment of liberty brings before his eyes again the Mallarméan rose and azure of the French countryside, which was his spiritual *patrie*. So deeply rooted is this affection, that during his captivity we even find Kuncz translating, ironically enough, the *Vacances d'un jeune homme sage*.

Even in condemning the treatment he had had to endure, he shows no trace of hatred. His only reproach for his tormentors is that they had betrayed his ideals of humanity and of France. And although in this story there is as little sentimentally as there is violence, how joyfully this young dilettante tells of a human touch, a furtive gift of a cigarette or a glass of wine, smuggled through with the benevolent complicity of the guard. In a world which has organized and even sanctified hatred—hatred among races and hatred among classes—the author reminds us that charity and a desire for mutual understanding were once inherent in the idea of human dignity. It is pleasant for me to think that in presenting this admirable book to the French public, I am repaying, in some slight measure, France's debt to its author.

#### THE FRENCH ARMY

THE FRENCH WAR MACHINE. By Shelby Cullom Davis. London: Allen and Unwin. 1937.

(G. G. in the *Contemporary Review*, London)

MR. DAVIS is probably right in the importance he attaches to the nature and quality of the French Army. 'If,' he writes, 'there is one thing certain, it is that the fate of the Anglo-Saxon nations is bound up in the fate of the French, and on their fate depends the fate of democracy, liberty, and justice in the world.' It is not Mr. Davis's purpose to argue the case for an Anglo-French entente on diplomatic grounds, still less to argue the



absurd rivalry between a pro-French or a pro-German policy on the part of the British Government. He rather takes it for granted, without elaborating the diplomatic circumstance, that the accident of geography and of other acts of God do make of France a matter of material concern to Great Britain. He has therefore been at pains to sketch the recent history of France from a particular point of view, namely, the relative fighting strength of France and Germany. If the truth were simply told, most of us in our bones believe that the current nightmare of possible war centers around the old antagonism between Germany and France. We equally believe that nothing short of a miracle could keep us out of it. One of the practical questions, therefore, that cannot be dodged in present circumstances is what chance would France have in the military sense in the event of another war with Germany? From that point of view, Mr. Davis's book is wholly commendable. He has taken infinite trouble. He puts the military facts in their political background (for the political cannot be divorced from the military factor in any country) and he spreads his inquiry over the evolution of the past half-century.

The immediately interesting aspect of the book is that the author fully describes the present organization, strength

and morale of the French army. But he assigns a predominant importance to the question of man-power. That unfortunately is one of the indisputable facts of the human jungle we know as 'civilization.' The most important chapter, headed 'A Bid for Babies,' is a consideration of the central mystery of human life from the exclusively cold-blooded aspect of war material. He quotes the German who gave as his advice for the disarmament of Germany: 'Seize the German women, for it is they who manufacture the most redoubtable and most necessary material of war.' He gives a long account of the historic race between the German and the French population and incorporates the frantic tale of the devices that have been adopted in France to make good in that race. The quicker tempo of German fertility and the obstinate fact that the population of Germany exceeds that of France by some fifty per cent is represented by the author—and who shall deny it?—as the very kernel of Europe's diplomatic problems.

Mr. Davis ends with the somewhat half-hearted hope that 'new guns, new machine-guns, new tanks, new airplanes, coupled to a wise production organization, may render France's smaller striking army a more formidable force than Germany's *Millionenbeer*.'

## OUR OWN BOOKSHELF

**FORTY YEARS OF AMERICAN JAPANESE RELATIONS.** By Foster R. Dulles. New York: Appleton-Century Company. 1937. 289 pages. \$3.00.

**JAPAN IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.** By Eleanor Tupper and George E. McReynolds. New York: Macmillan Company. 1937. 465 pages. \$3.75.

**GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK.** By General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1937. 187 pages. \$2.50.

**THE NORTH CHINA PROBLEM.** By Shubsi Hsü. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsb. 1937. 112 pages. \$2.00.

**WHEN CHINA UNITES.** By Harry Gannes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1937. 293 pages. \$2.50.

HERE is a small shelf of books recently published on international relations in the Far East that provides great diversity of treatment. A journalist writes in a straightforward, readable, more or less popular style; two conscientious professors jointly produce a heavy volume of compilation; a national leader and his wife report a historical event of great significance autobiographically; a governmental official, and former professor, offers a semi-official apology for an official policy; and finally, a political worker who is also a newspaper columnist, attempts to write a brief popular history but gives us instead only an undigested account based upon his own political ideology.

The famous American naval historian Mahan long ago expressed the traditional formula of American foreign policy—domination of the Caribbean, isolation from Europe and cooperation in the Far East—and the American advocacy of the Open Door and the integrity of China must be remembered as being the embodiment of the third phase of this policy. Since American policy in China has always called for some sort of cooperation with other Powers, it has always presented problems far more complex than American policy toward Latin America or Europe. Whereas in the beginning America assisted Japan in preventing the European Powers from dismembering China, she has, since the beginning of

the European War, been trying repeatedly to enlist the help of European Powers to stop Japan from dominating China. This is the essence of forty years' history of the Open Door policy, the vicissitudes and failures of which have been so lucidly and ably presented by Mr. Dulles in his new book on the Far East. The author has cleverly organized his book so as to include two chapters—one on European Imperialism and one on Japanese Imperialism—which taken together give a very good explanation of why America has had to alter her attitude toward concerted international action in China. Because of his keen understanding of the traditional American formula, Mr. Dulles is not disturbed by the change and he concludes that it does not imply a complete change of policy. To accuse Mr. Dulles of saying that the Open-Door policy has failed completely is to misunderstand his argument; and it is unfair to charge him with the duty of suggesting 'either how it can be gracefully abandoned or how it can be made effective again.'

The change in America's attitude toward the Far East has been clearly reflected in public opinion, and this is the basis of the study of Eleanor Tupper and George McReynolds. Their book is not so much a history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, interpreted in the light of American public opinion, as it is a survey of American opinions on Japanese diplomatic events compiled from Congressional documents, personal records, public addresses, newspapers and periodicals. Japanese diplomatic events in American public opinion include not only Japan's relations with America in such issues as immigration, the navy and trade, not only her relations with Korea, the Philippines and China, but also the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Siberian intervention and the recent German-Japanese anti-Communist entente. While the authors have shown the real grouping of opinion on the immigration question, they have made no attempt to do the same regarding the general policy toward China, and thus the reader can only get a vague notion that there has been some sort of change in this country from Japanophilism to Japanophobia.

American public opinion, particularly as

presented in the American press, however, has never shown enough mastery of facts to formulate any strong opinion of international affairs in the Pacific. In the words of Professors Tupper and McReynolds, 'from the day, December 13, when Chiang was kidnapped until his return to Nanking on December 26, 1936, the American press clearly indicated how little it really understood Oriental politics. Editors regarded the affair from its beginning to its end as a Chinese puzzle.' This puzzle should have been solved for the American public when they were presented with General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek's own report of the Sian Incident. During the Generalissimo's detention in that famous city, he was never molested or threatened by those who held him and pleaded with him to stop the anti-Communist campaigns which had cost China at least \$300,000,000, and to resist Japanese aggression which, at that time, had already overrun about one-sixth of China. This fact is made clear in *General Chiang Kai-shek*, and the autobiography also reveals how differently the General and his wife reacted in the emergency. Over against Chiang's fiery anger and his insistence that his kidnappers were rebels was the reasonableness of his wife, who made a heroic effort to save his life not only because she was his wife but also for the sake of China's national future. While the well-treated Generalissimo did not seem to mind the threatened punitive expedition or civil war, Madame Chiang from the beginning advocated a peaceful solution in spite of the intimidation to which she was subjected in Nanking. At all events the Sian Incident marks a great stride in the crystallization of Chinese national policy, without which the present active resistance against foreign invasion could not have been possible.

There are many persons in China whose political thinking still lags far behind the spirit of a United Front against foreign aggression. Among them must be numbered Professor Hsü, who is now an officer in the Chinese Government. When he wrote his semi-official brochure several months after Sian, he still blamed the Mongolians and the Chinese Communists for the impotence of Nanking in putting up an active, effective resistance. He shows no understanding of Japanese internal politics, nor has he made any attempt to clarify Chinese internal politics as related to the North China problem.

Mr. Gannes must be regarded as a sympathizer with the Chinese national movement against the present Japanese invasion, but when he set out to write 'An Interpretive History of the Chinese Revolution' under the title *When China Unites*, he ought to have realized that he was attempting a task for which he was not equipped. He says, for instance, that 'on October 10, 1911, a well-organized insurrection was launched at Wu-chang' and ten pages later that General Li Yuan-hung was 'dragged trembling from under his wife's bed to lead the 1911 military actions against the Manchus.' The well-known 19th Route Army is said to have originated in Fukien instead of in Kwangtung, and, somewhat amusingly, Hu Kuo-chun, meaning 'Army for National Defense,' is described by Mr. Gannes as 'a militarist.'

—CHEN HAN-SENG

GERMAN UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM. By Edward Y. Hartsborne. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1937. 184 Pages. \$2.00.

THE calamitous effects of National Socialist ideology on German higher education are traced by Edward Y. Hartsborne, of the Department of Sociology of Harvard University, in this small but highly significant volume. The work is factual, thoroughly documented and free from personal bias. From pages replete with laws, statistics, official correspondence, private letters and press comments emerges a disturbing picture of the new German university which 'in essentials has lost the signs of a free institution.' *Akademische Freiheit*, long a characteristic of the German universities, once the finest in the world, is no more.

During the past four years, the German universities have lost one-fifth of their teaching staff and 30 per cent of their student body. There has been an emigration of scholars 'comparable in magnitude to that occasioned by the Russian Revolution of 1917.' The administration, ideology and socio-political rôle of the universities have changed drastically. The new German student must now undertake a career that is designed to make him a member of the political élite: he must be 'as fleet as a whippet, as sinewy as leather and as hard as Krupp steel.'

The university professor now leads a tragic existence, always uncertain of the duration of his appointment and even of his salary, 'com-

peting with glamorous, quasi-militaristic extra-curricular appeals for the interest of his students; lecturing before rows of brown-shirts, flanked in his seminars and informal discussion groups by zealous young Nazi teachers; in his free time called upon to participate in official functions, and to read official papers and periodicals; harassed by the thought of his banished and often expatriated colleagues and masters; disgusted at the habit of compromise and self-deception practised by others and even forced upon himself; fearful and cynical with regard to the future. He lives 'in a *universitas literarum* which has lost its respect for Letters, a veritable caricature of the old *civitas academica*, in which scholarly seclusiveness is decried as a political sin, and in which the worthy old German "calling" of Science, "*Wissenschaft als Beruf*," has well-nigh lost its meaning.'

Mr. Hartshorne is, however, objective. He lists the following as gains from the transformation: the control of student enrollment, a distinct quieting of the university scene, elimination of academic loafing and the new university sports program. Against these he places the following losses: the draining of scientific man-power, the loading of the university budget with supernumerary pensions, a new burden of self-deception, hypocrisy and compromise, wholesale annihilation of free discussion, prescription of an official dogmatic *Weltanschauung*, politicization of the classroom, and creation by government fiat of uniform study-plans from university to university. 'Germany,' he concludes, 'is rapidly falling into a quagmire of intellectual provincialism.'

Mr. Hartshorne has done a remarkably fine piece of work. To those who are impressed with stories of trains running on time, bread and circuses, drained marshes, *Autobahnen* and 'Fascist order,' his book is strongly recommended as an antidote.

—LOUIS LEO SNYDER

#### A HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

By K. B. Smellie. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. 468 pages. \$4.50.

MR. SMELLIE is scholarly, hard-headed, realistic—sceptical about all the current 'isms.' He makes a careful analysis of the whole development of English political institutions over a century, and discusses current

problems as resultants of that development.

Mr. Smellie's work is truly a magnificent and sustained essay on the modern evolution of the British State. For clarity in presentation it is divided into three periods: 1832-1870, 1870-1914, and post-1918. Each of these in turn has chapters on 'The State and Society,' which explore the prevailing social philosophies and the dominant social issues, economic, religious and educational; on 'Government and Parties,' which discuss questions of franchise and party, explain the various Cabinets, and analyze the changing work of Parliament; and on 'The Machinery of Administration,' which make clear the growth of administrative functions and emphasize the long struggle for adequate personnel and proper departmental planning necessary for their effective performance. The War, which Mr. Smellie appropriately describes as 'The Interregnum,' is treated in one chapter which shows the significant impact of organization for conflict on democratic institutions.

As a not uncritical friend of Imperialism, he sensibly points out that a combination of modern communications and individual adventure and enterprise made it impossible for government, in the interests either of its own or of primitive culture, forever to remain a disinterested spectator. He rejects economic determinism, and stresses the importance of non-economic interests and motivations. Without illusions as to the nobility of vested interests, and indeed emphasizing the long story of their resistance to change, he nevertheless rejects complete nationalization of resources as a solution. He believes that differences between industries in importance, scale and technology create the need for a variety of administrative devices and human abilities and motives for efficient operation with a view to maximum human welfare. A strong defender of the democratic way of life and an enemy of totalitarianism, he yet perceives that the preservation of popular government is no easy task—that increased opportunities for conflict render the task of canalizing the popular will so that it does not ruin the well-being of State and society supremely difficult.

It is scarcely less difficult to create efficient machinery of control and administration, to reconcile political expediency and administrative effectiveness, to devise connections between administrator and subject and to determine the appropriate division of functions



between administrator and technical expert for the service of the community, so that efficiency will not become dangerous or futile by neglect of human objectives or destruction of dynamic inventiveness. Above all, Mr. Smellie believes education is fundamental to the proper working of the modern State, and that England's problems are in no slight degree due to her slowness in developing any decent scheme of popular education and to its inadequacy even today.

Fundamental to all this, and emerging from it, is a more general thesis. A simple world has become complicated and interconnected. As a result, the State, as the basic organ of social well-being, has had to develop from an opponent of private force and a protector of individual activity, run by an undifferentiated group of frequently intelligent amateurs, to an all-embracing organ of direction that serves as a brake on private initiative, run by differentiated experts who must secure a harmonious relationship between themselves and with the public. The modern State is a purposeful ecologist, maintaining a balance with a view to a social well-being that cannot be measured in purely material terms. Such ecology has to be practiced under dynamic conditions, where man's own activities are forever changing the balance. Institutional change tends to lag, and no sooner has one worked out an adjustment, such as the creation of a party system or of cabinet government, than one is confronted with a new situation in which the scheme created by so much effort is almost irrelevant.

These ideas are not new. But Mr. Smellie's presentation of their interrelationships and his thorough illustration of their meaning are. He is concerned with England alone, and as a result the questions present themselves in a special context. But they are questions significant to all democracies, and many of them to all modern governments. To clothe abstractions in flesh, to show the general through the particular, is the most persuasive form of argument, and Mr. Smellie is the more persuasive by reason of his informed common sense. In addition, the book is well-written, full of pungent observations and provocative antitheses, while its author is masterly in his incorporation of effective quotations in the body of his own text.

—THOMAS I. COOK

... AND SPAIN SINGS: FIFTY LOYALIST BALLADS. *Adapted by American Poets. Edited by M. J. Benardete and Rolfe Humphries. New York: The Vanguard Press. 1937. 123 pages. \$1.00.*

AN old alliance between the literary mind of America and the cultural life of Spain, an alliance that has signified much for the sympathies of the American and the Spanish peoples, is finely reasserted in this volume of translations by American poets from a group of Spanish poems and ballads written out of the present struggle for freedom in Spain. They are poems that cannot be read without feeling by anyone who has followed that struggle anxiously and hopefully or has had any inkling of what it symbolizes in the world-wide conflict against reaction and autocracy. Needless to say, this is not a volume in which the introspections and the nostalgias, the negations and the intellectualities of so much contemporary poetry are to be expected or discovered: this verse is the verse of armed struggle and resistance; it is shot through with the contending emotions of popular hatred and popular unity, the anger and the aspiration of the democratic masses; and it abounds in images of terror and suffering.

Some of it is harsh and derisive; much of it is as militant and as exhilarating as the verse of our own Revolution and Civil War, of Freneau and Whitman; some of it, like some of 'Drum-Taps,' is in a vein of austere lament for the fallen and the assassinated. A few of the most distinguished talents in contemporary Spanish literature are represented here along with a group of hitherto obscure and un-literary voices from among the people themselves: the range extends from the spontaneous simplicity of the folk ballad to the complex sensibility of modern European verse. The translations—undertaken in so generous a spirit by the most representative American poets—are almost always adequate and are often far better than that: the best are triumphs of the translator's grindingly difficult art. The book, at the very least, is eloquent of an important thing that is happening to American and, I suppose, to Spanish literature; beyond that, it is a worthy token of the fraternal feeling that flows out from the American to the Spanish people.

—NEWTON ARVIN



## WITH THE ORGANIZATIONS

ALL organizations engaged either in studying, or in influencing, American foreign policy, will find the November number of *International Conciliation*, which deals with 'The World Situation,' of great value for reference. The pamphlet, costing twenty-five cents, can be obtained from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (405 West 117th Street, New York City). It contains the texts of recent official statements of United States policy, especially in regard to the undeclared Sino-Japanese War. President Roosevelt's memorable address at Chicago on October 5th, in which he called for a 'quarantine' against 'lawless' Powers without naming them, is followed by the text of the State Department's announcement of October 6th that 'the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty . . . and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.' Former Secretary Stimson's letter to the *New York Times*, in support of President Roosevelt's position, and two statements of the Japanese Government, in which it disclaims territorial designs in China, are also included.

THE National Council for Prevention of War (532 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.) continues to urge its members and friends to press their Congressmen to demand the invocation of the Neutrality Act against both China and Japan, and stresses that our failure to apply the law works to Japan's advantage. The Council is greatly concerned over two other matters: first, it is fearful of the consequences of permitting the President and the Department of State a free hand in determining American foreign policy, and

would have the war-making power at least firmly vested in Congress; second, it demands that the nation shall be kept fully informed about any commitments which the President may contemplate.

INDIVIDUAL leaders from, but not officially representing, the forty organizations which comprise the National Peace Conference (8 West 40th Street, New York City) have signed a statement approving the participation of the United States in the Nine-Power Parley at Brussels. A part of this significant statement, which emphasizes the need for economic readjustments, follows:—

'It is not enough to condemn resort to war. Nor is it enough to "quarantine" military aggression. Economic and political justice is the only foundation upon which the structure of enduring peace can be built. Concurrent with the convening of the approaching Nine Power Conference, we believe that the United States should initiate steps looking toward economic adjustments to improve the standards of living of all peoples.'

THE Foreign Policy Association (8 West 40th Street, New York City) devoted its first luncheon discussion of the season, on November 13th, to a consideration of 'The Issues Behind the Far Eastern Conflict.' Representative Chinese and Japanese speakers participated. The second luncheon discussion, to be held at the Hotel Astor in New York City on December 4th, will have as its subject 'The Rome-Berlin Axis: Is It a Threat to Peace?' The speakers will be Rudolf Kircher, editor-in-chief of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and Graham Hutton, assistant editor of the *Economist*, well-known lecturer and writer on international affairs. Raymond Leslie Buell, President of the Association, will preside.

## THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

am throws some light on this aspect of Japanese psychology in *Samurai Honor*, the story of Colonel Yuchi's atonement for a cardinal sin against Bushido. [p. 322]

THE writer of 'Reconnaissance in Spain' is one of the few observers who have visited both the Insurgent and Loyalist forces, and is, therefore, unusually qualified to report on their situation and prospects. In our mind he settles once and for all time the question of how Guernica was destroyed. [p. 333]

ALBERT MOUSSET, author of 'Austria in Balance,' is a distinguished editor and authority on European politics. In this concise article he explains the changes that are taking place in Austria's international position, clarifies the domestic situation and ventures a prediction as to the future. [p. 337]

IN 'Rumania at the Crossroads,' Prince Karl Anton Rohan declares that Europe's fate hangs upon decisions that King Carol and his advisers must make within the next few weeks. Prince Rohan is a conservative Austrian political writer, Secretary of the Corporation of Intellectual Unions and founder and former editor of the *Europäische Revue*. [p. 340]

JAMES Scorgie Meston, created Baron Meston for his distinguished service in the Indian Administration, describes the problems confronting the inexperienced Indian Nationalist leaders as the Provincial Governments begin their work. Baron Meston is a National Liberal, an expert on Indian finance and the author of *Nationhood for India*. In his article, 'Looking Forward in India,' he examines sympathetically the task of Mr. Gandhi and his compatriots. [p. 343]

'MISCELLANY' is the section which serves as a repository for interesting but

unclassifiable pieces. The first, 'An Englishman's Credo,' is by Osbert Sitwell, the essayist. [p. 349] The second item, 'On Flattering the Young,' is by the eminent French essayist and anti-Bergsonian, Julien Benda. M. Benda looks with alarm and not a little scorn on the over-emphasis on youth which he calls a characteristic of the dictatorships. [p. 352] 'Berlin Council Session' is the record of a discussion held by the Mayor and Commissioners of Berlin in regard to Jews at bathing resorts. [p. 354] Last is Delys Powell's account of Thomas Day, author of a sometime best-seller, *Sanford and Merton*, the man who set out in all seriousness to 'Search for a Perfect Wife.' [p. 356]

Robert Dell's significant article on French Labor, which we reprinted from the *Contemporary Review* in our November issue, had appeared in an earlier issue of the *Nation*.

### *Towards the Twentieth Century*

by H. V. ROUTH

A history of the literature of the nineteenth century which traces the thought of that period. \$3.50

### *The Old South: Struggles for Democracy*

by WILLIAM E. DODD

A noted historian studies the growth of democratic processes in the colonies. \$3.75

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